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Jose Alfonso Iracheta Carroll 
AIR QUALITY, MOBILITY AND METROPOLITAN POLICY: EMPIRICAL 
EVIDENCE FROM MEXICO CITY, LOS ANGELES AND SAN FRANCISCO 
This research addresses some of the most pressing problems related to metropolitan areas: 
The relationship between road congestion and air pollution. Chapter one develops an impact 
evaluation of the flagship air pollution control program of Mexico City named Hoy No Circula 
-HNC- (No Driving Day). This program regulates the days in which private vehicles can be 
used. It was first implemented in November 1989, then changed in July 2014 from an 
emissions-based to vehicles’ age regulation, and changed again to its original form in July 
2015. This research builds upon past studies by using two difference-in-differences 
specifications, and addressing potential spatial correlation among ambient data, and looks 
at the program’s first implementation, and the two policy changes that have not been subject 
to evaluation. The findings are consistent with the results of past studies for 1989, where 
HNC had a positive impact on air quality right after its implementation, but there was a 
reversion of this effect after about six months due to increments in the size of the vehicle 
fleet and the amount of driving. For the policy change of 2014, the results show extremely 
modest improvements in air quality, close to nonexistent. Finally, the evidence of the 2015 
return to the original rules suggest loses in air quality. 
Chapters two and three address the Induced Travel phenomenon in the metropolitan areas 
of Mexico City (chapter two) and Los Angeles and San Francisco (chapter three). This 
phenomenon portrays the relationship between road capacity, and the use of private 
vehicles, reflecting that additional road capacity tends to induce decisions about increasing 
the amount of driving by shifting hours, routes, transportation modes, distance traveled, or 
making additional trips in the short run; and overall increases in vehicle ownership, 
reallocation of activities, and shifts in urban development patterns in the long run. The main 
 vi 
concern behind Induced Travel is that increments of road capacity may end up reducing the 
overall efficiency of the transit system. This relationship is affected by the availability of 
public transportation, since it is an alternative for vehicle use, and increasing road capacity 
represents an opportunity cost to increasing public transportation capacity. This research 
uses recursive and simultaneous equations systems for a 17-year period (2000-2016), at 
the municipality and metro area levels. The findings show the existence of Induced Travel 
in the three metropolitan areas, and measure the effect size in terms of additional (induced) 
registered vehicles as a consequence of road-related infrastructure investments. 
Chapter four summarizes the policy implications of the three chapters and puts forward a 
set of policy alternatives to address road congestion and driving-related air quality loss in 
Mexico City. The proposal is based on the limitations of current policies, and the 
implementation of more advanced market-based policies in different cities of the world. 
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CHAPTER 1: 
HOY NO CIRCULA: AN IMPACT EVALUATION OF MEXICO CITY'S FLAGSHIP 
AIR POLLUTION CONTROL PROGRAM 
 
Abstract 
The flagship air pollution control program in Mexico City Metro Area (MCMA) named Hoy 
No Circula -HNC- (loosely translated as No Driving Day) regulates the frequency in which 
motor vehicles can be used in the city from Monday to Saturday based on a biannual vehicle-
emissions checkup. Such mandate was first implemented in November 1989, then changed 
in July 2014 from the emissions-based standard to vehicles’ age regulation, and changed 
again to its original form in July 2015. It can be argued that neither of the two policy changes 
responded to shifts in the trends of air pollution concentrations in the city, but rather to 
increased levels of corruption in the emissions checkup centers in 2014, and to judicial 
contentions about the new rules in 2015, making them exogenous policy changes. The goal 
of this paper is to conduct an impact evaluation of HNC on MCMA’s air quality at its three 
most relevant moments in time: its first implementation (1989), and the two policy changes 
(2014 and 2015). Past studies used interrupted time-series to show that the program, when 
first implemented, was relatively ineffective for reducing pollution; however, it substantially 
increased the number of vehicles in the city, offsetting environmental quality improvements. 
While the effects are consistent in the short run, in the longer run they remain elusive. This 
research builds upon those studies by using two difference-in-differences specifications with 
alternative controls, and addressing potential spatial confounders between monitoring 
stations that are inherent to ambient data, thus providing a more robust quasi-experimental 
design. In addition, this research looks at the program’s first implementation, but also at the 
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latest two policy changes that have not been subject to evaluation. For HNC’s first 
implementation, the results show statistically significant decreases in CO and O3 
concentrations in the short run, and increments in the middle/long run. A similar pattern is 
observed for NOX and NO2 in the long run. This evidence supports the findings of past 
studies, where HNC had a positive impact on air quality right after its implementation, but a 
reversion of this effect after about six months due to increments in the size of the vehicle 
fleet and the amount of driving. For the policy change of 2014, the results show extremely 
modest improvements in air quality, close to nonexistent. CO experienced mild increases in 
concentrations, however the opposite is true for NOX, NO2 and O3. Finally, the evidence of 
the 2015 return to the original rules suggests significant loses in air quality. CO, NO2 and O3 
experienced short and long run increments in concentrations, however this was not the case 
for NOX. 
1. Introduction 
The flagship air pollution control program in Mexico City Metro Area (MCMA) named Hoy 
No Circula (-HNC- loosely translated as No Driving Day) regulates the frequency in which 
most motor vehicles1 can be used in the city on weekdays based on a biannual vehicle-
emissions checkup. HNC was first implemented on November 20, 1989, and then faced two 
likely exogenous substantive policy changes on July 1st, 2014, and then a little over one year 
afterwards, on July 9, 2015. The goal of this research is to identify the impact that 
implementing, and then reforming HNC, had on air quality and on the size of the vehicle fleet 
in MCMA. 
 
1 Exempt vehicles are: Emergency vehicles, motorcycles, school transportation, funeral service 
vehicles, intercity bus services, vehicles that do not use fossil fuels, vehicles used by the disabled, 
and approved vintage/classic vehicles. 
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HNC was implemented in 1989 as an emergency measure for reducing extreme pollution 
concentrations caused by the phenomenon of thermal inversion, which regularly occurs in 
Mexico City during the winter season. Data from the short-term period at the time showed 
reductions in several pollutants presumably related to the program. Reinforced by the 
public’s warm welcome, policy makers decided to make HNC a permanent program, thus 
becoming the most important air pollution control policy in MCMA. 
Before HNC, several cities around the world had implemented similar policies, such as Día 
de Parada (Stay Put Day) in Caracas, Venezuela in 1979, Dactylios (Drive Around) in 
downtown Athens, Greece in 1982, and Restricción Vehicular (Vehicle Restriction) in 
Santiago, Chile in 1986. Since then, more and more cities around the world have adopted 
similar driving restriction policies, such as Beijing, Bogota, Lima, London, or Paris. Their aim 
is to reduce vehicle usage by raising its costs, either at the city level or in specific zones, 
which in turn should reduce emissions, traffic congestion, or both. 
When first implemented, Mexico City’s HNC worked as follows: Every private motor vehicle 
registered in the Federal District (currently known as Mexico City) and in the State of Mexico2 
was required to undergo an engine check-up (verificación vehicular) twice a year. Each 
check-up had to be performed at specifically designated facilities within a two-month 
predefined period that depended on the last number of the vehicle’s license plate. The 
check-up used an index that included measures of hydrocarbons, NO ppm emissions, CO, 
O2, and their diluted percent volume in the overall emissions. The resulting index value was 
then compared to a standard based on the vehicle’s model year. Depending on the relative 
engine performance, the vehicle would receive a zero-, one- or two-day usage restriction. 
 
2 The State of Mexico surrounds the Federal District on its north, east and west portions. In 1990, the 
Metropolitan Area of the Valley of Mexico (Greater Mexico City Metropolitan Area) had 15.5 million 
inhabitants, out of whom 52.9% lived in the Federal District, 47.1% lived in the State of Mexico, and 
0.01% in (the state of) Hidalgo. (CONAPO, 2010) 
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After the check-up, a hologram sticker was put on the vehicle with a printed zero, one, or 
two, corresponding to the number of days the vehicle would face the restriction. The 
applicable days depended on the last number of the vehicle’s license plate, which was 
coupled with an identification color sticker. For example, license plates ending in five or six 
(yellow sticker) were restricted on Mondays, nine or zero (blue sticker) on Fridays, and so 
on. Weekends were free of restriction. 
As mentioned, the program was originally designed to be an emergency measure to address 
the extreme pollution concentration at the time. However, when the program became 
permanent, it had several unintended consequences. Most authors agree that the most 
important one was that a few months after the HNC’s implementation, households made 
calculations on the additional costs induced by the driving restrictions and adjusted 
accordingly, in many cases by acquiring additional vehicles. These additional vehicles were 
mostly older vehicles imported from other states, with lower expected fuel efficiency. 
(Cantillo & Ortúzar, 2014; Davis, 2008; Eskeland & Feyzioglu, 1997; Gallego, Montero, & 
Salas, 2013) 
Therefore, the claim is that the presumed benefits of the program in the period right after its 
implementation (lower air-pollution concentrations due to fewer and more fuel-efficient 
vehicles), were offset in the middle and long run. Furthermore, it is possible that the number 
of trips made by members of households that acquired additional vehicles increased, since 
the number of unrestricted vehicle-days went up, even if all vehicles had a two-day 
restriction. Hence, it is possible that these additional trips offset the number of avoided trips 
due to the restriction, even to the point of having a net increment in trips, traffic congestion, 
and pollution emissions. 
Twenty-five years after HNC was implemented, in July 1st, 2014, the program was changed, 
shifting from emissions-based regulation to a policy based on the vehicles’ age. The new 
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rule stated that vehicles of up to eight years of age would face no restriction, and vehicles 
from nine to 15 years old would have a one-day restriction on weekdays, in addition to two 
Saturdays a month. Vehicles of 16 years old and older would face this same restriction as 
long as they met the standard’s emissions limit, otherwise facing a one-day restriction on 
weekdays, in addition to all Saturdays. 
It can be argued that this policy change did not respond to shifts in the trends of air pollution 
concentrations in the city, but rather to increased levels of corruption at engine check-up 
centers, where vehicle owners would pay bribes to obtain hologram stickers that allowed 
them to use their vehicles daily, instead of being forced to stay put up to two days per week. 
The new rule only lasted for a little over a year, since many vehicle owners claimed that their 
older, however well-maintained automobiles met the emissions standards, contending there 
was no legitimate justification for restricting their use. 
These contentions reached the Supreme Court of Justice, which ruled in favor of vehicle 
owners in early July 2015. Even though the Supreme Court’s ruling applied only to those 
who filed the contentions, the environmental authorities of the Federal District, the State of 
Mexico, and the neighboring states of Hidalgo, Morelos, Puebla, and Tlaxcala decided to go 
back to the previous emissions-based program on July 9, 2015. Thus, it is fair to assume 
that both policy changes were exogenous, providing the opportunity for undertaking an 
impact evaluation of the effects of the policy changes on air pollution emissions and trips in 
MCMA. 
2. Literature Review 
Road-based transport has several negative effects (negative externalities), mainly in the 
form of pollution emissions and road congestion, that have been widely researched 
especially for the United States, but also for many developed countries. (Rothengatter, 
1994) In the case of Mexico, there are only a few such studies that suggest that this field of 
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research is still on its early stages, nonetheless they show that the air quality loss problem 
occurring in all major Mexican cities, coupled with increasing road congestion is becoming 
a relevant issue in the research agenda. (Guzmán, Yúnez-Naude, & Wionczek, 1985; Parry 
& Timilsina, 2010) Cravioto, Yamasue, Okumura, and Ishihara (2013) measure overall road 
transport negative externalities for Mexico (at the country level) using seven categories: a) 
air pollution, b) greenhouse gases, c) noise, d) accidents, e) congestion, f) infrastructure and 
g) other externalities. They found that the total costs of road transport negative externalities 
amount to an average of US$59.4 billion per year, or 6.2% of the nominal GDP (for 2006). 
In order to cope with these negative externalities, several approaches have been put in 
practice in different cities of the world. Some of the most salient are the congestion charges, 
which have been mostly studied in London, Singapore and Stockholm. (Albalate & Bel, 
2009) These measures have proved to be relatively successful, despite the fact that they 
have faced relevant obstacles, mainly in the form of public acceptance and because of 
concerns related to social equity and the distribution of the costs of these measures. 
(Quigley & Hårsman, 2010; Santos, Fraser, & Newbery, 2006; Thomson, 1998) Another set 
of instruments that have been widely studied from a theoretical perspective, however have 
not yet been implemented in any city, are the so-called tradable driving permit programs, 
which are analogous to the cap-and-trade systems for point source pollution emissions 
control. (Dogterom, Ettema, & Dijst, 2017; Goddard, 1997; Grant-Muller & Xu, 2014) These 
tradable driving permit programs have the potential, at least in theory, to transform the way 
in which mobile-source pollution and road congestion in cities are managed, but there is still 
no city that has moved toward implementing such a system, thus there is no empirical 
evidence about its actual ability to internalize these negative externalities, and about its 
effects over controlling air pollution and road congestion problems. 
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The third policy approach to tackle these problems, is to enforce driving restrictions based 
not on economic incentives, but rather on direct vehicle use restrictions on specific days, 
times and areas of the city, such as the HNC. These programs have been implemented in 
many cities of the world, since they are relatively simpler to implement by relying on direct 
enforcement by the transportation authorities. These programs have been found generally 
ineffective or with limited positive effects, coupled with side effects, such as the increase in 
the vehicle fleet as was observed in Mexico City. The observed effects for the case of the 
Dactylios program in Athens, which is one of the early vehicle restriction programs, were of 
reducing road congestion within the controlled area, but with an opposite effect  for the area 
outside the restriction zone, where road congestion substantially increased. (Matsoukis, 
1985) Studies have found that the Pico y Placa programs in Bogota and Medellin, Colombia 
had a mild positive effect in the short run in terms of reducing pollution emissions, however, 
these emissions returned over time to levels similar to when the programs were 
implemented. However, in both cities there was an observed increment in the vehicle fleet 
size. (Camargo Diaz, 2017; Posada Henao, Farbiarz Castro, & Gonzalez Calderon, 2011; 
Ramos, Cantillo, Arellana, & Sarmiento, 2017) Opposite to what was observed in Colombia, 
in Quito, Ecuador, the Pico y Placa program had a positive effect on air quality, without the 
commonly associated road congestion side effects. (Carrillo, Malik, & Yoo, 2016). 
For the case of Mexico City, several assessments about the effects of HNC have been 
developed in the past. Most of them are observational or correlational studies that lack the 
ability to provide causal evidence of the impacts of the program. However, three of them use 
quasi-experimental methods, reaching conclusions that reflect stronger evidence than the 
former type of studies. Nonetheless, there are methodological concerns that might affect 
their findings. Eskeland and Feyzioglu (1997) look at the effects of HNC on fuel consumption 
and vehicle ownership by developing two formal models. The first model shapes the 
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gasoline demand function. The second focuses on behavioral change based on household 
characteristics suggesting expected responses to the vehicle usage restrictions, such as 
shifting to different transportation means or acquiring additional vehicles. Using data prior to 
the first implementation in 1989, Eskeland and Feyzioglu estimate the values for fuel 
consumption and vehicle usage for the post implementation period. These predicted values 
are then used as counterfactual to the observed values, where the differences reflect the 
causal effects of the program. Regardless of the relative strength of their models, the fact 
that they do not have actual empirical data to use as a counterfactual, but rather the 
estimated values of their models, makes their findings contestable. 
Davis (2008) and Gallego et al. (2013) use interrupted time-series, which is the simplest 
type of regression discontinuity design (RDD), (Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 2002) to look 
at the effects of HNC on pollution emissions, and on the size of the vehicle fleet. In both 
studies, no running (or forcing) variable that randomly assigns treatment and control groups 
on either side of the cut point is present, other than time. The basic idea in this design is 
that, for a short period of time, right before and after the implementation of HNC, nothing 
changed in the conditions affecting pollution concentrations, except the implementation of 
the policy. Thus, comparing the outcome variable on both periods should provide a measure 
of the causal effects of the program. 
For an RDD, a key internal validity assumption is that the control and treatment groups are 
equal in expectations, and this is only plausible over a narrow window around the cut point. 
(Murnane & Willett, 2010) Since an interrupted time-series uses time as the cut point, the 
equality of expectations assumption will be plausibly met at relatively short periods of time 
before and after implementation of the policy only. In practical terms, the equality of 
expectations assumption for an interrupted time-series means that the more time passes by, 
the greater the chances that conditions, other than the implementation of the policy, will 
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change, therefore challenging any claim of causal effects. In other words, in both studies 
only those effects observed in the short-term (local average treatment effects) would 
plausibly be meeting the equality in expectations assumption. 
However, even the findings for a short-time window around the policy implementation may 
be challenged by the fact that pollution concentrations follow a seasonal trend, although the 
intensity of the cycle varies for each pollutant. Most of them reach the peak during the winter, 
and the lowest point is reached during the summer months as shown in Figure 1 for CO and 
NO2 (O3 follows the opposite pattern). 
Figure 1. CO and NO2 maximum concentrations 1988-1989 
 
Source: Iracheta, J.A. using MCMA’s Automatic Network of Atmospheric Monitoring data.  
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It is plausible to consider that some of the variation in pollution concentrations responds to 
a seasonal change, rather than to the actual policy. Furthermore, the most important 
unintended consequence of HNC (many households acquiring additional vehicles, which in 
turn increased the size of the vehicle fleet that potentially offset the emissions reductions), 
may not be captured under those designs. It is likely that such adjustment by households 
took place over a longer period of time, since acquiring a vehicle implies an unusually large 
expense. Therefore, it is reasonable to consider that a simple interrupted time-series design 
will not be able to capture these unintended, yet causally related effects, since they 
happened outside the window where the equality in expectations assumption was likely met. 
Because of the previous arguments, the research design in these three studies limits the 
validity of their findings even though they are relatively consistent. A more robust design 
would include a counterfactual that accounts for variations on the secular trend (i.e. the 
seasonal nature of pollution concentrations over time) as well as for other potential changes 
in the conditions that affect pollution concentrations but are not related to the implementation 
of the policy. A difference-in-differences would be such a design, and in addition would allow 
to better control variations in the outcome variable within a broader time window. This would 
allow capturing the immediate effects of the policy, as well as those that presumably took 
place when households acquired additional vehicles to adjust to the policy. 
Another methodological concern with the existing research is that spatial data, such as 
pollution concentration, is likely to be correlated with observations from neighboring 
geographical units. Since emissions flow from one location to the next, such correlations 
may be biasing the results. Such a feature of ambient data is usually addressed by including 
variables controlling for geographic proximity between stations; however, none of the 
existing studies considers this potential confounder. A widely accepted method for testing 
the existence of spatial correlation is using Moran’s I statistical test. (Ward & Gleditsch, 
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2008) For the case of air quality monitoring stations, a good way for running this test is 
building a standardized inverse Euclidean distance matrix, that is then used for weighting 
the correlation between stations. (Pisati, 2016) There is strong evidence of the existence of 
spatial correlation between monitoring stations in Mexico City, both in 1989 and 2014: 
Table 1. Moran’s I test of no spatial correlation 
November 1989 
Pollutant Time period Type of weight matrix Matrix size 
Mondays 
(p-value) 
Fridays 
(p-value) 
CO max 8 hrs. 
November 1989 
Distance-based 
(inverse distance) 
8x8 0.365 0.047 
NOX max day 5x5 0.181 0.051 
 
June-July 2014 
Pollutant Time period Type of weight matrix Matrix size 
Mondays 
(p-value) 
Fridays 
(p-value) 
CO max 8 hrs. 
June-July 2014 
Distance-based 
(inverse distance) 
20x20 0.014 0.007 
NOX max day 26x26 0.000 0.000 
Source: Iracheta, J.A. using MCMA’s Automatic Network of Atmospheric Monitoring data. 
The results of the Moran’s I test present evidence to assert that measurements of ambient 
pollution concentrations in MCMA are correlated between neighboring monitoring stations, 
and such a feature should be included in all models that use their data. Such evidence is 
very strong for 2014, however it is not as much for 1989, but when running the test for every 
day of the week, its value increases (therefore reducing the p-value) as it approaches Friday. 
This research intends to build upon past studies to improve the understanding of the HNC 
impacts on Mexico City’s air quality. 
3. Data and Methods 
a) Data 
This paper uses historical data for CO, NOX, NO2 and O3 emissions as outcome variables. 
The data were obtained from Mexico City’s Automatic Network of Atmospheric Monitoring 
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(RAMA for its Spanish acronym), where each station reports hourly measurements of those 
pollutants (however not all stations measure all pollutants). PM10 and PM2.5 were not 
considered in the analysis since these pollutants are strongly dependent on other 
environmental factors, rather than on vehicle’s emissions. The RAMA network started 
working in 1986 with 11 stations and, together with three other networks, the monitoring 
capacity has substantially increased to 56 stations as of 2017. In 1989, only 15 stations were 
in place and reporting pollution measurements, and for 2015, between 21 and 36 stations 
reported data depending on the compound. The hourly measurements were transformed to 
daily measurements based on the Mexican standards for ambient pollution concentrations. 
The transformations used the maximum eight-hour mean concentration per day for CO, 
(Salud, 1993a) the maximum daily value for NOX, for NO2, (Salud, 1993b) and for O3. (Salud, 
2014) 
Map 1. Mexico City Metro Area air quality monitoring stations 
 
Source: Iracheta, J.A. using MCMA’s Automatic Network of Atmospheric Monitoring 
website, monitoring stations location. 
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There are additional variables, such as those related to weather conditions, as well as 
economic activity, that are expected to affect pollution concentrations in Mexico City, and 
therefore they should be controlled for in order to limit the effect that confounding factors 
might have on the models. As for weather conditions, wind and rain serve for dispersing the 
pollutants, therefore having a positive effect on air quality. Higher temperature tends to have 
a negative effect on air quality since it may favor the generation of photochemical smog and 
ozone. All models use three-hour measurements for maximum and minimum temperatures, 
wind speed during pollution peak hours, and maximum daily levels of rain in Mexico City. 
These variables were provided by the Mexican National Meteorological Service. 
Economic activity may also have an effect over pollution concentrations. When economic 
activity is more dynamic, everything else constant, one would expect to observe higher 
levels of pollution concentrations due to presumably higher number of trips of all kinds taking 
place in the city, higher levels of production output and of production and delivery of all kind 
of services. Therefore, since it is expected that economic activity would have an effect on 
pollution emissions, however unrelated to HNC, it might be a confounder, thus it should be 
controlled for within the models. Several sources were used to include variations on 
economic activity, depending on their availability. Given the lack of daily or weekly 
information for 1989 about economic activity or economic output, the best available proxy 
was the daily close values of the Dow Jones Index, and starting in 1988, the Mexican Stock 
Exchange (MexBol) index. For 2014 and 2015, the biweekly Mexican National Index of 
Consumer Prices (INPC for its Spanish acronym), and the daily MexBol index were used, in 
addition to the monthly index of industrial activity by sector for Mexico City (IMAI for its 
Spanish acronym). In the case of the INPC, the expected effect depends on its changes 
relative to past periods, where higher inflation would reduce consumption and economic 
activity, and relatively lower inflation would increase both. Finally, for controlling for spatial 
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correlation, a matrix of standardized inverse Euclidean distances between monitoring 
stations was used, where smaller distances reflect higher values. 
b) Methods 
All models use a Difference-in-Differences research design (DID), considering alternative 
specifications with two different control groups that are intended to estimate the impact of 
HNC on pollution emissions. To estimate the dimension of the impacts of HNC, the DID 
research design estimates the expected value of the outcome variable before and after the 
implementation of the program, taking the difference between both periods, and then 
subtracting the difference observed in the control variable for the same pre and post periods. 
The remaining difference (the difference in the outcome variable minus the difference in the 
control variable) provides the net causal effect of the program. The general functional form 
is the following: 
𝑌! = 𝛽" + 𝛽#(𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡!) + 𝛽$(𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡!) + 𝛽%(𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡! ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡!) + 𝑋!𝛽 + 𝜖! 
Where 𝑌! is the outcome variable, 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡! is a dummy for the treatment group, 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡! is a 
dummy for the post implementation period, and (𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡! ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡!) is an interaction term of the 
two dummies, where 𝛽% represents the policy effect (net impact). 𝑋!𝛽 is a vector of covariates 
that includes variables for weather conditions, economic activity and an index of the inverse 
Euclidean distance between monitoring stations; and 𝜖! is the error term. The purpose of 
using two different specifications for measuring the impact of HNC on pollution 
concentrations is to reduce the potential bias inherent to the limitations of each DID design 
given the availability of data, in particular for 1989. Under such conditions, none of the 
possible counterfactuals is ideal, and each of them faces particular restrictions, however 
considering the overall relative consistency and convergence of the findings, the likeliness 
of obtaining biased results is minimized. As such, this paper is able to provide stronger 
evidence about the effects of the HNC on MCMA’s air quality. Since the two specifications 
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are intended to measure the environmental impact of HNC, pollution emissions are the 
outcome variable. 
To understand the structure of the first DID specification it is best to allow some level of 
abstraction. One can assume that there is an identical city to Mexico City that shares the 
same geographic and weather conditions with the same seasonality, as well as other 
relevant characteristics, such as population, economic activity and productive plant. If such 
city existed, it would be an ideal candidate to use as counterfactual for comparing the 
changes in pollution concentrations resulting from the implementation of HNC. Such city is 
Mexico City itself, but looking at it in previous time periods. In particular, one can look at the 
same corresponding days of the year in which the HNC program was implemented, but one 
and two years before. It should be evident that the vast majority of conditions would be the 
same, except for those changes that occurred during the last year. Of special interest would 
be those changes that might affect pollution emissions, such as changes in economic and/or 
industrial activity. 
Figure 2: DID using data from prior years as control (specification one) 
 
Source: Iracheta, J.A. 
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Unavailability of economic or industrial activity data for 1989 (other than yearly 
measurements for Mexico City, or three-month GDP at the national level) raised the question 
of whether having relevant information that may affect pollution was being excluded from 
the models, thus biasing the results. In 1988, the General Law of Ecological Equilibrium and 
Environmental Protection (LGEEPA by its Spanish acronym) was promulgated, considering 
several actions to improve air quality in Mexico City. Some of those actions involved 
reducing lead content in gasoline fuels, gradually substituting fuel oil with natural gas in the 
main Mexico City’s power plant, as well as relocating highly polluting industries out of the 
city. (Molina & Molina, 2002) Most of these actions started taking place on the early years 
of the 1990s under the Comprehensive Program for Air Pollution in MCMA (PICCA by its 
Spanish acronym). (Molina & Molina, 2002) One of the most significant actions was the 
shutdown of the Ascapotzalco-18 de Marzo oil refinery, located in northern Mexico City, in 
March 18, 1991, which was the facility with the worst air pollution record. Other industrial 
facilities were also moved out of the city during this period; however most of these actions 
took place at least one year after the period of implementation of HNC. Therefore, it is fair 
to assume that no major changes over factors affecting air pollution occurred in the two-year 
period prior to the program’s implementation, making this specification viable. 
Nonetheless, it is likely that some unobserved factors that are consequence of PICCA and 
that have a positive effect on Mexico City’s pollution concentrations, such as early relocation 
of minor polluting facilities or marginal increments in the substitution of gasoline fuels by 
natural gas, will remain uncontrolled for. Thus, it is reasonable to expect some degree of 
positive bias in the results, i.e. an overestimation of the effects of HNC. That being said, it is 
also reasonable to expect that the degree of such bias will be relatively low, and will not 
substantially affect the outcome. 
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The second DID specification uses Sundays’ concentrations as counterfactual. Since HNC 
in its original design did not impose driving restrictions on weekends (later on, some level of 
restriction was imposed on Saturdays), one would be able to use changes in pollution 
concentrations during these days as control for the changes occurring on weekdays. The 
data for 1989 show a consistently different pattern in pollution concentrations on Sundays 
when compared to weekdays. This difference is particularly clear for CO and NO2, however 
it is not so much for O3. 
Figure 3. DID using Sundays’ concentrations as control (specification two) 
 
Source: Iracheta, J.A. 
Median life of pollution concentrations is usually longer than 24 hours; therefore, it is likely 
that some proportion of the concentration observed over the weekend remains as residual 
from Fridays, or even Thursdays, conceivably generating some bias. By using Sundays only, 
such potential for bias is reduced; however, it is likely that some of it would remain.  
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Figure 4. MCMA CO, NO2 and O3 mean daily and hourly concentrations 
 
 
 
Source: Iracheta, J.A. using MCMA’s Automatic Network of Atmospheric Monitoring data. 
 
Finally, in order to assess the compliance of the parallel trend assumption that is required 
for a consistent DID research design, visual tests of the performance of all pollutants at the 
three time periods (1989, 2014, and 2015) were performed and the assumption was met. 
 
 19 
Figure 5. CO and NOX parallel trend assumption visual test 1988-1989 
 
 
Note: Lighter dotted lines show the control groups, whereas darker dotted lines show the 
treatment groups. 
Source: Iracheta, J.A. using MCMA’s Automatic Network of Atmospheric Monitoring data. 
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4. Results and Discussion 
This section begins by discussing the impacts of HNC on CO, NOX, NO2 and O3 emissions 
at the program’s first implementation in 1989, then moves on to the 2014 policy change, and 
finally discusses the 2015 return to the prior rules of HNC. The analysis for each pollutant 
and DID specification uses, in the first place, the pooled overall daily mean and maximum 
values for all stations with available data controlling for spatial correlation and, in the second 
place, the maximum concentrations for each individual station. Also, the results are 
differentiated for the short- and middle-run (three to six months, and six to 24 months), since 
it is likely to find different, and even opposite directions for the effects depending on the time 
span. Recall that most literature indicates that a relevant indirect effect of HNC was to 
increase the size of the vehicle fleet in the city a few months after the enforcement began, 
which conceivably offset the reduction in pollution concentrations occurring right after the 
program’s implementation. Such an effect should be observable in a period between three 
months and one year, which is enough time for households to adjust to the policy and 
acquire additional vehicles. While this adjustment has been widely discussed in the literature 
for the first implementation, there is no evidence available for the 2014 and 2015 policy 
changes. To make comparisons and interpretations straightforward, all regression 
coefficients for all models are presented in standard deviation units. 
a) HNC 1989 First Implementation 
We first take a look at the results for specification one, in which the previous years’ pollution 
concentrations are used as control, considering pooled data with all observations from all 
available monitoring stations. This specification allows to run tests for as much as the 
equivalent of six months’ time (125 days, excluding weekends) because after that, there is 
an overlap of the daily observations, therefore affecting the results. The summary of results 
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for all specifications, pollutants and time periods are presented on tables 2 and 3. The 
complete tables with all relevant results can be found in Appendix 1. 
When looking at the maximum, as well as the mean daily concentrations for CO, the HNC’s 
impact follows the expected direction of the effect in the short and middle run. This means 
that there is a short-term reduction in both mean daily and maximum concentrations across 
Mexico City (60 days excluding weekends or three months approximately), and then there 
is a reversion of this effect, observed in the middle run (125 days, excluding weekends or 
six months approximately). The case of NOX in the short and middle run is different since 
there is a significant decrease in concentrations for both mean daily values and maximum 
concentrations during the first 60 days after implementing HNC, but there are no significant 
effects for the 125-day period. With the exception of the 125-day test for NOX, these results 
are consistent with what other studies have found, and with what is expected, especially 
since CO and NOX are the two pollutants closest related to mobile sources, therefore, most 
affected by HNC. 
Table 2. MCMA 1989. Impacts summary (mean daily concentrations) 
1989 Pooled data for all monitoring stations using pollution mean daily concentrations 
Pollutant CO NOX NO2 O3 
Design D1 D2 D1 D2 D1 D2 D1 D2 
Control Previous Years Sunday 
Previous 
Years Sunday 
Previous 
Years Sunday 
Previous 
Years Sunday 
60 Days -0.070*** -0.018 -0.137*** -0.025 -0.214*** -0.092 0.109*** 0.019 
125 Days 0.036** 0.000 -0.035 0.037 -0.265*** -0.069 0.193*** 0.031 
250-260 
Days  -0.010  -0.007  -0.098**  0.024 
500-520 
Days  -0.028  -0.020  -0.093***  0.017 
* p-val<0.1; ** p-val<0.05; *** p-val<0.01 
Source: Iracheta, J.A. using MCMA’s Automatic Network of Atmospheric Monitoring data. 
Note: For comparison purposes, standardized coefficients are used.  
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Table 3. MCMA 1989. Impacts summary (maximum daily concentrations) 
1989 Pooled data for all monitoring stations using pollution maximum daily concentrations 
Pollutant CO NOX NO2 O3 
Design D1 D2 D1 D2 D1 D2 D1 D2 
Control Previous Years Sunday 
Previous 
Years Sunday 
Previous 
Years Sunday 
Previous 
Years Sunday 
60 Days -0.050** -0.048 -0.079* 0.060 -0.168*** 0.065 0.128*** -0.017 
125 Days 0.031** -0.003 0.018 0.144** -0.156*** 0.064 0.238*** -0.027 
250-260 
Days  -0.029  -0.030  -0.062  -0.027 
500-520 
Days  -0.059***  -0.052  -0.080**  -0.037 
* p-val<0.1; ** p-val<0.05; *** p-val<0.01 
Source: Iracheta, J.A. using MCMA’s Automatic Network of Atmospheric Monitoring data. 
Note: For comparison purposes, standardized coefficients are used. 
For the case of NO2, there is a strong and significant reduction in maximum and mean daily 
concentrations both on the short and middle run; however, the opposite effects are true for 
O3, since there is an even stronger increment for the maximum and daily mean 
concentrations in the short and middle run. Note that on all cases the direction of the impacts 
is consistent between mean daily values and maximum concentrations, where maximum 
concentrations have an overall smaller impact size. All models include the standardized 
inverse Euclidean distance matrix in order to control for spatial correlation, as well as several 
control variables for weather conditions and economic activity. 
The findings from specification two are inconclusive. This design utilizes Sundays’ 
concentrations as counterfactual for testing the values observed during the weekdays. The 
data available for this specification allows for testing CO, NOX, NO2 and O3 for 60-, 125-, 
250- and 500-day periods. Unfortunately, almost no effect is statistically significant, with the 
exception of a positive, however small reduction in NO2 concentrations in the long run. 
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Therefore, it is not possible to make any claim besides the seemingly positive long run NO2 
positive effect on air quality. 
After looking at both specifications’ results for estimating the impact of HNC on air quality, 
as measured by CO, NOX, NO2 and O3 maximum and mean daily concentrations for different 
time periods, it is possible to draw some conclusions. In the first place, CO, which is the 
pollutant that is emitted the most by mobile sources, shows the expected behavior under 
specification one, i.e. there is a reduction in its concentration over a short period after the 
Hoy No Circula was implemented, and a reversion of this effect in the middle run, in the form 
of statistically significant increments in CO concentrations, both for mean daily values as 
well as for maximum values. Such effect can be explained by the broadly discussed increase 
in the size of the vehicle fleet in the city, in which families acquired additional (mostly older) 
vehicles as a way to overcome the imposed driving restrictions. 
The case for NOX and NO2 is different. While there is a convergence on the effect sign under 
both specifications, only under specification one there are statistically significant reductions 
for both compounds in the short run. In the long run, there are statistically significant 
reductions of NO2 concentrations under specification two as a result of the implementation 
of HNC. These reductions tend to be smaller in size for NOX than for NO2, but there is, 
nonetheless, a positive impact of HNC on these pollutants’ concentrations. 
Finally, the impacts of HNC on O3 concentrations are consistent across time periods. There 
is an observed increment in concentrations for the short and middle run, for mean daily 
values as well as for maximum concentrations. These effects are only observed under 
specification one, since the results are not statistically significant under specification two 
(most likely due to the relatively small variation in concentrations across week-days and 
Sundays), nonetheless there is still evidence that the program was ineffective, and even 
counterproductive to reducing ozone pollution. 
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So far, the impacts of HNC on air quality have been analyzed assuming that Mexico City is 
a homogeneous entity, with no differences between areas of the city. However, this could 
not be farther from the truth and, in fact, the available data points at relevant differences in 
air quality depending on the location of the monitoring stations. Therefore, the next section 
analyses the differentiated impacts of HNC on pollution concentrations by area of the city 
using data at the monitoring station level. Even though these measurements are taken at 
specific points, each monitoring station is considered to reflect the conditions of its area of 
influence. The extent of such area will depend on various factors that are usually not 
homogeneous across geographical regions. For the purposes of presenting the estimated 
impacts on air quality, this study uses an area of 5 km. radius around the monitoring stations. 
It is important to keep in mind that these models do not include any spatial correlation control 
variable since each one considers data at its specific monitoring station only. Only selected 
maps are used to support the analysis, but the complete set is available in Appendix 2. 
The results for CO show a consistent pattern. There is an overall reduction in maximum 
concentrations in the central parts of the city for the 60- and 125-day periods; however, there 
are strong increments in the periphery, particularly in the northern areas. These results are 
consistent with the direction of the prevailing winds in Mexico City, which flow mainly to the 
north, north-west and west. The differences between the short and middle run are 
particularly clear for specification one, where one can observe dramatic increments in 
pollution in the north part of the city. This is also reflected in specification two, but with a 
lesser magnitude. When looking at longer periods of time, there is a clear pattern of air 
quality loss as time goes by. For the 125-day period, both designs show increments in CO 
maximum concentrations covering larger areas of the city, but particularly in the north. 
Map 2 shows, on the left side, the impacts of HNC in the short run (60-day period), and the 
middle run impacts on the right side (125-day period). The top maps correspond to 
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specification one (previous years’ data as control) and the bottom maps correspond to 
specification two (Sundays concentrations as control). Each circle is a buffer representing 
the area that is captured by each monitoring station and the buffer’s color represent changes 
in concentration. The greener the buffer, the larger is the reduction in concentrations (i.e. 
better air quality), whereas more orange/red buffers represent larger increments in 
concentrations (i.e. worse air quality). Note that only statistically significant impacts are 
shown in the maps, therefore there are some stations for which the impacts were measured, 
but they are not depicted in the maps if the results were not statistically significant. 
There is a consistent general increment in maximum NOX concentrations for the two 
specifications, and for the 60- and 125-day periods, which contrasts with the findings using 
the pooled data. This is not to say that the entire city suffered from higher concentrations of 
NOX as a result of the implementation of HNC, but rather that the general trend is one of 
lower air quality, even though some areas of the city experienced improvements. 
Similar results are observed for NO2 and O3. The former shows improvements in air quality 
in the center and north of the city that remain when going from the 60- to the 125-day period; 
however, strong increments in maximum concentrations of NO2 taking place in the south 
side of the city, and they get worse as time goes by. For O3 there is a strong reduction in air 
quality almost in the entire city, which is broadly consistent with what was found when 
looking at the impacts using pooled data. Furthermore, when we move from 60 to 125 days, 
the negative impacts of HNC are even stronger. These findings are presented on maps 3 
and 4. 
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In conclusion, the evidence shows that the Hoy No Circula program was highly ineffective 
in 1989 for dealing with Mexico City’s air quality problem. Furthermore, the evidence points 
out that, even though at first it had some mixed results, favoring improvements in air quality, 
they were reversed in the middle run. This coincides with the reaction of families living in 
Mexico City that acquired additional vehicles when the program became permanent, 
eventually offsetting the gains in air quality and even reversing those effects. It is of special 
interest the findings regarding concentrations of CO and O3. In both cases, HNC had a 
perverse effect by increasing the levels of mean daily and maximum values in the medium 
and long run (from six to 24 months after the program’s implementation). Furthermore, these 
effects took place in most of the city (even though some areas experienced improvements 
in air quality). For NOX and NO2 there are some mixed impacts, and it is not possible to 
make uncontroverted assertions. Nonetheless, the evidence points at reductions in air 
quality in the long run, with more variation than the one observed for CO and O3. 
The evidence presented here supports the findings of past studies and provides a more in-
depth analysis of the effects of HNC on air pollution levels in Mexico City, addressing both 
the overall results and location-based impacts. Recall that past studies did not consider the 
effects of spatial correlation, in addition to seasonal effects and lack of strong 
counterfactuals. This analysis builds upon those studies, and finds stronger evidence about 
the unintended consequences of HNC. 
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b) HNC 2014 Policy Change 
The policy change that took place in 2014 is analyzed in this section. The summary of all 
impacts is shown on tables 4 and 5, but the full results for all models are available in 
Appendix 1. Recall that the new set of rules for HNC redefined the driving restrictions 
according to the age of the car, as opposed to its meeting the emissions standards. The 
goal of such an approach was to enable a stronger ability to curb corruption occurring at 
engine check-up centers. 
Table 4. MCMA 2014. Impacts summary (mean daily concentrations) 
2014 Pooled data for all monitoring stations using pollution mean daily concentrations 
Pollutant CO NOX NO2 O3 
Design D1 D2 D1 D2 D1 D2 D1 D2 
Control Previous Years Sunday 
Previous 
Years Sunday 
Previous 
Years Sunday 
Previous 
Years Sunday 
60 Days 0.029** 0.055* -0.008 0.133*** 0.019 0.090*** 0.033*** -0.074** 
125 Days 0.007 -0.010 -0.057*** -0.032* -0.052*** -0.032* -0.046*** -0.182*** 
* p-val<0.1; ** p-val<0.05; *** p-val<0.01 
Source: Iracheta, J.A. using MCMA’s Automatic Network of Atmospheric Monitoring data. 
Note: For comparison purposes, standardized coefficients are used. 
We start by looking at the impacts of these rule changes on CO concentrations. Under 
specification one, there is a very small increment in the 60-, as well as in the 125-day periods 
for both mean daily values and maximum concentrations. However, these increments are 
almost negligible. Something similar is observed under specification two, where there are 
low increments in the short and long run for CO. For the case of maximum concentrations, 
there is a stronger increase in CO concentrations under specification two for 60 and 125 
days. These results are generally consistent with what was observed under specification 
one.  
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Table 5. MCMA 2014. Impacts summary (maximum daily concentrations) 
2014 Pooled data for all monitoring stations using pollution maximum daily concentrations 
Pollutant CO NOX NO2 O3 
Design D1 D2 D1 D2 D1 D2 D1 D2 
Control Previous Years Sunday 
Previous 
Years Sunday 
Previous 
Years Sunday 
Previous 
Years Sunday 
60 Days 0.040*** 0.142*** -0.011 0.016 0.011 0.060** 0.054*** -0.023 
125 Days 0.043*** 0.056** -0.035*** -0.087*** -0.043*** -0.049*** -0.023** -0.127*** 
* p-val<0.1; ** p-val<0.05; *** p-val<0.01 
Source: Iracheta, J.A. using MCMA’s Automatic Network of Atmospheric Monitoring data. 
Note: For comparison purposes, standardized coefficients are used. 
For NOX and NO2, there are consistent increments in concentrations under specification two 
in the short run, for both mean and maximum daily values. Nonetheless, in the middle run, 
these effects are reversed, and one can observe reductions in mean daily values as well as 
on maximum concentrations under both specifications but, again, very small in magnitude. 
The point to be taken is that the evidence points at positive impacts of the changes in rules 
of HNC on air quality regarding NOX and NO2 concentrations in the middle run. 
Finally, for the case of O3, under specification one there is an observed increment in 
concentrations in the short run, and then a reduction after six months, for both the mean 
daily values as well as for maximum concentrations. Similar to the effects on the other 
components, they are also very small. Under specification two, there is a consistent 
reduction of concentrations in O3 on all cases, that is, in the 60- and 125-day periods, and 
for mean daily values and maximum concentrations. Even though there is weak evidence of 
an increase in O3 concentrations in the short run, it is fair to say that the 2014 rules change 
had an overall positive effect on air quality (in terms of O3), since there are consistent 
concentration reductions in the middle run. 
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The impact that the 2014 HNC rules change had on air quality is less clear than what was 
observed in 1989. The magnitude in most cases is considerably small, and in some even 
negligible. For the case of CO, the evidence points at small increments in concentrations 
(lower air quality), both for mean daily values and for maximum values; therefore, the results 
in terms of CO are overall negative. 
The case for reduction of NOX and NO2 is somewhat stronger. On both specifications, there 
is a clear reduction in mean daily values and maximum concentrations in the 125-day period 
(six months), and such results are also statistically significant; however, they are very small 
in magnitude. The impact in the short term (3 months) remains unclear since many of the 
coefficients are not statistically significant; however, one can still observe small increments 
in concentrations in the short run. It is fair to say that the 2014 HNC rules change had a 
positive impact on air quality in terms of these two pollutants. 
Similar to NOX and NO2, the evidence about changes in concentrations for O3 is clear and 
negative (i.e. improved air quality) in the 125-day period since all coefficients on both 
specifications are consistent and significant. That is not the case for the short-term impacts. 
It appears that the 2014 HNC rules change had a positive effect on air quality in terms of 
O3, even though it is not clear what happened right after the rules change was enforced. 
What is clear is that after six months, the overall O3 concentrations went down. 
Overall, the impacts of the 2014 HNC rules change on air quality were very small. For some 
pollutants, there were small reductions in concentrations, but for others there were small 
increments. All in all, the evidence suggests that the impact of this policy change was close 
to nonexistent. However, it is important to acknowledge that the positive effects on air quality 
are better supported by the evidence than the negative ones, and it is possible that, given a 
longer period of time (recall that these rules lasted only one year), the positive impacts would 
have prevailed. 
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Now, let us take a look at the differentiated effects that the 2014 HNC policy change had 
over different areas of MCMA. The full set of maps is presented in Appendix 2. The analysis 
starts by looking at the impacts on CO concentrations. Recall that the data for the overall 
impact on the city was somewhat inconclusive; nonetheless, the results seemed to suggest 
very low losses of air quality (i.e. small increments in CO concentrations). The changes in 
maximum CO concentrations for 60 and 125 days, by area of the city, show a pattern of 
reduction of air quality due to CO. As opposed to what was observed for the pooled data, 
the results show a clear air quality loss pattern for the entire city. The evidence suggests 
that the north side of the city seems to be the one that experienced the best outcome, having 
reduction in CO concentrations in some parts; however, the central and south portions of 
the city seem to be the most negatively affected. It is worth noting that, even though the 
overall results seem to be negative, there is a decreasing trend for the increments in CO 
concentrations, i.e., had the policy lasted longer time, it is possible that the impacts would 
have turned positive. The results for CO are presented in Map 5. 
Different than what the evidence shows for CO, the cases of NOX and NO2 are considerably 
stronger and consistent. On both specifications there is a clear pattern of reduction of 
maximum concentrations, both for 60 and 125 days. This, of course, is not the case for all 
areas of the city, but it is fair to say that the reductions were experienced on the vast majority 
of them. Particularly, under specification two for NO2 there is a reduction in maximum 
concentrations on all but two monitoring stations in the four-month period. What is important 
to take from this analysis is that most of the stations do have consistent results, and that 
reductions in NOX and NO2 were observed almost in the entire city. The results for NOX are 
presented in Map 6. 
The results observed for O3 concentrations are similar to those of NO2 and NOX. On both 
specifications there is a clear pattern of improvements on air quality due to reductions in O3 
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concentrations. With the exception of the station located at the Metropolitan Autonomous 
University campus Xochimilco (UAX) which experienced a strong increment in O3 maximum 
concentration, the impact of the 2014 HNC rules change was positive for most of the city. 
These results are presented on Map 7. 
Briefly summarizing the results of the 2014 HNC rules change, the program had a positive, 
however low impact on air quality. On one hand, the evidence suggests that mean daily 
values and maximum concentrations of NOX, NO2 and O3 experienced an overall reduction, 
after three and six months of the new rules being enforced. On the other hand, the results 
for CO are not as straightforward. Depending on whether the data were pooled or by station, 
on the specification used and the period, the results varied considerably. For CO, there is 
weak evidence of very mild increments in concentrations that seem to be decreasing in time. 
Despite the limitations of the results that have been discussed throughout this section, it is 
fair to say that the 2014 HNC rules change had a positive effect on MCMA’s air quality. The 
evidence of positive impacts is strong, and even though these effects are small, they are 
positive nonetheless. The evidence of negative impacts is not as clear, and remains elusive. 
In any case, regardless of being positive or negative, all impacts were very small, and close 
to nonexistent. 
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c) HNC 2015 Return to the Previous Rules 
Since the beginning of the changes in rules of HNC in July 2014, a strong resistance took 
place, particularly from vehicle owners who kept their cars under good conditions, meeting 
the emissions standards, and complying with all the related regulations. One group of such 
owners pushed their case through the legal figure of Juicio de Amparo, which is designed 
to protect the private citizens from illegitimate actions performed by public authorities that 
affect their Constitutional rights (the figure of habeas corpus is somehow similar under the 
Anglo-Saxon legal systems). The legal proceeding made it all the way up to the Mexican 
National Supreme Court of Justice, which ruled in favor of the plaintiffs and declared that 
the 2014 HNC rules change were restraining some of their basic rights, therefore, they 
should be allowed to use their vehicle as long as they met the emissions standards. This 
ruling represented a de facto return to the previous HNC’s operation rules, which were then 
made official by the governments of Mexico City, the State of Mexico, and all the other 
political jurisdictions affected by it. This section analyzes the impact of returning to the 
original HNC rules, after one year with the vehicle age-related driving restriction. The 
complete results are presented in Appendix 1. 
We start by looking at the impacts of this change on CO, NOX, NO2 and O3 concentrations 
under specification one. The results for the policy change of 2015 are overwhelmingly 
negative. All pollutants experienced statistically significant increments on mean daily 
concentrations, and most of them faced a similar impact for maximum concentrations (there 
are a couple of not significant coefficients). However, these results are most likely showing 
an overestimation of the actual impacts. The reason is that specification one relies on the 
data observed for the same day of the previous year as a way for controlling for changes in 
air quality. Since this control group uses 2014 data that experienced another policy change 
around the same time of the year (there is about one-week difference), it would be more 
 39 
precise to understand the impacts under specification one in terms of the difference between 
the policy changes of 2014 and 2015. In other words, the impacts of the 2015 HNC policy 
change are estimating the difference in relation to the impacts of 2014, but not in terms of 
the air quality observed before the 2014 policy change. 
Table 6. MCMA 2015. Impacts summary (mean daily concentrations) 
2015 Pooled data for all monitoring stations using pollution mean daily concentrations 
Pollutant CO NOX NO2 O3 
Design D1 D2 D1 D2 D1 D2 D1 D2 
$ Previous Years Sunday 
Previous 
Years Sunday 
Previous 
Years Sunday 
Previous 
Years Sunday 
60 Days 0.117*** 0.066*** 0.073*** 0.046** 0.139*** 0.071*** 0.238*** 0.109*** 
125 Days 0.116*** 0.164*** 0.065*** 0.124*** 0.131*** 0.089*** 0.081*** 0.027 
* p-val<0.1; ** p-val<0.05; *** p-val<0.01 
Source: Iracheta, J.A. using MCMA’s Automatic Network of Atmospheric Monitoring data. 
Note: For comparison purposes, standardized coefficients are used. 
 
Table 7. MCMA 2015. Impacts summary (maximum daily concentrations) 
2015 Pooled data for all monitoring stations using pollution maximum daily concentrations 
Pollutant CO NOX NO2 O3 
Design D1 D2 D1 D2 D1 D2 D1 D2 
Control Previous Years Sunday 
Previous 
Years Sunday 
Previous 
Years Sunday 
Previous 
Years Sunday 
60 Days 0.076*** 0.029 0.002 -0.019 0.091*** 0.031 0.172*** -0.014 
125 Days 0.086*** 0.109*** 0.046*** -0.061*** 0.100*** 0.086*** 0.015 -0.012 
* p-val<0.1; ** p-val<0.05; *** p-val<0.01 
Source: Iracheta, J.A. using MCMA’s Automatic Network of Atmospheric Monitoring data. 
Note: For comparison purposes, standardized coefficients are used. 
Moving forward, the results under specification two seem to point in the same direction as 
what was observed under specification one. For CO there are relatively strong increments 
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in maximum and mean daily concentrations for the 125-day period. For 60 days, the impact 
size is smaller in both cases, but the coefficient for maximum concentrations is not 
statistically significant. Nonetheless, all signs are consistent and show a similar behavior 
than specification one. 
NOX concentrations are more problematic. Under specification two the direction of the effect 
for the six-month period on maximum daily concentrations is inconsistent with the rest of the 
NOX coefficients, since all of them show a statistically significant increment, except that one. 
The results about NO2 concentrations, on the other hand, are consistent across time periods 
and specifications. On all cases, there is an increment of concentrations (for 60 and 125 
days, as well as for mean daily, and maximum values). Also, on all cases the impact size is 
relatively small, but particularly so for the 60-day period. The results of specification two 
have consistently lower effect size than those observed under specification one, which 
makes sense considering that the impacts under specification one are defined in terms of 
the 2014 policy change that is likely overestimating them. 
Finally, the evidence of the impact of the 2015 HNC policy change on O3 show an overall 
increase in concentrations for mean daily values across specifications; however, for 
maximum daily concentrations, only for the three-month period the coefficient is statistically 
significant and consistent with the other results. Since only under specification one there are 
clear results, it is possible to say that the 2015 policy change had a negative effect in terms 
of O3 concentrations; however, these results are not as strong as what was observed for the 
rest of the pollutants. 
To conclude this section, the evidence seems to suggest a negative impact caused by the 
2015 return to the previous rules of HNC. These results are reasonable, since the policy 
change meant that a large proportion of vehicles (those of 15 years of age and older), would 
be able to go back into the streets on an almost daily basis. For some pollutants, such as 
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CO and NO2, the data point out a clear increment in concentrations for 60 and 125 days, 
both on mean daily as well as maximum concentrations. For NOX the evidence is not as 
strong, however there is still overall consistency across specifications for mean daily values 
in terms of the direction of the signs and the effects size. More problematic are the results 
for maximum daily values, since there are some inconsistencies in the signs. Nonetheless, 
similar to the results for NO2, there seems to be a pattern of reduction in air quality in terms 
of this pollutant, as a consequence of the 2015 HNC policy change. 
Finally, for O3, the impact of the 2015 rules change also seems to be a negative one. There 
are a few coefficients with an opposite sign (i.e., showing a reduction in concentrations); 
however, none is statistically significant. For the rest, there is a consistency in the direction 
and magnitude of the effects. 
The next stage is to look at the impacts of the HNC rules change of 2015 differentiated by 
area of the city. The analysis starts by looking at CO maximum concentrations. There is a 
clear increment in CO maximum concentrations in most parts of the city, particularly in the 
central area. On both specifications, there is a slight reduction in concentrations in the 125-
day period for the north side of the city, but overall there is a clear pattern of a lower air 
quality in MCMA. These results are consistent with what was observed using pooled data 
for the entire city under both specifications and it is fair to suggest that the HNC rules change 
of 2015 increased CO concentrations in MCMA. These results are presented on Map 8. 
When looking at pooled data for NOX concentrations, there were some questions on the 
confidence of the results in light of their apparent inconsistency for maximum daily values. 
Unfortunately, this pattern is also observed when analyzing behavior at the monitoring 
station level. Under both specifications, there is a short-term increment in maximum NOX 
concentrations for the central part of the city. While such increases remain for 125 days 
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under specification one, under specification two they are reversed, and most parts of the 
city seem to experience reductions in maximum concentrations. 
These inconsistencies are difficult to reconcile, but one possible explanation is that 
specification one is showing the difference between the 2014 and 2015 policy changes, 
since they took place with around one-week difference in each respective year. From this 
perspective, the HNC 2014 policy change had a relatively higher positive impact on air 
quality (reduced NOX concentrations) than the one observed in 2015. Therefore, if we look 
at the results of 2015, they may be just pointing out that, compared to 2014, the 2015 policy 
change had smaller, however positive impacts. Such explanation would be supported by the 
results observed under specification two. These results are presented on Map 9. 
For NO2, the analysis at the monitoring station provides stronger evidence of the impacts of 
the 2015 HNC policy change. Under both specifications, there is a clear and general 
increment in NO2 maximum concentrations, both at the 60- as well as at the 125-day periods. 
In particular, the increments in maximum concentrations seem to be located mostly on the 
central area of the city, while the north and west sides seem to have experienced 
improvements in air quality in terms of NO2 concentrations. 
For the case of O3, there is evidence of increments in maximum concentrations particularly 
in the center and north sides of the city. This pattern can be observed for the 60- and 125-
day periods. However, there is a clearer pattern under specification one, while there 
somehow mixed effects under specification two for both mean and maximum daily values. 
Under specification one, there is a dramatic increase in O3 concentrations across the city, 
with three stations in the center and north of the city with very strong negative results. Under 
specification two, there is only a reduction in air quality in the center and north of the city, 
but the rest shows reductions in maximum concentrations. These results are presented in 
Map 10. 
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To conclude this section, the results of the 2015 HNC return to its previous rules suggest an 
overall reduction in air quality for MCMA. The analysis for 2015 turned out to be very clear 
for most of the pollutants, however it is important to keep in mind that specification one must 
be interpreted in terms of the changes observed in 2014 (therefore with some degree of 
underestimation). CO concentrations, both for pooled and for by-station data, on the short 
and middle run appear to have gone up, thus reducing air quality in the city. For NOX and 
NO2, the evidence suggests two differentiated effects. For the former, there was an apparent 
reduction in concentrations, but significantly small in magnitude. The opposite is true for the 
latter, where relatively small NO2 concentrations increases took place in most parts of the 
city. 
O3 concentrations seem to follow a clear pattern of overall increments in concentrations for 
most parts of the city, with some areas that experienced strong increments in concentrations. 
This pattern was observed in the short and middle run; however, after six months the effects 
of the policy change were not as large, and they seem to decrease in time. 
5. Conclusions 
This study used two difference-in-differences research designs to estimate the impacts that 
the Hoy No Circula program had on air quality in MCMA, in particular for CO, NOX, NO2 and 
O3 concentrations, in three periods in time: the first implementation in 1989, and two policy 
changes in 2014 and 2015. Under all DID specifications, the analysis used pooled data from 
all monitoring stations controlling for spatial correlation for mean as well as for maximum 
daily values. This study also looked at data at the station level in order to identify 
geographically differentiated impacts of the program. On all cases, the analysis used 
different time periods, typically 60 and 125 days which correspond to three and six months, 
but it also included 260 and 520 days (12 and 24 months respectively) in specific cases. 
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The findings of this study are consistent with what other studies have found for HNC’s first 
implementation in 1989, (Cantillo & Ortúzar, 2014; Davis, 2008; Eskeland & Feyzioglu, 1997; 
Gallego et al., 2013) in that HNC was an effective program to deal with air pollution 
generated by mobile sources in Mexico City during the first few months right after its 
implementation, however its positive effects were offset after six to twelve months. Such 
impacts took place due to the unintended effects of HNC on vehicle ownership. When the 
program became permanent, it created strong incentives for families to acquire additional 
vehicles to overcome the driving restrictions. Thus, HNC’s expected results of improved air 
quality were partially observed in the period right after the program’s implementation only, 
but they faded away as time went by. 
The most important case is that of CO, which is the compound most emitted by mobile 
sources subject to HNC. While there were reductions in concentrations in the short run as a 
consequence of HNC’s implementation, these effects were reversed after six months’ time, 
and such behavior was reinforced over longer periods of time. Therefore, there is strong 
evidence to suggest that HNC’s unintended effects were large enough as to offset the 
improvements on air quality that took place right after the program was implemented. Ozone 
followed a similar pattern, but its concentrations increased both in the short and middle run. 
The increments over the latter, however, were substantially larger, suggesting that HNC was 
detrimental for air quality in terms of O3, and the negative impacts increased over time. The 
effects for both compounds were not homogeneous across the city, and some areas 
experienced improved air quality. Nonetheless, the overall pattern is one of loses in air 
quality as a consequence of the implementation of HNC. 
The evidence is substantially weaker for NOX and NO2 than what was observed for CO and 
O3. The results seem to suggest that HNC had a positive impact on NOX and NO2 in the 
short run, and mildly positive in the middle run. Nonetheless, there remains a lack of clarity 
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that is confirmed when looking at the specific results in different areas of the city. As 
expected, the results are not homogeneous across the city, and the impacts strongly differ 
depending on the location. For both compounds, there are reductions in concentrations in 
the north side of the city; however, the results for the south are the complete opposite. Also, 
the central part of the city seems to have experienced reductions in air quality due to NOX 
and NO2. These results confirm that it is not possible to make an unequivocal claim about 
the impact of HNC on air quality, but rather that the impacts were highly differentiated. In 
any case, the implementation of the program brought some level of improved air quality at 
first, but such improvements disappeared after a few months, therefore making the program 
ineffective when it was first implemented. 
For the 2014 policy change, the results are less straightforward. On most cases the 
magnitude of the impacts was considerably small, and in some, could be deemed as non-
existent. In the case of CO, the evidence seems to suggest a very small, negative impact 
on air quality that seems to be decreasing in time. These results are confirmed when looking 
at the impacts at the station level, where several areas of the city experienced some level 
of decline in air quality. Nonetheless, some other areas, particularly in the north side, seem 
to have experienced reductions in CO concentrations. 
The evidence regarding NOX, NO2 and O3 suggest that the 2014 policy change had a positive 
impact on air quality, both after three and six months, by reducing their concentrations. 
However, as with CO, these reductions were substantially low and, in some cases, close to 
negligible. 
The findings for the 2014 policy change are weaker than those of 1989. Recall that this 
policy change took place to deal with corruption at the check-up centers, and not because 
of shifts in the trend of pollution concentrations. This would explain why the impacts are so 
small and difficult to identify and this would also be a confirmation of the reason behind the 
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decision for redesigning the rules of HNC. In any case, it is possible to conclude that this 
policy change did have a slight positive effect on air quality. 
Finally, when HNC returned to its previous rules in 2015, a relevant number of vehicles were 
allowed back in the streets on a daily basis. There are no clear figures about how many, but 
what is clear is that the number of vehicle-days increased. Such behavior is consistent with 
the findings of this analysis for 2015, that show an overall reduction in air quality not only 
right after overruling the 2014 rules (i.e., returning to the previous rules), but also after six 
months passed. It is worth noting that specification one for 2015 is estimating the impacts in 
terms of what was happening in 2014. Therefore, specification one serves as a way to 
compare both policy changes. 
There is strong evidence showing that CO, NO2 and O3 concentrations consistently 
increased after the policy change; and such decline in air quality was experienced in most 
parts of the city (however, that was not the case for the north part for CO and NO2, and the 
center-south sides for O3). These impacts are particularly clear under specification one, 
which means that the policy change of 2015 was considerably detrimental for air quality in 
terms of the slight gains observed in 2014. 
For NOX, the findings are less clear, since there are relevant inconsistencies across 
specifications and time periods. That being said, the evidence seems to suggest a very small 
overall reduction in concentrations, which would mean a small improvement in air quality. 
However, these results remain contested and it is not possible to make a claim. 
The policy change of returning to the previous rules in 2015 proved to be detrimental for 
MCMA’s air quality. Furthermore, when compared to the impacts observed in 2014, the 
losses in air quality are even more dramatic. Overall, the Hoy No Circula program has a 
negative record. After being analyzed in three different moments in time, only one (2014) 
seems to have been beneficial for air quality. This policy has been in place for almost three 
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decades and it has yielded limited improvements, yet it has imposed very high costs. 
Furthermore, there is evidence that the unintended negative consequences of HNC in terms 
of mobility, have been much larger than the benefits, therefore it is possible to say that this 
policy has worked against the well-being of MCMA’s inhabitants. This being said, there are 
no easy answers or policy alternatives that could be implemented to replace HNC. 
Eliminating HNC without having a strong program to replace it would be catastrophic for 
MCMA. At this point, it is important to note that, even though HNC was created to address 
a problem of air quality, it has become a core component for the mobility strategy not only 
for Mexico City, but also for the central region of the country. Therefore, one cannot discuss 
the future of such program without considering its potential impacts on air quality, as well as 
on mobility. According to TomTom (2017), Mexico City had the worst traffic congestion levels 
of the world for 2016 and was in the top ten for 2017 and 2018, becoming one of the most 
pressing issues for the city. 
Therefore, the key question is not whether HNC should continue to function as a way for 
managing the problem of air pollution, but rather what kind of redesign, or which program(s) 
should be put in place parallel to HNC in order to phase it out. The first set of policy options 
relates to the creation of substitutes to the use of the kind of polluting vehicles that are 
currently used. The emergence of hybrid, electric, natural gas or biofuel vehicles makes a 
program of incentives for replacing the current gasoline fuel-based vehicle fleet technically 
feasible. Nonetheless, there are two strong arguments that would work against this policy. 
One is that these types of vehicles are still cost restrictive for the majority of MCMA’s 
inhabitants, and particularly for those that live in the lower-income State of Mexico. A second 
argument is that, even if replacing the vehicle fleet were financially feasible, the traffic 
congestion problems would remain the same or they would even be enhanced due to the 
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expected incentives that would be created by such program to continue using private 
vehicles. 
A second alternative is the expansion of the mass public transportation system on all of its 
modes to incentivize a shift in transportation mode in favor of public transportation. Such 
program would require a considerably large source of funding since a key component would 
be the expansion of the subway system, extending the current lines mainly to areas in the 
State of Mexico that are not connected today, but also enlarging its capacity since it is 
already near its maximum. (CDMX, 2017) The expansion of the bus rapid transit system 
(Metrobus), as well as the light rail would be required, in addition to the public bike system 
(EcoBici). These are all strong alternatives, with the potential of effectively addressing both 
problems of air pollution and transit congestion in the long run. However, for the subway, 
the bus rapid transit and the light rail systems, they all face several limitations that weaken 
their feasibility. Such limitations relate to the costs of building and maintaining the 
infrastructure, as well as the costs for their operation. According to Mexico City’s subway 
system agency CDMX (2017), in 2015, the subway system required a subsidy to cover 38% 
of its total operational costs, and the real cost per trip represented 2.65 times the user-payed 
fee. Also, there are political and jurisdictional limitations that have prevented the public 
transportation system to effectively connect Mexico City with its metropolitan region located 
in the State of Mexico. 
A second set of alternatives consists on using market-based policy instruments. One such 
alternative is putting a price on the environmental damage caused by the use of polluting 
vehicles in the form of an emissions Pigouvean tax, or establishing a congestion charge that 
effectively imposes a Pigouvean tax on road congestion. These kinds of policies have 
proven to be effective for industrial environmental regulation, (Goulder & Parry, 2008; 
Stavins, 2007) however they face several limitations. The first one relates to the technical 
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difficulties for accurately measuring the tax level that internalizes the cost of the 
environmental damage. It is also politically unattractive since there are negative incentives 
for decision makers to implement such policy. Finally, since the tax would be addressing 
environmental damage, and not traffic congestion problems, there would be a degree of 
disconnection between the policy objective and the level of the tax. Going further into that 
argument, an alternative would be imposing a Pigouvean tax on consumption of city public 
roads to directly address the congestion problem, however the overall limitations would 
remain the same. 
Another option would be the implementation of a tradable driving permit system, analogous 
to a cap-and-trade system for point source industrial pollution. Such a program would 
establish a target for the maximum number of vehicles that can circulate in the city, based 
on their pollution potential and the roads infrastructure capacity threshold; and define 
decreasing yearly goals about the number of vehicles allowed for circulation, until the target 
is reached. To implement such policy, a permit trading system would be required in order to 
allow market forces to attain the price for both the environmental damage, as well as the 
consumption of public roads. Such a program would require a definition about how the 
permits would be granted, such as grandfathering or auctioning all permits, or a mix of both. 
This policy faces several limitations. The first one is technical, since no driving permit trading 
system has been implemented in the world, and no cap-and-trade system currently exists in 
Mexico. This would potentially compromise its implementation due to the steep learning 
curve that would be faced. This argument is particularly challenging since regular citizens 
would be the ones that do the actual trading. Another strong argument against this policy is 
that it could be challenged in courts as an attempt to restrict the right for free circulation 
within Mexican territory. 
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These policies are not a comprehensive account of the pool of alternatives that could be 
implemented, however they are some of the most salient that are or have been subject to 
public debate. As it has been stated, none of these policies are perfect and they all face 
relevant shortcomings, therefore it would be wise to use a mixed approach, combining 
different policies. One such example would be an aggressive expansion of the mass public 
transportation system, accompanied by a vehicle usage permit trading system.  
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CHAPTER 2: 
ROAD-RELATED INVESTMENTS AND INDUCED TRAVEL IN METRO AREAS: 
THE CASE OF MEXICO CITY 
 
Abstract 
There is a large body of literature that addresses the relationship between road capacity, 
and the use of private vehicles, mainly reflecting that building additional road capacity tends 
to affect decisions about driving. In the short term this could mean shifting hours, routes, 
transportation modes, distance traveled, or making additional trips to take advantage of the 
improved infrastructure, on what has been broadly called “induced travel”. In the long term, 
added road capacity could mean overall increases in vehicle ownership, as well as 
reallocation of activities, and shifts in urban development patterns. The main concern behind 
induced travel is that public policy that aims at improving transit, i.e. increasing travel speed 
and reducing commuting time by increasing road capacity, may end up reducing the overall 
efficiency of the transit system. Furthermore, this relationship is also affected by the 
availability of public transportation, since it may be an actual alternative for vehicle use, and 
increasing road capacity represents an opportunity cost to increasing public transportation 
capacity. While there is strong evidence suggesting the existence of both short- and long-
term effects, there are relevant variations on the size of the effects, as well as on the 
methods used for estimating them. 
Most of the studies rely on vehicle-miles traveled (VMT) for measuring the actual driving; 
however, there are several shortcomings to this approach. One is that this variable can be 
measured for specific road projects, but not necessarily for the overall transit system. Also, 
if the goal is to look at the entire system, then VMT needs to be obtained through surveys, 
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forcing a frequent tradeoff between using time-series vs cross-sectional data. Finally, some 
models fail to consider a measure of public transportation, and overlook the environmental 
implications of adding road capacity. Methodologically, modeling the effects of adding road 
capacity necessarily involves endogenous variables (road congestion induces adding 
capacity, that in turn induces more road congestion). This research uses a recursive 
equations system for Mexico City Metro Area, for a 17-year period (2000-2016), at the 
delegation/municipality, and metro area levels. This research builds upon previous models, 
but explicitly addresses the short and long run effects, as well as some of the observed 
shortcomings. First, investment in roads-related infrastructure is used as a measure for its 
availability at the local level. Second, total registered vehicles are used as a proxy measure 
for the amount of driving taking place in each jurisdiction. Finally, changes in the extension 
of the urban area are utilized as a measure for changes in land use over the long term. This 
research is relevant for metro areas since it presents an alternative way for looking at the 
short and middle run effects of adding road capacity, shedding additional light on 
metropolitan transit systems. For Mexico this is one of the very few studies of this nature, 
and likely the most comprehensive so far. 
1. Introduction 
Metropolitan areas are vast urban spaces characterized by large, diverse, and 
heterogeneous populations, distributed unevenly in the territory across multiple political and 
administrative jurisdictions. These mega cities are regional centers for economic and social 
activity, providing urban services such as access to larger markets, high quality basic 
services, education, public space, infrastructure, and cultural, and recreational activities. 
Metro areas share physical and functional links across these jurisdictions, therefore making 
governance an extremely challenging task. In addition, the complex nature of metro areas, 
coupled with the concentration of population and economic activities, imposes severe 
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environmental stress, affecting air, water, and land. This concentration demands large 
amounts of energy and other resources, with a corresponding generation of waste and 
problems of visual and noise pollution. 
Embedded in such complexity, the metropolitan transit subsystem is a key component, since 
it allows for most of the economic and social interactions to occur. Transit systems take 
different shapes depending on the availability of transportation modes, although some broad 
categories can be readily defined by who and how many are able to have access: private 
(based on private vehicles), public (based on public individual vehicles, such as buses), 
mass public (based on public linked vehicles over exclusive lanes/routes, such as trams, 
subways, or BRT), or non-motorized transportation (such as pedestrians, or bicycles). Most 
metro areas have combinations of all these modes; however, there is usually a predominant 
one. 
In this research, I explore the relationship between private transportation and road-related 
infrastructure, also considering the public and mass public transportation alternatives. The 
goal is to test and measure the “induced travel” hypothesis; i.e., the claim that there is a 
feedback effect between the availability of roads (private transportation infrastructure) and 
the use of vehicles in a metro area. This feedback effect results from large concentrations 
of people with a need to move from one place to another, creating pressure over the entire 
transportation system. If we assume that the public and mass public transportation 
subsystems remain unchanged (constant), then these pressures will be absorbed by the 
private transportation subsystem, which will translate into traffic congestion, increased 
commuting time, and lower air quality. 
A common response from the public sector to relieve traffic is to improve/expand the road 
network, facilitating vehicle flow. However, when such improvements/expansions occur, 
several signals and incentives are created for vehicle owners to increase the use of their 
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private vehicles. First, an improved road infrastructure will tend to reduce private vehicle 
commuting time in the short run, making it more appealing for users to shift routes, times, 
and/or transportation modes in order to take advantage of the enhanced infrastructure. This 
effect has been termed “triple convergence” (Downs, 1992). However, as more vehicles 
enter the subsystem, the capacity limit is met and commuting times increase, but with a 
larger total vehicle fleet that puts additional pressure on the entire sub system. This revisited 
problem of traffic congestion is again addressed by adding capacity, starting the cycle over 
and generating an upward spiral of private vehicle-based congestion. 
Second, given that public budgets are limited, any road-related investment represents a 
direct opportunity cost to investing in alternative transportation modes, such as public and/or 
mass public transportation. This means that investment decisions on roads are not only 
incentivizing the use of private vehicles, but they are also creating negative incentives to 
using alternative modes of transportation. Third, as the two previous elements take effect, 
the overall metropolitan infrastructure becomes more difficult and costlier to transform, 
enhancing the two effects and making them more likely to remain in place. 
With these ideas in mind, using yearly data from 2000 to 2016 for three metro areas, I 
explore the two-way causal effect of investing in road-related projects over the size of the 
vehicle fleet, and how that vehicle fleet in turn affects investment decisions. This chapter 
focuses on investigating this two-way causal effect in Mexico City Metro Area, whereas the 
next chapter applies the same principles to investigate the two-way causal effects in Los 
Angeles and San Francisco metro areas. The country distinction is proposed for three 
reasons. The first one is that U.S. cities follow different growth patterns than Mexican cities. 
This is particularly relevant for the cases of California cities, where the elements that affect 
urban expansion and transportation are considerably different than those observed for the 
average Mexican city, therefore it is to be expected that such differences will shed light on 
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how these different patterns affect the two-way causal relationship. The second is that there 
are several studies that measure induced transit from different approaches for Los Angeles 
and San Francisco. Such studies should be useful to calibrate the results of the models used 
in this research, however that is not the case for Mexico City where, to the best of my 
knowledge, there are no studies that measure induced transit, thus there are no references 
to compare the results. Finally, it is critical to understand this phenomenon in Mexico, since 
almost 60% of its population lives in metropolitan areas that have expanded without 
necessarily respecting the principles stated in their urban planning instruments in the past 
three decades. (CONAPO, 2010) 
In terms of the methods, for Mexico City and Los Angeles, the urban area variable turned 
out to be non-statistically significant in all of the specifications, and it was excluded from 
both simultaneous systems. To address this shortcoming, a recursive system of equations 
was used instead of a simultaneous one. Nonetheless, it was possible to successfully 
estimate a simultaneous equations system for San Francisco Metro Area. 
2. Literature Review 
There is a large body of literature that addresses the relationship between traffic congestion, 
road capacity, and the use of private vehicles, mainly reflecting changes in road capacity 
that increase travel speed, travel distance, and the number of trips. Behind the induced 
travel literature there is the theory that improvements in road capacity produce behavioral 
changes in favor of a more intense usage of vehicles. The rationale behind this two-way 
causality is that under improved road infrastructure conditions, a “triple convergence” will 
occur where vehicle users will shift their routes, hours, and transportation modes to take 
advantage of such infrastructure. (Downs, 1992) The triple convergence gives way to the 
“Law of Peak-Hour Traffic Congestion,” which states that on urban commuter expressways, 
peak-hour traffic congestion will rise to meet maximum capacity. (Downs, 1962) However, 
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the triple convergence does not consider other changes in the pattern of vehicle use that 
result from improvements in road infrastructure and that may affect traffic. “Induced travel” 
(Cervero & Hansen, 2002) or “generated traffic” (Litman & Colman, 2001) encompasses five 
such changes: 1) newly generated trips (also called latent demand), 2) longer journeys, 3) 
changes in modal splits, 4) route diversions, and 5) changes in commute hour. More 
restrictively, the concept of “induced demand” (Cervero & Hansen, 2002) includes only the 
first three categories. This same concept of induced demand is called induced travel by 
Litman and Colman (2001). However, the term “induced travel” entails different concepts 
depending on the author. For the sake of clarity, I will use the Cervero and Hansen (2002) 
definition of “induced travel” since it encompasses the five elements that have a role for 
explaining this phenomenon. 
It is important to note that all these hypothesized effects occur over the short term, i.e., these 
behavioral changes are likely to be an immediate response to increases in road capacity. 
However, there are two additional effects that are expected to occur over the long haul. The 
first is an increase in household auto ownership levels, as a way to adjust to the improved 
road conditions. The second is a reallocation of activities through changes in land use and 
urban development patterns, where additional road capacity allows for higher speeds and 
longer commutes, making new developments possible. (Noland & Lem, 2002) 
Another potential consequence of induced travel is that increasing road capacity may reduce 
the overall efficiency of the private transportation network, making road congestion worse. 
This effect has been called the Downs-Thomson Paradox (Noland & Lem, 2002) or Braess’ 
Paradox (Litman & Colman, 2001). This paradox is rooted in two elements. The first is the 
opportunity cost of increasing road capacity at the expense of public transportation, where 
lack of investments or actual disinvestment may reduce public system capacity, thus 
reducing the number of users and causing fares to rise. This effect, in turn, causes further 
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shifts in mode from public to private transportation. (Noland & Lem, 2002) The second 
element accounts for shifts in land use patterns, where additional road capacity induces 
more dispersed automobile-dependent developments. (Litman & Colman, 2001) These 
hypothesized effects are considered to occur in the long run, whereas the five changes of 
induced travel occur in short periods of time. (Litman & Colman, 2001; Noland & Lem, 2002) 
The total travel time budget is also a relevant element to consider when discussing induced 
travel. Several studies show that, on the aggregate, time budgets tend to remain constant 
in the long run, although with some variations dependent on individual and household 
characteristics, destination, and type of residential area. (Gunn, 1981; Metz, 2008; 
Mokhtarian & Chen, 2004; Zahavi & Ryan, 1980) Furthermore, there is evidence suggesting 
that, under more favorable travel conditions such as faster speeds, these time budgets tend 
to be fully or almost fully used in the form of longer distance travel. (Goodwin, 1996) If, on 
average, travel time remains constant, higher road capacity translates into higher speeds 
and greater distance traveled, at least partially off-setting the potential time savings. (Noland 
& Lem, 2002) 
Goodwin (1996) reviews a large number of empirical studies addressing induced travel in 
the United Kingdom (UK). He identifies two categories of research that measure the effects 
of improved road infrastructure based on the costs of vehicle use due to fuel consumption 
and travel time. The first category is characterized by empirical studies that show consistent 
results on the relationship between fuel cost and vehicle use. These studies derive fuel cost 
elasticities close to -0.1 in the short run, increasing to around -0.5 in the long term. The 
second category shows a larger effect, with a travel time elasticity of about -0.5 in the short 
term and -1.0 in the long term. The differences in the magnitude of the resulting elasticities 
show that the response for changes in travel time tends to be larger than the response to 
changes in fuel costs. Using comparable parameters for the US (mainly reflecting a different 
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gasoline price, which is considerably lower than in the UK), the resulting elasticities would 
range from -0.56 in the short run, to -1.18 in the long run. (Noland & Lem, 2002) 
Goodwin (1996) also looks at the evidence provided by vehicle counts on specific road 
projects. When comparing traffic forecasts prior to the execution of a project with the actual 
resulting traffic once the project is in full operation, vehicle counts are underestimated on 
average by 10%. For the relieved roads (roads that would reduce their traffic load due to a 
near-by project) this underestimate is approximately 16%. In principle, these miscalculations 
could be attributed to unexpected induced travel, considering that the forecast errors tend 
to increase over time, consistent with what fuel and time cost studies show. However, these 
findings have been challenged since most of these traffic forecasts fail to properly address 
economic growth rates that, in turn, effect changes in traffic levels (regardless of road 
capacity). Rodier and Johnston (2002) looked at the potential sources of forecasting error 
and found that while personal income and fuel price did not play a relevant role, population 
and employment growth had a significant effect. 
Noland and Lem (2002) make a comprehensive review of the empirical literature on induced 
travel in the US. Several studies look at the relationship between vehicle-miles traveled 
(VMT) and lane-miles at different geographical levels. Early studies used both time series 
and panel data with fixed effects models, controlling for variables such as population, 
income, population density, gasoline prices, and type of facility. (Hansen & Huang, 1997; 
Noland, 2001) All these variables had a significant effect on explaining changes in VMT. The 
authors were able to estimate elasticities of lane miles (additional road capacity) with respect 
to VMT, which ranged from 0.3 to 0.7 at the county level and between 0.5 and 0.9 at the 
metropolitan level. (Hansen & Huang, 1997) They also estimate short run elasticities 
between 0.3 and 0.6, and long run elasticities from 0.7 to 1.0. (Noland, 2001) Despite these 
efforts, the ability to draw causal inferences about induced travel is highly constrained, 
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especially considering that there is a two-way endogenous causal relationship between road 
capacity and use of vehicles. 
A second set of studies addressed this shortcoming by using instrumental variables. Noland 
and Cowart (2000) find weak evidence of a causal link between changes in lane miles and 
increased VMT; however, they believe that the relative weakness of their instruments (total 
urbanized area and the inverse of population density, i.e., area divided by population) is 
likely to affect their results. Fulton, Noland, Meszler, and Thomas (2000) use aggregate data 
at the state level for their IV models (using two and three year-lagged growth in lane-miles 
as instrument), and find statistically significant short-run elasticities of between 0.3 and 0.5. 
Even though the instrumental variables approach is more robust than previous statistical 
analysis and allows for identifying causal relationships, the choice of the instruments is 
usually challenged, thus undermining the findings. To address this limitation, as well as the 
issue of causality when dealing with endogenous variables, a third set of studies used 
systems of simultaneous equations. Cervero and Hansen (2002) use a 15-year time series 
in California to look at specific facilities (roads) and find an elasticity for lane miles with 
respect to VMT of 0.5. Fulton et al. (2000) look at county level data from Maryland, Virginia, 
North Carolina, and Washington, DC, and find similar results. Using California data, Cervero 
(2003) develops a more advanced “path model” accounting for supply and demand of road 
infrastructure in the short run, including its effects over urban development in the long run. 
His results are somewhat consistent with previous findings; however, he points out that there 
is evidence that previous estimates have overstated the magnitude of the short-term induced 
travel. In the long-term, he finds evidence that additional lane-miles induced changes in land 
use and urban development. The results show more-than-proportional additional building 
activities along new or improved corridors, particularly of housing developments, taking 
place over periods of two to three years after the road work ended. 
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Strathman, Dueker, Sanchez, Zhang, and Riis (2000) and Barr (2000) use  household data 
with a large variety of exogenous and endogenous variables for their simultaneous equation 
systems. The former study finds an elasticity of 0.29 for lane miles with respect to VMT, 
whereas the latter finds time elasticities of between -0.3 and -0.4. In both cases, the findings 
are consistent with previous studies. 
Studies addressing induced travel have provided relatively consistent evidence about the 
direction (sign) of the gasoline price, time travel, and VMT elasticities. These findings 
represent a strong theoretical and empirical base. Nonetheless, this literature seems to be 
particularly focused on the effects of adding road capacity over the amount of driving that 
takes place but, by relying on VMT as a measure of the actual driving, previous research is 
subject to several shortcomings. One is that VMT can be measured for specific road 
projects, but not necessarily for the overall transit system. Also, if the goal is to look at the 
entire system, then VMT needs to be obtained through surveys, forcing a tradeoff between 
using time series and cross-sectional data. Finally, some models fail to fully capture the 
effect of relevant variables, such as the availability of public transportation or alternative 
transportation modes, and overlook the environmental implications of adding road capacity. 
For most of the studies that use a simultaneous equation system (at least for those that have 
been mentioned in the literature review), the availability of alternative transportation modes 
(mainly public transportation) is usually considered an exogenous variable, serving as a 
control rather than an actual structural component of the system (endogenously 
determined). This allows inclusion of different measures of alternative transportation modes 
as policy variables, which then can be used for estimating their effects on the endogenous 
variables of the system. 
In summary, there are two major contributions of the proposed research. The first one is to 
include alternative transportation modes (in this case by using modal split) as a way to 
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control for its effects on the variables of interest. Such a specification should inform how 
alternative modes of transportation affect investments in road infrastructure and the usage 
of vehicles. The second is the choice of metropolitan areas to be studied. A large proportion 
of past research has focused on California, with other relevant metro areas neglected. In 
addition, such a model has not been estimated for Mexico City, which has unique 
characteristics that distinguish it from U.S. cities. Thus, findings for Mexico City may be quite 
different and have the potential for a significant impact on the policy debate that is currently 
taking place about the national environmental crisis that is affecting large cities, and in 
particular Mexico City. 
3. Data and Methods 
a) Data 
For the public investment in road-related infrastructure variable, yearly reporting of 
public expenditures on road-related projects for each metropolitan area were used. The data 
are obtained at the city, county/municipality, state, and federal levels. Expenditures include 
construction of new roads and related projects (such as junctions, overpasses, etc.), 
maintenance of existing ones, installment and maintenance of signaling, and acquisition of 
rights of way. The data were obtained from a variety of sources: 1) Public accounts reports 
(informes de la cuenta pública) at the state- and municipal-level for each jurisdiction of the 
Mexico City Metro Area from 2000 to 2016, 2) state of the government reports (informes de 
gobierno) and supporting documents for Mexico City and the State of Mexico from 2000 to 
2016, 3) investment reports for specific funds such as the Metropolitan Fund (Fondo 
Metropolitano) or the Federal District Communication Infrastructure Improvement Fund 
(Fideicomiso para el Mejoramiento de las Vías de Comunicación del Distrito Federal, 
FIMEVIC).  
 94 
For the registered vehicles variable, yearly data on the number of private and total vehicles 
registered at local jurisdictions within metropolitan areas were used, and were obtained from 
the Statistic Yearbook for Mexico City and for the State of Mexico from 2000 to 2016 
published by the Mexican National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI). The modal 
split variable used yearly data on the proportion of trips made using the public 
transportation system. The data were obtained from Mexico City’ and State of Mexico’s 
transportation agencies. A relevant drawback is that these agencies do not keep track of the 
modal split in a systematic way. They keep global point estimations on the distribution of 
trips across modes, but they are not specific to political jurisdictions or time frames; thus, 
they are not adequate for statistical inference. Due to these issues, the models use the 
number of users of mass public transport for each system. In particular, for Mexico City 
delegations (municipalities equivalent), this variable includes the users of the subway 
system (metro), the BRT system (Metrobús), and light rail (transportes eléctricos). For the 
State of Mexico municipalities, it includes the users of the BRT system (Mexibús), and the 
cableway system (Mexicable). For each system and route, the number of daily users per 
station was obtained and, according to the station’s location, was assigned to its 
corresponding political jurisdiction. 
The urban area variable used yearly data on the total size of the urban area by 
county/municipality. The measurements relied on GIS remote sensing procedures for the 
total size of the urban area and for each year using end-of-year satellite imagery (usually 
December of the corresponding year), although close time ranges were used in some cases 
in order to obtain the clearest images possible. The satellite imagery was obtained from the 
United States Geological Survey, using Landsat 7 imagery for the years 2000 to 2012, and 
Landsat 8 for 2013 to 2016. Finally, the total population variable used yearly data on total 
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population size obtained from the Mexican National Institute of Statistics and Geography 
(INEGI), and the Mexican National Population Commission (CONAPO). 
b) Methods 
This research is intended to measure the effect that three endogenous variables subject to 
reverse causality have over each other, therefore it is necessary to address the issue of 
endogeneity. A simultaneous equation system is proposed since it is a method that 
adequately addresses this issue. The system, in this form, would be estimated 
independently for each city; however, following the same structure. The structural equations 
that theoretically would be estimated via two-stage least squares (TSLS) are the following: 
𝐸𝑞	𝐴:	𝑉𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑠! = 𝛼" + 𝛼#𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡!,%&' + 𝛼(𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑎𝑙𝑆𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑡! + 𝛼)𝑉𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑠!,%&# + 𝛼*𝑈𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎! + 𝑋!𝛼 + 𝜀#! 𝐸𝑞	𝐵:	𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡! = 𝛽" + 𝛽#𝑉𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑠!,%&' + 𝛽(𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑎𝑙𝑆𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑡! + 𝛽)𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡!,%&# + 𝛽*𝑈𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎! + 𝑋!𝛽 + 𝜀(! 
𝐸𝑞	𝐶:	𝑈𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎!= 𝛿" + 𝛿#𝑉𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑠!,%&' + 𝛿(𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡!,%&' + 𝛿)𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑎𝑙𝑆𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑡!,%&' + 𝛿*𝑈𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎!,%&# + 𝑋!𝛿 + 𝜀*! 
Where: 
𝑉𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑠! is the total number registered vehicles.  𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡! is the total investment in road-related infrastructure. 𝑈𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎! is the total size of the urban area. 𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑎𝑙𝑆𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑡! is the proportion of trips made using the mass public transportation system. 𝑋!𝛼,	𝑋!𝛽 and 𝑋!𝛿 are vectors of exogenously determined covariates, such as total 
population. 
Additionally, lagged versions of the endogenous variables are included, since they strongly 
depend on their past behavior. Since these lagged variables are predetermined within the 
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system in prior periods, it is assumed that they are exogenously predetermined.3 It is 
important to note that, even though there are three structural equations in the theoretical 
model, for reasons that are explained later in this section, it was only possible to estimate 
equations A and B. 
For these models, the common practice is to keep the modal split or public transportation 
variables on the right-hand side of the equations in order to allow using them as a policy 
variable. (Cervero & Hansen, 2002; Strathman et al., 2000) This means that one could 
exogenously alter its value to reflect policy goals and forecast its effects over the system. 
Mexican cities show a different urban expansion pattern than US cities. While it can be 
argued that the latter grow in large part due to the availability of better and faster roads that 
push out the urban limits, the former do not necessarily follow that same development 
pattern. One of the most important reasons for the expansion of Mexican cities is the 
emergence of informal settlements and new developments in the outskirts that occur due to 
lack of affordable land located within the urban areas (Salazar, 2012). Such urbanizations 
take place regardless of the existence of adequate transportation infrastructure and, in many 
cases, they suffer from a relevant lack of connectivity to the main city. In the Mexico City 
Metro Area, much of the transportation infrastructure to service the expansion areas of the 
city was built as a response to growing urban pressure to connect distant communities, 
rather than the opposite (Iracheta, 2009). This is not to say that the availability of roads does 
not have an effect on urban expansion. Rather, such effects are not as strong in Mexican 
cities in comparison to US cities. 
 
3 The lagged variables were constructed by hand, independently from the SAS and Stata LAG 
functions to avoid bringing values from one urban area into the data points for the next one, since the 
database uses a combination of cross-section and time series data points for each jurisdiction and 
each year. Additionally, not all jurisdictions have information for all years, thus the manual 
construction of the lagged variables prevented from using data for years that, otherwise, would be 
missing. 
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This pattern became evident when putting together the variable for the size of the urban 
area. It was evident, from inspection of the data for the municipality-level yearly values, that 
there was little variation, with no variation at all in some cases. This was particularly the case 
for several Mexico City delegations, where the totality of their territory has been fully 
occupied even for decades. Hence, when estimating the system of equations for its different 
specifications, the effect of urban expansion was systematically insignificant. This was also 
true for the variables of interest in equation C (where urban area is the left-hand variable). 
Because of these anomalies, the equation and the variable for urban expansion was 
excluded from the model, resulting in a two-equation system. 
The system of equations then becomes recursive, with the lagged endogenous variables 
providing the interaction across time periods. The main implication for this methodological 
change is that the parameters are estimated sequentially, rather than in a jointly way. In 
order to meet the no serial correlation assumption 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑢#& , 𝑢$&) = 0, which is required to 
obtain unbiased estimators, all right-hand side variables must be exogenous. (Gujarati, 
2004) Since lagged variables are considered predetermined within the model, (Gujarati, 
2004; Pindyck & Rubinfeld, 1998) the above condition is met by using lagged versions of 
the variables of interest (Number of registered vehicles and investment in roads 
infrastructure) which are considered predetermined in the model since they took their values 
on prior time periods. With these conditions in mind, the models can be estimated using 
OLS, however there is a tradeoff in that the equations are no longer interdependent, but 
rather they have a unilateral causal dependence. In other words, 𝑌# affects 𝑌$, but 𝑌$ does 
not affect 𝑌#. (Gujarati, 2004) The equations are then: 𝐸𝑞	𝐴:	𝑉𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑠! = 𝛼" + 𝛼#𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡!,&() + 𝛼$𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑎𝑙𝑆𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑡! + 𝛼%𝑉𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑠!,&(# + 𝑋!𝛼 + 𝜀#! 𝐸𝑞	𝐵:	𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡! = 𝛽" + 𝛽#𝑉𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑠!,&() + 𝛽$𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑎𝑙𝑆𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑡! + 𝛽%𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡!,&(# + 𝑋!𝛽 + 𝜀$! 
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Since the equations are no longer simultaneous, but recursive, they can be estimated using 
OLS. 
4. Results and Discussion 
There are several considerations for specifying the system of equations. Firstly, the system 
is estimated separately for Mexico City Metro Area and for Mexico City. The latter includes 
all 16 delegations of Mexico City only, and the former includes these delegations in addition 
to 28 of the 59 municipalities of the State of Mexico that are part of the Metro Area. These 
municipalities are only those physically contiguous to Mexico City that have had investment 
in roads infrastructure as well as access to mass public transport. Secondly, for Equation A, 
the models utilize separately the number of registered private vehicles (those used for 
private transport) and the total number of vehicles (vehicles used for private and public 
transport, such as taxis, and the like), since it is reasonable to expect different effects for 
each group. Finally, for Equation B, the models are divided into two groups. The first uses 
total investment in roads (construction of new roads, as well as extension or enlargement of 
existing ones) and overpasses (including the construction or improvement of overpasses, 
underpasses, tunnels and elevated intersections). The second group utilizes these two 
measures in addition to investments in street pavement and rolling surface maintenance. 
This separation responds to the systematic inconsistencies that have been reported in news 
media about the misuse of public resources destined to pavement and rolling surface 
maintenance, therefore being subject to potential bias. For each section, a total of 12 models 
were estimated, with a grand total of 24 models that consider all the relevant equation 
permutations about the variable time-frames (as stated in the theoretical model), using 
current time-periods, as well as one- and two-year lagged values. The specifications 
summary is as follows:  
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Table 1. Specifications summary 
Specification 1: Mexico City Metro Area Specification 2: Mexico City (excluding State of Mexico’s metropolitan municipalities) 
 Equation A Equation B  Equation A Equation B 
1.1 
Number of 
private 
vehicles 
a. Total investment in 
roads and overpasses 
b. Total investment in 
roads, overpasses 
and pavement 
2.1 
Number of 
private 
vehicles 
a. Total investment in 
roads and overpasses 
b. Total investment in 
roads, overpasses 
and pavement 
1.2 
Total 
number of 
vehicles 
a. Total investment in 
roads and overpasses 
b. Total investment in 
roads, overpasses 
and pavement 
2.2 
Total 
number of 
vehicles 
a. Total investment in 
roads and overpasses 
b. Total investment in 
roads, overpasses 
and pavement 
Source: Iracheta, J.A. 
After running Breusch-Pagan tests for the two dependent variables on the corresponding 
independent variables for each model, a problem of heteroskedasticity was found on all the 
variations of both specifications. Thus, all the models utilized robust standard errors in order 
to correct for standard deviation bias, and to properly test for the significance of each 
variable. The variance inflation factors were also estimated to prevent the occurrence of a 
problem of Multicollinearity, and the corresponding corrections were made for each model 
individually. Once the best possible model was identified for each equation, it was included 
in the recursive equations system. 
a) Mexico City Metro Area 
Specification 1.1 
Equation A is intended to model the effects that road-related infrastructure investments have 
over the size of the vehicle fleet in the city (using the number of vehicle registrations as a 
proxy variable), and Equation B is intended to model the effect that the size of the vehicle 
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fleet (using the number of registered vehicles that in this case work as a proxy for road 
congestion) have over the public decisions about road-related infrastructure investments. 
Specification 1.1 estimates the recursive system of equations for the Mexico City Metro Area 
considering the number of private vehicles on the left-hand side of Equation A, and total 
investment in road infrastructure (in its two variations excluding and including expenditures 
in pavement) for Equation B. For a recursive model to be properly estimated using OLS, all 
right-hand side variables must be exogenous, which means that the variables of interest 
must be lagged so they can be predetermined in the model. Therefore, no model using 
current time periods for the total investment in roads infrastructure variable or the total 
number of the registered vehicles variable on the right-hand side of the equation was 
estimated. 
The results show that, for every MX$100 million (US$11.3 million as of the 2016 purchase 
parity power -PPP- factor of 8.869) (BANXICO, 2018; OECD, 2018) invested in road 
infrastructure (roads and overpasses), a little over 1,900 private vehicles are added to the 
metropolitan vehicle fleet in the first year after the investment takes place, and about 3,400 
private vehicles are added two years after the investment takes place. If expenditures in 
pavement are included in the road infrastructure investment variable, the number of 
additional registered private vehicles increases to approximately 2,130 for every MX$100 
million investment in the first year, and remains steady around 3,440 additional private 
vehicles in the second year after the investment takes place. All these coefficients are 
statistically significant at 99% percent confidence. 
On Equation B of the system, for every 1,000 registered vehicles, there is an approximate 
MX$943 thousand (US$106.3 thousand PPP) investment in roads infrastructure 
(considering roads and overpasses only, at 95% confidence) in the first year after the vehicle 
registration, and about MX$918 thousand (US$103.5 thousand PPP) two years after the 
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registration at 90% confidence. When pavement expenses are included, the investment 
amount increases to MX$1.325 million (US$149.4 thousand PPP) after the first year, and to 
MX$1.369 million (US$154.4 thousand PPP) two years after the registration of the vehicles. 
The latter coefficients are significant at 99% confidence. 
These models also show that total population has a direct positive effect on the total number 
of private vehicle registrations. For every million additional inhabitants in the Mexico City 
Metro Area, between 157 and 160 thousand additional vehicles enter the vehicle fleet. The 
number of mass public transport users also affects the total number of registered private 
vehicles. In Equation A, the sign of the results for the number of mass public transport users 
is the opposite of what was expected, and for every additional million users of the mass 
transport system, between 718 and 721 additional private vehicles are registered. Even 
though these effects are relatively small, they still reflect a counterintuitive result. A possible 
explanation for this effect is that Mexico City’s mass transit system is not efficient enough 
as to absorb all current and additional users, thus when a large enough number of additional 
regular users enter the system, they overcrowd current users, pushing some of them to shift 
mode from public to private transportation. 
For Equation B, the number of mass transport system users reduce the amount of 
investment destined to roads infrastructure. For the case of investment in roads and 
overpasses only, the results show that, for every million additional mass transport users, 
there is a reduction in roads infrastructure investment of between MX$970 thousand and 
1.01 million (US$109.4 thousand and 113.9 thousand PPP). When pavement expenditures 
are included, for every million additional mass transport users, there is a reduction in roads 
infrastructure investment of between MX$1.03 and 1.05 million (US$116.1 and 118.4 
thousand PPP). A summary of the main results is presented in Table 4. 
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Specification 1.2 
Specification 1.2 estimates the recursive equation system for the Mexico City Metro Area 
considering the total number of vehicles on the left-hand side of Equation A, and total 
investment in road infrastructure (in its two variations excluding and including expenditures 
for pavement) for Equation B. The main findings are as follow. For every MX$100 million 
(US$11.3 million PPP) invested in road infrastructure (roads and overpasses), 
approximately 1,870 vehicles (for private and public use) are added to the metropolitan 
vehicle fleet one year after the investment is made, and about 3,340 vehicles are added two 
years after the investment takes place. If expenditures in pavement are included in the road 
infrastructure investment variable, similar to Specification 1.1, the number of additional 
registered vehicles increases to approximately 2,100 for every MX$100 million (US$11.3 
million PPP) investment in the first year, and remains steady around 3,400 additional 
vehicles in the second year after the investment takes place. All these coefficients are 
statistically significant at 99% percent confidence. 
For every 1,000 registered vehicles, there is a MX$881 thousand (US$99.3 thousand PPP) 
investment in roads infrastructure (considering roads and overpasses only, at 90% 
confidence) in the first year after the vehicle registration, and MX$848.5 thousand (US$95.7 
thousand PPP) two years after the registration. When pavement expenses are included, the 
investment amount increases to MX$1.27 million (US$143.2 thousand PPP) after the first 
year, and to MX$1.31 million (US$147.7 thousand PPP) two years after the registration of 
the vehicles. The latter coefficients are significant at 99% confidence. Table 5 presents a 
summary of these results. 
 104 
 
 105 
b) Mexico City (Excluding State of Mexico’s Metropolitan 
Municipalities) 
Specifications 2.1 and 2.2 follow the same logic as specifications 1.1 and 1.2, however they 
include information for Mexico City only. In other words, these models consider only data 
from the 16 Mexico City delegations, excluding State of Mexico’s municipalities that are part 
of the Mexico City Metro Area. 
Specification 2.1 
Specification 2.1 utilizes the number of private vehicles on the left-hand side of Equation A, 
and total investment in road infrastructure (in its two variations excluding and including 
pavement expenditures) for Equation B. A summary of the main results is presented in Table 
6. 
The results show that, for every MX$100 million (US$11.3 million PPP) invested in road 
infrastructure (roads and overpasses), approximately 1,680 additional private vehicles enter 
Mexico City’s vehicle fleet in the first year after the investment takes place, and about 2,130 
additional private vehicles enter the fleet two years after the investment takes place. When 
pavement expenditures are considered in the road infrastructure investment variable, the 
number of additional registered private vehicles increases to approximately 1,930 for every 
MX$100 million (US$11.3 million PPP) investment in the first year, and 2,050 additional 
private vehicles in the second year. All these coefficients are statistically significant at 99% 
percent confidence. 
Looking at Equation B, for every 1,000 registered vehicles, there is an approximate MX$875 
thousand (US$98.7 thousand PPP) investment in roads infrastructure (considering roads 
and overpasses only) in the first year after the vehicle registration, and about MX$929 
thousand (US$104.7 thousand PPP) two years after the registration, however these 
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coefficients are not statistically significant. When pavement expenses are included, the 
investment amount increases to a little under MX$1.1 million (US$124 thousand PPP) after 
the first year, and to around MX$1.14 million (US$128.5 thousand PPP) two years after the 
registration of the vehicles. The latter coefficients are significant at 99% confidence. 
Similar to what was observed under Specification 1.1, both total population and total users 
of mass public transport have a positive and statistically significant effect on the total number 
of registered private vehicles. The case of increments in total population also increasing the 
total number of registered vehicles is straightforward; however, that is not the case for 
increments in total users of mass public transport which, one would expect, would reduce 
the total number of registered private vehicles; however, the results show the opposite effect. 
These results are consistent with what was observed for Mexico City Metro Area and, as 
mentioned before, a possible explanation for such counterintuitive result is that, when a large 
enough number of additional mass public transport users enter the system, they overcrowd 
current users, pushing those that are able to rely on private transportation to shift mode from 
public to private. 
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Specification 2.2 
Specification 2.2 utilizes the total number of vehicles on the left-hand side of Equation A, 
and total investment in road infrastructure (in its two variations excluding and including 
pavement expenditures) for Equation B. The results are as follow: 
For every MX$100 million (US$11.3 million PPP) invested in road infrastructure (roads and 
overpasses), approximately 1,700 vehicles (for private and public use) enter the 
metropolitan vehicle fleet one year after the investment is made, and about 2,100 vehicles 
enter two years after the investment takes place. If pavement expenditures are included in 
the road infrastructure investment variable, the number of additional registered vehicles 
increases to approximately 1,900 for every MX$100 million (US$11.3 million PPP) 
investment in the first year, and remains steady around 2,000 additional vehicles in the 
second year after the investment takes place. All coefficients are statistically significant at 
95% percent confidence. 
When looking at Equation B, for every 1,000 registered vehicles, there is about MX$845 
thousand (US$95.3 thousand PPP) investment in roads infrastructure (considering roads 
and overpasses only) in the first year after vehicle registration, and a bit over MX$898 
thousand (US$101.3 thousand PPP) two years after registration; however, none of these 
coefficients is statistically significant. When pavement expenses are included, the 
investment amount increases to MX$1.04 million (US$117.3 thousand PPP) after the first 
year, and to MX$1.07 million (US$120.6 thousand PPP) two years after the registration of 
the vehicles. The latter coefficients are significant at 99% confidence. Table 7 presents a 
summary of the main results. 
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5. Conclusions 
The findings of this research are consistent both with other studies and the expected results 
of the theoretical model. The evidence provided here points out the existence of the induced 
travel phenomenon in Mexico City. 
Equation A measures the impact of investment on roads infrastructure on the number of 
registered vehicles (which can be assumed to add up to the vehicle fleet of the city). The 
theoretical model considers that increments in investment for roads infrastructure would 
create a positive incentive for the use of private vehicles, as opposed to the use of mass 
public transport or other alternative modes. When looking at the entire metro area (Mexico 
City and the State of Mexico), the evidence suggests that, for every additional MX$100 
million (US$11.3 million PPP) of investment in roads infrastructure, there is an increase in 
the size of the vehicle fleet (as measured by vehicle registration) of between 1,900 and 2,130 
vehicles one year after the investment takes place (depending on if the investment considers 
roads and overpasses only, or the latter plus pavement expenditures), and about 3,400 two 
years after the investment takes place. When looking at Mexico City only, the effects are 
smaller, but nonetheless significant. For every additional MX$100 million (US$11.3 million 
PPP), the number of additional registered range from 1,680 to 1,930 on the first year, and 
between 2,050 and 2,130 after two years of the investment. 
In order to put these numbers in perspective, in 2016 there was an overall investment in 
roads infrastructure, including roads, overpasses and pavement, of about MX$8.7 billion 
(US$980.9 million PPP) in the Mexico City Metro Area. This investment, according to the 
results, would have induced an increment in the vehicle fleet of between 165,000 and 
185,000 additional private vehicles one year after the investment took place. The 2016 
overall investment for Mexico City was of about MX$6.8 billion (US$767 million PPP), which 
would have induced an increment of between 114,000 and 131,000 private vehicle 
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registrations, one year after the investment took place, representing about one third of all 
additional registered vehicles in Mexico City for that year. 
Figure 1. Main results for the Mexico City Metro Area 
 
Figure 2. Main results for Mexico City 
 
Source: Iracheta, J.A. 
Equation B measures the impact that the number of registered vehicles (a proxy variable for 
road congestion) has on the amount of investment that is directed to roads infrastructure, as 
an effort to reduce such congestion. The evidence points out that, in the Mexico City Metro 
Area, for every thousand additional vehicles that are registered, there is an investment in 
roads of between MX$943 thousand (US$106.3 thousand PPP) and MX$1.325 million 
(US$149.4 thousand PPP) after one year, and between MX$918 thousand and MX$1.369 
million (US$103.5 and 154.4 thousand PPP) two years after the vehicle registration. 
Investment in road 
infrastructureVehicle fleet
(-for each additional-
US$11.3 million PPP)
(-for each additional-
1,000 veh)
US$106.3 to 149.4 thousand PPP
t1 t2
1,900 to 2,130 vehicles
3,400 vehicles
US$103.5 to 154.4 thousand PPP
Investment in road 
infrastructureVehicle fleet
(-for each additional-
US$11.3 million PPP)
(-for each additional-
1,000 veh)
US$98.7 to 124 thousand PPP
t1 t2
1,680 to 1,930 vehicles
2,050 to 2,130 vehicles
US$104.7 to 128.5 thousand PPP
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For Mexico City alone, the evidence suggests that, for every MX$100 million (US$11.3 
million PPP), there is an induced increment in private vehicle registrations of between 1,680 
and 1,930 after one year, and of between 2,050 and 2,130 registrations two years after the 
investment in roads infrastructure takes place. In terms of Equation B, the evidence points 
out at the occurrence of investments that range from MX$875 thousand to MX$1.1 million 
(US$ 98.7 to 124 thousand PPP) in the first year for every thousand additional registered 
vehicles, and investments of between MX$929 thousand to MX$1.14 million (US$104.7 to 
128.5 thousand PPP) for every thousand additional registered vehicles in the second year 
after the registrations take place. 
These results suggest that induced travel is observable in Mexico City, and the results are 
consistent with what has been observed in other cities. This evidence also suggests that the 
transportation strategy that has been implemented historically in Mexico City and in the 
entire country, which has relied mainly on developing road infrastructure, may have been 
counterproductive, increasing the severity of the problem of road congestion. Additionally, 
investing in roads infrastructure represents an opportunity cost to investing in alternative 
transportation modes, mainly mass public transport. But the problems of induced travel are 
not only related to congestion, but also to pollution emission increments and environmental 
quality loss, impacts on public health, increments in travel time and an overall reduction of 
quality of life. 
There are several implications in terms of environmental and transportation policy that are 
readily present from these results. The first one is that Mexico City’s authorities, local, city 
wide and metropolitan, urgently require to engage into a profound revision of the measures 
that are being taken for tackling the air pollution and road congestion problems from an 
integrated perspective, and relying on different policies than those that have been 
implemented so far. Chapter one showed that the flagship air pollution control program in 
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Mexico City, the Hoy No Circula (HNC), has had serious unintended consequences, such 
as substantially increasing the size of the vehicle fleet, however with mixed results regarding 
improvements in air quality. Nonetheless, when looking at the long-term pollution 
concentrations in Mexico City, it is possible to observe some mild improvements on air 
quality. The main causes for those long-term improvements remain elusive, since many 
factors have a role to play such as reduction in gasoline lead contents and improvements in 
engines’ fuel efficiency. Also, it has been claimed by the local authorities that the HNC has 
been determinant for keeping air pollution from spiraling out of control, however there is no 
causal evidence to support such claim, since the effects of the HNC program evaluations 
are only valid for a short period of time afterwards its implementation and policy changes. 
As mentioned, the HNC implementation had the effect of increasing the size of the vehicle 
fleet, but also have the road-related infrastructure investments, as the evidence suggests. 
Thus, these policies have not been effective for addressing these issues, and furthermore, 
it is reasonable to say that they have actually worsen the problem of road congestion, and 
restrained the potential for stronger improvements in air quality, making the case for a 
different kind of debate about measures to be taken and policies to be implemented in 
Mexico City. 
Some of the most salient alternative policies are congestion pricing, such as London’ or 
Stockholm’s congestion charges, that have proved to be effective, (Albalate & Bel, 2009) 
and tradable driving permit systems, which have not been implemented in any city so far, 
but have been widely discussed, particularly for Chinese cities. Both of these policies rely 
on economic incentives, which are powerful tools for shifting public’s behavior, in addition to 
having the potential to attain economic efficiency, if properly designed, by internalizing the 
congestion- and air pollution-related externalities imposed on all citizens by drivers and their 
vehicles, at the socially-efficient price. 
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Even though these policies represent a way forward and a departure from traditional 
command-and-control approaches, such as those based on driving restrictions, they have 
also raised equity concerns about the distribution of their costs and benefits. Accessibility 
differences across areas of the city to mass public transportation or non-motorized 
alternatives will determine how these costs and benefits are distributed. In the case of 
Mexican cities, one must be cautious, since these transportation alternatives tend to shrink 
and disappear as one moves further away from city centers. And these city outskirts tend to 
be the least developed, where most of low-income families live, therefore imposing a double 
charge, one for being forced to rely on fewer, and proportionally more expensive 
transportation alternatives, and a second one derived from the congestion-related charges 
or permits that might be put in place. 
It is also important to acknowledge that tradable permit-based programs have been 
implemented mostly for regional air pollution control for point sources, and there are no real-
world references as to how they would work if implemented for mobile sources and road 
congestion control. These considerations are relevant, since one would expect that such a 
program would carry a steep learning curve, both for the enforcing authorities, as well as for 
regular citizens that would be subjected to the policies. 
Based on the evidence presented here, it should be paramount to further evaluate the effects 
of public investment decisions, in order to reverse the problems posed by the phenomenon 
of induced travel and to shift the transportation model that persists in Mexico City and the 
rest of Mexican cities. However, such revisions should occur within a much broader public 
debate, relying on a careful analysis of policy alternatives, paying special attention to the 
design features and equity concerns, as well as the technological, operational and 
enforcement mechanisms that are used.  
 115 
References 
Albalate, D., & Bel, G. (2009). What Local Policy Makers Should Know about Urban Road 
Charging: Lessons from Worldwide Experience. Public Administration Review, 
69(5), 962-975. Retrieved from www.jstor.org/stable/40468975 
 
BANXICO. (2018). Sistema de Información Económica. Retrieved from 
http://www.banxico.org.mx/ 
 
Barr, L. (2000). Testing for the significance of induced highway travel demand in 
metropolitan areas. Transportation Research Record: Journal of the Transportation 
Research Board(1706), 1-8. 
 
Cervero, R. (2003). Road Expansion, Urban Growth, and Induced Travel. Journal of the 
American Planning Association, 69(2), 145. Retrieved from 
http://proxyiub.uits.iu.edu/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=
true&db=aph&AN=9512026&site=ehost-live&scope=site 
 
Cervero, R., & Hansen, M. (2002). Induced Travel Demand and Induced Road Investment: 
A Simultaneous Equation Analysis. Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, 
36(3), 469-490. Retrieved from 
http://www.jstor.org.proxyiub.uits.iu.edu/stable/20053915 
 
CONAPO, C. N. d. P. (2010). Delimitación de las zonas metropolitanas de México 2010. 
Retrieved from Mexico: 
http://www.conapo.gob.mx/es/CONAPO/Zonas_metropolitanas_2010 
 
Downs, A. (1962). The law of peak-hour expressway congestion. Traffic Quarterly, 16(3). 
 
Downs, A. (1992). Stuck in traffic: Coping with peak-hour traffic congestion: Brookings 
Institution Press. 
 
Fulton, L. M., Noland, R. B., Meszler, D. J., & Thomas, J. V. (2000). A statistical analysis of 
induced travel effects in the US mid-Atlantic region. Journal of Transportation and 
Statistics, 3(1), 1-14. 
 
Goodwin, P. B. (1996). Empirical evidence on induced traffic. Transportation, 23(1), 35-54. 
 
Gujarati, D. N. (2004). Basic Econometrics (4th edition ed.): McGraw-Hill. 
 
 116 
Gunn, H. F. (1981). Travel budgets—A review of evidence and modelling implications. 
Transportation Research Part A: General, 15(1), 7-23. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0191-2607(83)90012-2 
 
Hansen, M., & Huang, Y. (1997). Road supply and traffic in California urban areas. 
Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, 31(3), 205-218. 
 
Iracheta, A. X. (2009). Políticas Públicas para Gobernar las Metrópolis Mexicanas. Mexico 
City, Mexico: Miguel Angel Porrúa. 
 
Litman, T., & Colman, S. B. (2001). Generated traffic: Implications for transport planning. 
Institute of Transportation Engineers. ITE Journal, 71(4), 38. 
 
Metz, D. (2008). The myth of travel time saving. Transport reviews, 28(3), 321-336. 
 
Mokhtarian, P. L., & Chen, C. (2004). TTB or not TTB, that is the question: a review and 
analysis of the empirical literature on travel time (and money) budgets. 
Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, 38(9–10), 643-675. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tra.2003.12.004 
 
Noland, R. B. (2001). Relationships between highway capacity and induced vehicle travel. 
Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, 35(1), 47-72. 
 
Noland, R. B., & Cowart, W. A. (2000). Analysis of metropolitan highway capacity and the 
growth in vehicle miles of travel. Transportation, 27(4), 363-390. 
 
Noland, R. B., & Lem, L. L. (2002). A review of the evidence for induced travel and changes 
in transportation and environmental policy in the US and the UK. Transportation 
Research Part D: Transport and Environment, 7(1), 1-26. 
 
OECD. (2018). OECD Data, Purchasing Power Parities. Retrieved from 
https://data.oecd.org/conversion/purchasing-power-parities-ppp.htm 
 
Pindyck, R. S., & Rubinfeld, D. L. (1998). Econometric models and economic forecasts: 
Irwin/McGraw-Hill. 
 
Rodier, C. J., & Johnston, R. A. (2002). Uncertain socioeconomic projections used in travel 
demand and emissions models: could plausible errors result in air quality 
nonconformity? Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, 36(7), 613-
631. 
 117 
 
Salazar, C. E. (2012). Irregular. Suelo y mercado en América Latina. México: El Colegio de 
México. 
 
Strathman, J., Dueker, K., Sanchez, T., Zhang, J., & Riis, A.-E. (2000). Analysis of induced 
travel in the 1995 NPTS. Center for Urban Studies, Portland State University. 
 
Zahavi, Y., & Ryan, J. M. (1980). Stability of travel components over time. 
  
 118 
CHAPTER 3: 
ROAD-RELATED INVESTMENTS AND INDUCED TRAVEL IN METRO AREAS: 
THE CASES OF LOS ANGELES AND SAN FRANCISCO 
 
Abstract 
Induced travel is a phenomenon in which the problem of road congestion is tackled by 
increasing road capacity that, in turn, causes a series of unintended behavioral changes in 
the short run, in terms of new trips, longer travel distance, route changes, shifts in 
transportation modes and travel hours, that end up increasing the number of vehicles 
circulating and thus offsetting the benefits obtained from these infrastructure investments. 
In the long run, the additional road infrastructure may induce increases in vehicle ownership, 
reallocation of economic activities, and transformation of the urbanization patterns toward 
city expansion. Furthermore, induced travel may be enhanced by the allocation of public 
investment for road infrastructure, mostly used by private vehicles, becoming an opportunity 
cost for public transport or alternative transportation modes. The main policy implication of 
induced travel is that the public efforts for reducing road congestion, reducing commuting 
time or increasing travel speed, by increasing road capacity, may be actually reducing the 
overall efficiency of the entire transit system. 
The induced travel hypothesis has been observed in many cities of the world, and there is 
strong evidence that suggests the existence of both short- and long-term effects. The 
literature relies in a variety of methods and spatial configurations, mostly focusing on specific 
road projects using vehicle-miles traveled (VMT) as a measure for the amount of driving at 
the project and its immediate area of influence. Such approach is very appealing, since it 
provides results traceable to specific projects and areas of the city, however there are 
several shortcomings to it. The most important is that it is constrained to well defined city 
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areas since the data are obtained from local surveys, and they are not available to the rest 
of the city on a systematic and timely fashion as to allow for statistical inference. 
Modeling the induced travel phenomenon necessarily involves the inclusion of endogenous 
variables (road congestion induces decisions to increase road capacity that, in turn, induces 
more road congestion). For overcoming this potential problem, this research estimates a 
simultaneous equations system for the San Francisco Metro Area, and a recursive equations 
system for the Los Angeles Metro Area using county data for a 17-year period (2000 to 
2016). The goal of this research is to model induced travel at the metropolitan level, as 
opposed to the local dimension that is usually found in the literature. In that sense, it builds 
upon previous research and sheds light on the effects of induced travel on the city-wide 
transit system. In order to attain such goal, this research uses investment in road-related 
infrastructure, as opposed to mile-lane or similar variables, as a proxy measure of road 
capacity; and total registered vehicles instead of VMT, as a proxy variable for total driving in 
each political jurisdiction. Finally, the urbanization pattern is measured through yearly 
changes in the urban area size. This research is relevant for the induced travel literature 
because it presents a more integrated way for understanding the short- and long-term 
effects of the public decisions related to road infrastructure and the metropolitan transit 
system. 
1. Introduction 
Induced travel is a phenomenon that has been well documented in the transportation 
literature using different approaches, including statistical studies and quasi-experimental 
research with a variety of methods, such as instrumental variables and simultaneous 
equations systems. Recall from chapter two that induced travel encompasses, in the short 
run, five types of behavioral change due to additional road capacity, that may take the form 
of improvements or enlargement of road infrastructure: 1) new trips that otherwise would not 
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have happened, 2) longer travel distance, 3) changes in modal split, usually from public to 
private transportation, 4) changes in routes, and 5) changes in commute hour. (Cervero & 
Hansen, 2002; Downs, 1992; Litman & Colman, 2001). 
The endogeneity of the two-way causal relationship that exists between the construction of 
additional road capacity as a measure to tackle road congestion, which may end up inducing 
even more driving and road congestion, makes the task of modeling and measuring this 
phenomenon a highly complex one. In chapter two, a recursive equations system model 
was used to identify the existence and the magnitude of the induced travel phenomenon in 
Mexico City. The relevance of that research lies in the fact that no study has ever estimated 
an effect size of the induced travel problem in Mexico, at the project-specific level or 
otherwise, but rather, induced travel has been only addressed hypothetically by the mobility 
and transportation opinion-makers, or as a matter of perception and discourse, but with no 
quantitative evidence. 
The case presented in this chapter, corresponding to the metro areas of Los Angeles and 
San Francisco is different from the case of Mexico City, but it is also relevant for other 
reasons. In the first place, the urbanization patterns of U.S. cities are very specific, with 
California cities further possessing their own specificity. These patterns show expansive 
cities, where inhabitants of the wealthy suburbs commute to the city center and back, taking 
advantage of dense freeway networks that allow to live further away with relatively low 
negative effects in terms of financial costs or driving time budget. Mexican cities, on the 
contrary, have mixed patterns, where the wealthy areas tend to concentrate near the urban 
core, and the outskirts tend to be where the lower-income families live. However, it is also 
true that newer urban developments for higher income families usually locate further away 
from the city centers, creating a complex and heterogeneous mosaic with stark differences 
among neighboring areas. 
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In second place, Los Angeles and San Francisco have been widely studied in the past, and 
several quasi-experimental studies support a series of overall consistent results. (Cervero 
& Hansen, 2002; Noland & Lem, 2002) Nonetheless, these studies have focused mainly on 
specific road projects and the impacts on their immediate influence radio, but they do not 
address the problem from the perspective of the city as a whole. This research addresses 
the induced travel phenomenon from a metropolitan perspective by implicitly assuming that 
the effects of specific road infrastructure projects that may be causing a locally observable 
problem of induced travel, may also be causing a city-wide effect, since drivers usually do 
not limit their driving to the specific areas where projects are built, but rather they only pass 
by these infrastructures and move further to other parts of the city, therefore affecting a 
larger area, and potentially the entire city. 
This research contributes to further the understanding of the induced travel phenomenon by 
studying a seemingly local problem of road congestion that is addressed by constructing 
additional road capacity that is, however, potentially having an effect at the metropolitan 
level and, therefore, affecting the entire metropolitan transit system. This is relevant for the 
cases of Los Angeles and San Francisco, since there is no readily available evidence of the 
magnitude of the problem at the metropolitan level. 
As mentioned before, chapters two and three test the induced travel hypothesis from a 
metropolitan perspective and, therefore, they share the same theoretical framework. This 
approach is applied to three different metro areas, that can be grouped together into two 
cases: 1) Mexico City in Mexico (chapter two), and 2) Los Angeles and San Francisco in 
California (chapter three). Since the theoretical framework is the same, the Literature 
Review is also the same for both chapters, however the remaining sections are different for 
each one.  
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2. Data and Methods 
a) Data 
The public investment in road-related infrastructure variable used yearly reporting of 
public expenditures on road-related projects for each metro area. The data were obtained 
from the California State Controller and the California Department of Transportation at the 
city, county and state levels. Expenditures include construction of new roads, reconstruction 
of existing ones, installment of signals, and overall maintenance of roads, in the form of 
patching and sealing. The registered vehicles variable uses yearly data on the number of 
total autos registered at local jurisdictions within metropolitan areas. The data were obtained 
from the Bureau of Transportation Statistics at the Department of Transportation. 
The modal split variable uses yearly data on the number of trips made using the public 
transportation system. The data were obtained from the Bureau of Transportation Statistics 
at the Department of Transportation. The urban area variable uses yearly data on the total 
size of the urban area by county. The total size of the urban area was obtained by GIS 
remote sensing procedures for each year using end-of-year satellite imagery (usually 
December of the corresponding year), although close time ranges were used in some cases 
in order to obtain the clearest images possible. The imagery was obtained from the United 
States Geological Survey. Analysis of the years 2000 to 2012 used Landsat 7 imagery, and 
Landsat 8 was used for the years 2013 to 2016. Finally, total population data at the county 
level were obtained from the US Census Bureau.  
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b) Methods 
This research is intended to measure the effect that three endogenous variables subject to 
reverse causality have over each other, therefore it is necessary to address the issue of 
endogeneity. A simultaneous equations system using two-stage least squares (TSLS) is 
proposed since it is a method that adequately addresses this issue. The system, in this form, 
would be estimated independently for each metro area; however, following the same 
structure. The theoretical structural equations are the following: 
𝐸𝑞	𝐴:	𝑉𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑠! = 𝛼" + 𝛼#𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡!,%&' + 𝛼(𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑎𝑙𝑆𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑡! + 𝛼)𝑉𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑠!,%&# + 𝛼*𝑈𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎! + 𝑋!𝛼 + 𝜀#! 𝐸𝑞	𝐵:	𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡! = 𝛽" + 𝛽#𝑉𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑠!,%&' + 𝛽(𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑎𝑙𝑆𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑡! + 𝛽)𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡!,%&# + 𝛽*𝑈𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎! + 𝑋!𝛽 + 𝜀(! 
𝐸𝑞	𝐶:	𝑈𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎!= 𝛿" + 𝛿#𝑉𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑠!,%&' + 𝛿(𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡!,%&' + 𝛿)𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑎𝑙𝑆𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑡!,%&' + 𝛿*𝑈𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎!,%&# + 𝑋!𝛿 + 𝜀*! 
Where: 
𝑉𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑠! is the total number of registered vehicles. 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡! is the total investment in road-related infrastructure (in its different variations). 𝑈𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎! is the total size of the urban area. 𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑎𝑙𝑆𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑡! is the number of unlinked passenger trips using the mass public transportation 
system. 
𝑋!𝛼,	𝑋!𝛽 and 𝑋!𝛿 are vectors of exogenously determined covariates. 
Additionally, lagged versions of the endogenous variables are included, since they strongly 
depend on their past behavior. Since these lagged variables are predetermined within the 
system in prior periods, it is assumed that they are exogenously predetermined.4 
 
4 The lagged variables were constructed by hand, independently from the SAS and Stata LAG 
functions to avoid bringing values from one jurisdiction into the data points for the next one, since the 
database uses a combination of cross-section and time series data points for each city and each 
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For these models, the common practice is to keep the modal split or public transportation 
variables on the right-hand side of the equations in order to allow using them as a policy 
variable. (Cervero & Hansen, 2002; Strathman et al., 2000) This means that one could 
exogenously alter its value to reflect policy goals and forecast its effects over the system. 
Order condition of identification: 
To test if the equations system is identified, we can look at the following matrix of 
endogenous and exogenous covariates, where Y1 is vehicles, Y2 is roads investments, Y3 is 
the urban area size, X1 is the modal split and X2 is a pre-determined exogenous variable. 
Table 1. Endogenous and exogenous covariates matrix 
Endogenous left-hand 
variables 
Endogenous right-hand 
variables 
Predetermined (exogenous) right-hand 
variables Y1i	 Y2i	 Y3i	 Y1i	 Y2i	 Y3i	 Y1i,t-n	 Y2i,t-n	 Y3i,t-n	 X1i,t-n	 X2	1	 0	 0	 0	 0	 1	 1	 1	 0	 1	 1	0	 1	 0	 0	 0	 1	 1	 1	 0	 1	 1	0	 0	 1	 0	 0	 0	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	
The order condition is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for identification of the 
system. If 𝐾 − 𝑘 ≥ 𝑚 − 1, the model is identified, where K is the number of predetermined 
variables in the model, k is the number of predetermined variables in a given equation, and m is the number of endogenous variables in a given equation. (Gujarati, 2004, p. 748) 
On structural equations one and two, K=13, k=4,	and m=2, therefore the order condition is 
met since 𝐾 − 𝑘 = 9 and 𝑚− 1 = 1 for each of them. For the third structural equation, K=13,	k=5 and m=1, thus 𝐾 − 𝑘 = 8 and 𝑚− 1 = 0, therefore meeting the order condition, and 
having the system identified as a whole.  
 
year. Additionally, not all jurisdictions have information for all years, thus the manual construction of 
the lagged variables prevented from using data for years that, otherwise, would be missing. 
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Rank condition of identification: 
The rank condition provides a sufficient condition for identifying the system of equations. If 
in a model of M equations with M	endogenous variables is possible to construct at least one 
nonzero determinant of order (M-1)(M-1) from the coefficients of both endogenous and 
predetermined variables excluded from that particular equation, then the equation is 
identified. (Gujarati, 2004, p. 752) To check if the rank condition is met, we use the structural 
equations solving for the error term, and substituting the names of the endogenous variables 
for Yi, and the predetermined variables by Yi,t-n, or Xi, and then looking at their corresponding 
matrices: 𝐸𝑞	𝐴:	𝑌! − 𝛼" − 𝛼!𝑌#,%&' − 𝛼#𝑋! − 𝛼(𝑌!,%&! − 𝛼)𝑌( − 𝛼*𝑋# = 𝜀! 𝐸𝑞	𝐵: 𝑌# − 𝛽" − 𝛽!𝑌!,%&' − 𝛽#𝑋! − 𝛽(𝑌#,%&! − 𝛽)𝑌( − 𝛽*𝑋# = 𝜀# 𝐸𝑞	𝐶: 𝑌( − 𝛿" − 𝛿!𝑌!,%&' − 𝛿#𝑌#,%&' − 𝛿(𝑋!,%&' − 𝛿)𝑌(,%&! − 𝛿*𝑋# = 𝜀( 
Table 2. Coefficients matrix 
Eq. Coefficients 
1 Y1 Y2 Y3 Y1,t-n Y2,t-n Y3,t-n X1 X2 
A −𝛼" 1 0 −𝛼* −𝛼) −𝛼# 0 −𝛼( −𝛼2 
B −𝛽" 0 1 −𝛽* −𝛽# −𝛽) 0 −𝛽( −𝛽2 
C −𝛿" 0 0 1 −𝛿# −𝛿( −𝛿* −𝛿) −𝛿2 
Equations matrices for excluded coefficients: 
𝐴 = _1 00 −𝛿4` where 𝐷𝑒𝑡𝐴 = b1 00 −𝛿4b = −𝛿4 
𝐵 = _1 00 −𝛿4` where 𝐷𝑒𝑡𝐵 = b1 00 −𝛿4b = −𝛿4 
𝐵 = c1 00 1d where 𝐷𝑒𝑡𝐵 = e1 00 1e = 1
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Therefore, assuming that the coefficients are nonzero, the system meets the rank condition, 
hence it can be estimated. It is expected that not all the predetermined variables will have a 
nonzero coefficient, in which case the structural equations will be adjusted to reflect the best 
possible fit. 
3. Results and Discussion 
The results are presented separately for the two metro areas. In the case of the Los Angeles 
Metro Area, no specification using the urban area turned out to be statistically significant; 
therefore, all results were estimated using recursive equations systems, and are presented 
in terms of Equations A and B only. For the case of the San Francisco Metro Area, it was 
possible to estimate most specifications using simultaneous equations systems. 
After running Breusch-Pagan tests for the two or three dependent variables (depending on 
the type of system) on the corresponding independent variables for each model, a problem 
of heteroskedasticity was found on all the variations of all specifications. Thus, all models 
utilized robust standard errors in order to correct for standard deviation bias and to properly 
test for the significance of each variable. The variance inflation factors were also estimated 
to prevent the occurrence of a problem of multicollinearity, and the corresponding 
corrections were made for each model individually. Once the best possible model was 
identified for each equation, it was included in the recursive or simultaneous equations 
systems. The specifications summary is as follows:  
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Table 3. Specifications summary 
Los Angeles Metro Area San Francisco Metro Area 
Equation A Equation B Equation A Equation B Equation C 
Recursive Equation System Simultaneous Equation System 
Total number 
of vehicles 
(registered 
vehicles) 
Total investment in new 
roads, reconstruction and 
signals Total number of vehicles 
(registered 
vehicles) 
Total 
investment in 
new roads, 
reconstruction 
and signals 
Urban area 
Total investment in new 
roads, reconstruction, 
signals, patching and sealing 
Source: Iracheta, J.A. 
a) Los Angeles Metro Area 
For the case of the Los Angeles Metro Area, the urban area variable, which measures the 
size of the total urban area for each county and each year, turned out to be non-statistically 
significant on all variations of equations A and B. Therefore, it was not possible to include 
Equation C, which utilizes urban area on the left-hand side of the equation since no 
interactions with equations A and B would occur. Therefore, a recursive equations system 
was used. The main results summary is presented in Table 4. 
Equation A models the effects that investments on road-related infrastructure have over the 
size of the vehicle fleet in the city, in this case measured by the total number of registered 
vehicles working as a proxy variable. Equation B is intended to show the effect the vehicle 
fleet size has over the amount of resources that are dedicated to road-related infrastructure. 
In this equation there are two variations for its dependent variable: models one through three 
use total investment in new roads, roads reconstruction and signaling, whereas models four 
through six use investment in patching and sealing, in addition to new roads, reconstruction 
of existing ones and signaling. 
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In Equation A, model one shows that for every additional dollar invested in new roads, 
reconstruction of existing ones and installation of roads signaling, there is an additional 
registration of 0.0089 vehicles the same year of the investment. In a more understandable 
scale, these coefficients show that, for every additional one million dollars of investment in 
road-related infrastructure (construction of new roads, reconstruction of existing ones, 
signals, patching and sealing), there is an increment of 8,400 registered vehicles that will 
take place in that year as well as in the two coming years (model six). This figure is of 8,100 
If we look at one year after the investment (model five), and of 7,700 if we look at the year 
in which the investment takes place (model four). All coefficients are statistically significant 
at 99% confidence. These results point out that investments on road-related infrastructure 
have a persistent effect over time in terms of the number of vehicles that are registered, and 
such effect seems to be incremental as time goes by. Such results are consistent with what 
was expected, since improvements in road infrastructure appear to have a positive effect on 
decisions about driving, or at least about having a registered vehicle that allows for the 
possibility of choosing a private vehicle as transportation mode. 
Regarding Equation B, the results show that for every additional registered vehicle, there is 
an increase in roads infrastructure investment of about 102 dollars, which is equivalent to 
saying that, for every 10,000 additional registered vehicles, there is an increment of 1.02 
million dollars in investments for new roads, reconstruction of existing ones, and signaling. 
When looking at the effects of vehicles that are registered in previous years, there are no 
relevant changes, since the invested amount increases to 103 and 104 dollars when the 
vehicle registration takes place one and two years prior to the investment respectively. All 
the coefficients are statistically significant at 99% confidence. These results point out that 
there is a relatively steady relationship between vehicle registrations and the financial 
resources destined to building roads infrastructure. These results are also consistent with 
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what was expected, since it has been claimed that, as the size of the vehicle fleet increases, 
road congestion, especially during rush hours, also increases, influencing decision-makers 
to dedicate more resources to expand or improve road-related infrastructure, thus fueling 
the endogenous cycle of induced travel. 
In Equation B, public transportation ridership is a relevant variable to consider. For every 
additional thousand public transportation rides, there is an increment of between 240 and 
257 dollars in investment for roads infrastructure. If we consider that, only in Los Angeles 
County there were 569.2 millions of unlinked passenger trips (rides) during 2016, this 
amount would have an effect on investment of between 136 and 146 million dollars during 
that year, which represents between 14 and 15% of the 953.7 million dollars that were 
invested in Los Angeles County in construction of new roads, reconstruction of existing ones 
and signaling. These effects seem counterintuitive since one would expect that public 
transportation additional trips would reduce the need for additional investments in road-
related infrastructure; however, such effect might be only reflecting increments in the overall 
metropolitan number of trips made, which would use all transportation modes available. 
The results for models four through six, corresponding to investment in patching and sealing, 
in addition to investment in new roads, reconstruction of existing ones and signaling; are 
similar to what was observed in models one through three. In Equation A, for every additional 
one million dollars invested on roads infrastructure, there is a 7,700 increase in registered 
vehicles in the year that the investment takes place (model four). When the investment 
happens one year before, the number of registered vehicles increases to 8,100 (model five), 
and when the investment takes place two years before (model six), the increment is of 8,400 
registered vehicles. All coefficients are statistically significant at 99% percent confidence. 
In Equation B, the results show that for every additional registered vehicle, there is a 121 
dollar increase in roads infrastructure investment. This means that, for every 10,000 
 131 
additional registered vehicles, there is a 1.21 million dollar increase to the amount destined 
for roads infrastructure. In terms of the registrations that took place one year before, the 
investment amount for every 10,000 additional registered vehicles increases to $1.23 
million, and for registrations that took place two years before, the investment in roads 
infrastructure is of $1.24 million. All coefficients are statistically significant at 99% 
confidence. 
Public transportation ridership has statistically significant effects on both equations. For 
Equation A, an increment of 10,000 additional unlinked passenger trips (rides) has an effect 
of reducing the number of vehicle registrations between 9 and 16 units. If we assume that 
one person takes two trips every one of the 260 workdays (for example, to go to work, or 
school, and back), per year; then one person would be taking around 520 trips yearly. 
Hence, 10,000 trips would be the approximate number of total trips that 19.2 (~20) people 
would take, on average, over the year. One could say that a reduction of between 9 and 16 
vehicle registrations might be due to shifts in transportation mode from private vehicles to 
public transportation. In terms of Equation B, for every additional thousand public 
transportation rides, there is an increment of between 229 and 250 dollars in investment for 
roads infrastructure. Again, if we consider the total number of unlinked passenger trips 
(rides) in Los Angeles County for 2016 (569.2 millions), this amount would mean an 
investment of between 130 and 142 million dollars during that year, which represents 
between 12 and 14% of the 1.053 billion dollars that were invested in Los Angeles County 
in construction of new roads, reconstruction of existing ones, signaling, sealing and 
patching. As mentioned before, these effects might reflect an overall increment in the 
number of trips made throughout the metropolitan area, on all transportation modes 
available.  
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b) San Francisco Metro Area 
In contrast to what was observed for Los Angeles, it was possible to estimate most 
specifications using simultaneous equations systems for the San Francisco Metro Area. On 
all specifications, the road-related infrastructure investment variables include investment in 
construction of new roads, reconstruction of existing ones and signaling. The main results 
summary is presented in Table 5 (5.1 through 5.3). 
Equation A is intended to model how the number of registered vehicles is affected by road-
related infrastructure investment decisions, as well as by changes in the size of the urban 
area. The results show that, for each additional one million dollars of investment in roads 
infrastructure, there is a vehicle registration increase of 3,683 units the year in which the 
investment takes place, and there is an increment of 3,588 vehicles registered for 
investments that are realized one year before. However, there is an unexpected result when 
looking at investment taking place two years prior to the vehicle registration, in which for 
each additional one million dollars of investment in road-related infrastructure, there is a 
reduction of between 1,080 and 1,090 vehicle registrations in the current year, which is the 
opposite effect than what is expected. In terms of the relationship between the size of the 
urban area and the number of registered vehicles, for each increment of one hectare in the 
size of the urban area there is an associated effect of between 10.9 (~11) and 19.8 (~20) 
additional registered vehicles, which means that, for every additional 100 hectares in the 
size of the urban area, there are between 1,100 and 2,000 new registered vehicles. These 
results are consistent with the theoretical model, since it is to be expected that, given a more 
extended city, families will require additional vehicles to meet their transportation 
requirements, especially because newer urbanized areas tend to gain access to the public 
transportation networks (if they ever gain access) after the urbanization occurs. 
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Table 5.a. Simultaneous equations systems main results summary (1 of 3) 
 
* p<0.1,     ** p<0.05,     *** p<0.01 
Source: Iracheta, J.A.  
Total investment in new roads, reconstruction and signals (t) (US$) 0.003683* 0.35022 -0.00053 -0.05087 -0.00054 -0.05147
Total investment in new roads, reconstruction and signals (t-1) (US$)
Total investment in new roads, reconstruction and signals (t-2) (US$)
Mass public transportation total unlinked rides (t) (Rides) -0.00013 -0.01744 0.000669*** 0.09404 0.00067*** 0.09422
Mass public transportation total unlinked rides (t-1) (Rides)
Mass public transportation total unlinked rides (t-2) (Rides)
Urban area (t) (Has) 11.31869*** 0.62357 19.02984*** 1.04670 19.03912*** 1.04721
Urban area (t-1) (Has)
Urban area (t-2) (Has)
Total number of vehicles (t-1) (Vehicles)
Total number of vehicles (t-2) (Vehicles)
Intercept 39,695.99** 0 27,586.09** 0 27,624.35** 0
Adjusted r2
Total number of vehicles (t) (Vehicles) -8.93323 -0.09394 12.24632** 0.12875 11.94326** 0.12556
Total number of vehicles (t-1) (Vehicles)
Total number of vehicles (t-2) (Vehicles)
Mass public transportation total unlinked rides (t) (Rides) 0.033737 0.04855 0.056983** 0.08425 0.05672** 0.08386
Mass public transportation total unlinked rides (t-1) (Rides)
Mass public transportation total unlinked rides (t-2) (Rides)
Urban area (t) (Has)
Urban area (t-1) (Has)
Urban area (t-2) (Has)
Total investment in new roads, reconstruction and signals (t-1) (US$) 1.006187** 0.97269 0.806462*** 0.78135 0.809217*** 0.78402
Total investment in new roads, reconstruction and signals (t-2) (US$)
Intercept 4,594,186 0 2,326,331 0 2,354,916 0
Adjusted r2
Total number of vehicles (t) (Vehicles) 0.055566*** 1.00861
Total number of vehicles (t-1) (Vehicles) 0.05168*** 0.9259
Total number of vehicles (t-2) (Vehicles) 0.05251*** 0.92768
Total investment in new roads, reconstruction and signals (t) (US$)
Total investment in new roads, reconstruction and signals (t-1) (US$)
Total investment in new roads, reconstruction and signals (t-2) (US$) 0.000042** 0.06761 0.00004** 0.06507
Mass public transportation total unlinked rides (t) (Rides)
Mass public transportation total unlinked rides (t-1) (Rides)  -0.00003*** -0.06305  -0.00003*** -0.07182  -0.00003*** -0.07205
Mass public transportation total unlinked rides (t-2) (Rides)
Urban area (t-1) (Has)
Urban area (t-2) (Has)
Intercept  -1,850.53** 0  -1,420.74** 0  -1,433.95** 0
Adjusted r2
N (for the equations system)
EQUATION B: TOTAL INVESTMENT IN NEW ROADS, RECONSTRUCTION AND SIGNALS
EQUATION C: URBAN AREA
EQUATION A: TOTAL NUMBER OF VEHICLES
154 144 144
0.92711 0.94962 0.94891
0.8240 0.8393 0.8393
0.8894 0.9480 0.9479
Equations System 1 Equations System 2 Equations System 3
Variable
Coefficient (Statistical significance) / Standardized coefficient
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Table 5.b. Simultaneous equations systems main results summary (2 of 3) 
 
* p<0.1,     ** p<0.05,     *** p<0.01 
Source: Iracheta, J.A.  
Total investment in new roads, reconstruction and signals (t) (US$)
Total investment in new roads, reconstruction and signals (t-1) (US$) 0.003588* 0.32980 -0.0006 -0.05502 -0.00051 -0.04715
Total investment in new roads, reconstruction and signals (t-2) (US$)
Mass public transportation total unlinked rides (t) (Rides) -3.10E-06 -0.00042 0.000662*** 0.09316 0.000649*** 0.09127
Mass public transportation total unlinked rides (t-1) (Rides)
Mass public transportation total unlinked rides (t-2) (Rides)
Urban area (t) (Has) 10.95817*** 0.60371 19.1857*** 1.05527 19.01663*** 1.04597
Urban area (t-1) (Has)
Urban area (t-2) (Has)
Total number of vehicles (t-1) (Vehicles)
Total number of vehicles (t-2) (Vehicles)
Intercept 54,812.13*** 0 26,389.4** 0 26,988.06** 0
Adjusted r2
Total number of vehicles (t) (Vehicles)
Total number of vehicles (t-1) (Vehicles) 13.6448** 0.14144 12.48606** 0.12936 12.48606** 0.12936
Total number of vehicles (t-2) (Vehicles)
Mass public transportation total unlinked rides (t) (Rides) 0.05363** 0.07718 0.056867** 0.08408 0.056867** 0.08408
Mass public transportation total unlinked rides (t-1) (Rides)
Mass public transportation total unlinked rides (t-2) (Rides)
Urban area (t) (Has)
Urban area (t-1) (Has)
Urban area (t-2) (Has)
Total investment in new roads, reconstruction and signals (t-1) (US$) 0.799994*** 0.77336 0.805617*** 0.78053 0.805617*** 0.78053
Total investment in new roads, reconstruction and signals (t-2) (US$)
Intercept 2,570,544 0 2,329,646 0 2,329,646 0
Adjusted r2
Total number of vehicles (t) (Vehicles) 0.05557*** 1.00861
Total number of vehicles (t-1) (Vehicles) 0.05168*** 0.92591
Total number of vehicles (t-2) (Vehicles) 0.05251*** 0.92768
Total investment in new roads, reconstruction and signals (t) (US$)
Total investment in new roads, reconstruction and signals (t-1) (US$)
Total investment in new roads, reconstruction and signals (t-2) (US$) 0.000042** 0.06761 0.00004* 0.06507
Mass public transportation total unlinked rides (t) (Rides)
Mass public transportation total unlinked rides (t-1) (Rides)  -0.00003*** -0.06305  -0.00003*** -0.07182  -0.00003*** -0.07205
Mass public transportation total unlinked rides (t-2) (Rides)
Urban area (t-1) (Has)
Urban area (t-2) (Has)
Intercept  -1,850.53** 0  -1,420.74** 0  -1,433.95** 0
Adjusted r2
N (for the equations system)
EQUATION B: TOTAL INVESTMENT IN NEW ROADS, RECONSTRUCTION AND SIGNALS
EQUATION C: URBAN AREA
154 144 144
0.92711 0.94962 0.94891
0.84099 0.83923 0.83923
0.8887 0.9484 0.9490
EQUATION A: TOTAL NUMBER OF VEHICLES
Variable
Coefficient (Statistical significance) / Standardized coefficient
Equations System 4 Equations System 5 Equations System 6
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Table 5.c. Simultaneous equations systems main results summary (3 of 3) 
 
* p<0.1,     ** p<0.05,     *** p<0.01 
Source: Iracheta, J.A. 
Total investment in new roads, reconstruction and signals (t) (US$)
Total investment in new roads, reconstruction and signals (t-1) (US$)
Total investment in new roads, reconstruction and signals (t-2) (US$)  -0.00109** -0.09665  -0.00108** -0.09604
Mass public transportation total unlinked rides (t) (Rides) 0.000725*** 0.10195 0.000724*** 0.10182
Mass public transportation total unlinked rides (t-1) (Rides)
Mass public transportation total unlinked rides (t-2) (Rides)
Urban area (t) (Has) 19.8107*** 1.08965 19.7982*** 1.08896
Urban area (t-1) (Has)
Urban area (t-2) (Has)
Total number of vehicles (t-1) (Vehicles)
Total number of vehicles (t-2) (Vehicles)
Intercept 31,271.34** 0 31,298.02** 0
Adjusted r2
Total number of vehicles (t) (Vehicles)
Total number of vehicles (t-1) (Vehicles)
Total number of vehicles (t-2) (Vehicles) 12.35018** 0.12618 12.35018** 0.12618
Mass public transportation total unlinked rides (t) (Rides) 0.056798** 0.08398 0.056798** 0.08398
Mass public transportation total unlinked rides (t-1) (Rides)
Mass public transportation total unlinked rides (t-2) (Rides)
Urban area (t) (Has)
Urban area (t-1) (Has)
Urban area (t-2) (Has)
Total investment in new roads, reconstruction and signals (t-1) (US$) 0.808262*** 0.78309 0.808262*** 0.78309
Total investment in new roads, reconstruction and signals (t-2) (US$)
Intercept 2,351,715 0 2,351,715 0
Adjusted r2
Total number of vehicles (t) (Vehicles) 0.053967*** 0.98116
Total number of vehicles (t-1) (Vehicles) 0.051681*** 0.92591
Total number of vehicles (t-2) (Vehicles)
Total investment in new roads, reconstruction and signals (t) (US$)
Total investment in new roads, reconstruction and signals (t-1) (US$)
Total investment in new roads, reconstruction and signals (t-2) (US$) 0.000042** 0.06761
Mass public transportation total unlinked rides (t) (Rides)
Mass public transportation total unlinked rides (t-1) (Rides)  -0.00003*** -0.06104  -0.00003*** -0.07182
Mass public transportation total unlinked rides (t-2) (Rides)
Urban area (t-1) (Has)
Urban area (t-2) (Has)
Intercept -1,048.67 0  -1,420.74** 0
Adjusted r2
N (for the equations system)
Coefficient (Statistical significance) / Standardized coefficient
EQUATION B: TOTAL INVESTMENT IN NEW ROADS, RECONSTRUCTION AND SIGNALS
EQUATION C: URBAN AREA
EQUATION A: TOTAL NUMBER OF VEHICLES
Variable
Equations System 7 Equations System 8
144 144
0.9484 0.9496
0.8389 0.8389
0.9468 0.9469
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Regarding public transportation, for every 10,000 additional unlinked passenger trips, there 
is an increment of between 6 and 7 new vehicle registrations. These results are somehow 
counterintuitive, since one would expect that a larger number of public transportation trips 
would reflect a reduction in the number of vehicle registrations. However, these results might 
actually be showing that large increments in public transportation ridership negatively affect 
the quality of the service, causing some users to shift from public to private transportation. 
Equation B is intended to model the effect that vehicle registrations and the size of the urban 
area have over investment decisions on road-related infrastructure. The results show that, 
for every additional one thousand vehicle registrations, there is an increment of between 
$11,900 and $12,246 dedicated to road-related infrastructure in the year in which the 
registration takes place. The investment in roads-related infrastructure increases in an 
amount of between $12,486 and $13,645 for every one thousand additional vehicles 
registered one year before the investment takes place, and about $12,350 for vehicle 
registration occurring two years before the investments take place. These results suggest 
that the number of vehicle registrations affects road-related investment decisions of the 
current year, but also of subsequent years, which is consistent with the theoretical model. 
Public transportation ridership also has an effect over infrastructure investment decisions. 
Equation B shows that, for every additional 10,000 unlinked passenger trips, or in a more 
understandable scale (as pointed out for Los Angeles), for the yearly trips made by 19 
people, there is an increment of between $530 and $570 investment in road-related 
infrastructure. These results seem counterintuitive, since one would expect that the more 
trips are made using public transportation, the smaller the amount that would be destined to 
road-related infrastructure; however, given the relatively small effect size, it is possible to 
say that this relationship reflects increments in the overall trips made within the metro area, 
regardless of the mode used for those trips. 
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Total investment in roads infrastructure is also affected by past investments. The results 
suggest that past investments represent around 80% of current investment decisions, i.e. 
for every 80 cents invested in road-related infrastructure in t0, there is one-dollar investment 
in t1. A limitation of the simultaneous equation specification and of the data, is that it was not 
possible to model the relationship between the expansion of the urban area and increments 
in investment for road-related infrastructure. In all models strong multicollinearity was 
observed between the size of the urban area and other variables of interest, hence urban 
area size was excluded from this equation to avoid potential problems. 
Equation C models the effect that vehicle registrations and investments in road-related 
infrastructure have over the size of the urban area. The results show that, for every additional 
one thousand vehicle registrations, there is an increment of between 54 and 56 hectares in 
the size of the urban area on the same year that the registration takes place. But vehicle 
registration also affects the size of the urban area in subsequent years. For example, for 
every one thousand registered vehicles, urban size grows by around 51 hectares the 
following year, and by around 52 hectares two years after the registration. In other words, 
the number of vehicle registrations has relatively strong short- and long-term effects over 
the size of the urban area. If we consider that in 2016, there were 5,491 additional vehicle 
registrations in San Francisco County, the corresponding increase in the urban area would 
be of about 286 hectares directly related to the changes in the size of the vehicle fleet of the 
city. To put in perspective, during the period of analysis for this research (2000-2016) there 
was an increment of 62,639 vehicle registrations in San Francisco County, which would 
represent an enlargement of the urban area of about 3,257 hectares, representing 27.4% of 
the total urban area as of 2016. 
In terms of the effects of investments in road-related infrastructure over urban area size, the 
results showed that these investments have a two-year delayed effect on the urban area 
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size. For every additional one million dollars investment, there was an increment in the size 
of the urban area of between 40 and 42 hectares two years after the investment took place, 
which is what is expected according to the theoretical model. In 2014, there was an 
additional road-related infrastructure investment of $30.5 million compared to 2013. If the 
results are accurate, such investment would have pushed the urban area to grow about 
1,218 hectares in the two following years. 
The results regarding public transportation show that, for every 10,000 additional unlinked 
passenger trips, there is a reduction of 0.3 hectares in the size of the urban area. Again, 
assuming that 10,000 trips represent, on average, the total yearly trips made by 19 people, 
these results would mean that, if 100 additional people shifted mode in favor of public 
transportation, the urban area would be reduced in about 1.6 hectares. Such result is, of 
course, impossible since the urban area does not shrink, but rather shows how shifting 
modes from private to public transportation reduces the pressure over enlargement of the 
urban area. 
4. Conclusions 
This research is intended to produce and measure the existence of the induced travel 
phenomenon in the metropolitan areas of Los Angeles and San Francisco. Past studies 
have focused on specific road-related infrastructure projects, such as construction of 
additional lanes, or major infrastructure projects, however, there is not much evidence on if 
and how the phenomenon takes place at the metropolitan level. The metropolitan level of 
analysis is relevant, since people use the infrastructure built within specific projects only for 
a fraction of their entire trips, since they still need to make it to their final destination, 
regardless of whether there is adequate infrastructure to support the number of vehicles 
circulating in the area. Therefore, it is to be expected that the problems of induced travel not 
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only affect the areas where the infrastructure projects are developed, but also the entire 
metropolitan area. 
In broad terms, induced travel can be explained as follows: When a city suffers from road 
congestion and increasing travel time, there is an incentive for public decision-makers to 
dedicate resources to enlarge or improve road-related infrastructure. In turn, when such 
infrastructure is constructed, there are strong positive incentives for private vehicle users to 
increase the usage of their vehicles, and for non-private vehicle users to shift mode from 
public transportation (or other modes) to private vehicles. In turn, the increment in trips made 
using private vehicles overwhelms the capacity of existing infrastructure, again creating 
problems of road congestion and travel time, further inducing government decision-makers 
to dedicate additional financial resources to enlarge or improve road-related infrastructure. 
This results in a descending spiral where road congestion creates the need for increasing 
infrastructure spending. At this point, it is important to consider that all of this road-related 
spending represents an opportunity cost to improving the public transportation system as 
well as other modes different than private vehicles. 
Finally, to fully elucidate the idea of induced travel, one must consider that the expansion of 
the road-related infrastructure, i.e. additional lanes, bypasses, freeways, junctions, and the 
like, tends to facilitate access to farther-away urban developments. This, in turn, creates an 
incentive for urban expansion, which is more difficult to address via public transportation, 
limiting the alternatives of transportation modes to private vehicles which again exacerbates 
the problems of road congestion and the need for additional road-related infrastructure. 
For the Los Angeles Metro Area it was only possible to estimate equations A and B of the 
three-simultaneous equation system, thus a recursive equations system was used. The 
excluded equation (Equation C) was intended to model the effects of the size of the urban 
area over road-related infrastructure investment and the number of registered vehicles. 
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The results for Los Angeles show that increments in the size of the vehicle fleet, as 
measured by the number of registered vehicles, has an effect of increasing public spending 
for road-related infrastructure that, in turn, has an effect of increasing the number of vehicle 
registrations, thus suggesting the existence of induced travel. According to the results, each 
additional $1 million investment in construction of new roads, reconstruction of existing ones, 
signaling, sealing and patching, increases by 8,400 the number of vehicle registrations 
starting the year of the investment and for up to two years after. Considering that, in the 
period from 2000 to 2016 there was a total investment in road-related infrastructure of $26.7 
billion for the entire metropolitan area, this figure would have induced a total of 5.1 million 
vehicle registrations, representing approximately 48.4% of the entire vehicle fleet. 
Figure 1. Induced travel in the Los Angeles Metro Area 
 
Source: Iracheta, J.A. 
For every additional 10,000 vehicle registrations there was an effect of increasing the 
amount dedicated to road-related infrastructure of about $1.21 millions. Considering that the 
total number of vehicle registrations in the entire metropolitan area was of 10.6 million 
vehicles as of 2016, the total amount of road-related infrastructure investment that would 
have been induced by the change in the size of the vehicle fleet would have been of a little 
under $1.3 billion, representing 12.3% of the total investment. 
Investment in road 
infrastructureVehicle fleet
$1.21 million
7,700 vehicles
(-for each additional-
US$1 million)
(-for each additional-
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For the San Francisco Metro Area, it was possible to estimate the complete theoretical 
model using a simultaneous equations system of three equations. The results show that 
increments in the number of registered vehicles increase public spending for road-related 
infrastructure. In turn, this has the effect of increasing the number of vehicle registrations. 
Also, the results demonstrate that the number of registered vehicles increases the size of 
the urban area, which in turn has a positive effect on the number of registered vehicles. 
Additional spending in road-related infrastructure also has an effect of increasing the size of 
the urban area; however, it was not possible to estimate the effect that changes in the size 
of the urban area has over the amount of resources dedicated to road-related infrastructure. 
Similar to what was observed for Los Angeles, these results clearly suggest the existence 
of induced travel, with the additional positive feature of being able to estimate the complete 
theoretical model. 
According to the results, each additional $1 million investment in construction of new roads, 
reconstruction of existing ones and signaling increases by 3,683 the number of vehicle 
registrations. For example, if we consider that in the period from 2000 to 2016 there was a 
total investment in road-related infrastructure of $8.1 billion for the entire metropolitan area, 
the expected number of induced registered vehicles due to such investment is of 469,735 
vehicles, representing approximately 8.4% of the total vehicle fleet as of 2016. 
For every additional 1,000 vehicle registrations there was an effect of $11.9 to $12.2 
thousand increase in the amount dedicated to road-related infrastructure. Considering that 
the total number of vehicle registrations in the entire metropolitan area as of 2016 was of 
5,894,661 vehicles, the total amount of road-related infrastructure investment that would 
have been induced by the change in the size of the vehicle fleet would have been of between 
$1.05 and $1.08 billion, representing between 13 and 13.4% of the total investment. 
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In terms of the size of the urban area, both variables have a positive effect. In the first case, 
each additional 1,000 vehicle registrations increases the size of the urban area between 54 
and 56 hectares. In the second case, an additional $1 million investment in road-related 
infrastructure also increases the urban area between 40 and 42 hectares, but two years after 
the investment takes place. In other words, there is a positive long-term effect of investment 
decisions about road-related infrastructure over the size of the urban area. Considering that 
the increment in size of the urban area from 2013 to 2014 was of 220.5 hectares, it is 
possible to say that around 43% of such enlargement can be traced to the induced travel 
phenomenon, as explained by the bidirectional relationship of investment in road-related 
infrastructure and the size of the city’s vehicle fleet. 
Figure 2. Induced travel in the San Francisco Metro Area 
 
Source: Iracheta, J.A. 
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The evidence presented in this research provides arguments to fuel the public debate about 
how cities are shaping their transportation systems, and how the private vehicle-based 
model is creating negative feedback effects that work against the well-being of citizens for 
several reasons: 
1) Road congestion and longer travel time may cause stress and emotional discomfort, 
2) Longer commutes both in time and distance have a negative effect over human 
health and, by depriving people of alternative transportation modes, also deprive 
people of a more active way of life, 
3) A private vehicle-based system, under current circumstances, has a negative effect 
over local and global environment due to increasing the amount of pollution 
emissions, including greenhouse gases that fuel climate change, 
4) Non-private vehicle-based systems may have a positive effect over the construction 
of communities, since they allow an expansion of public spaces and city features that 
would be unavailable otherwise when there is a dependence on private vehicles and, 
finally 
5) A private vehicle-based system pushes out the boundaries of the cities, causing land 
use changes and larger environmental footprints, with the consequence of losing 
natural areas and endangering natural ecosystems. 
The findings of this research confirm the existence of induced travel in both the Los Angeles 
and San Francisco metro areas. These results are consistent with past research; however, 
it provides a wider perspective on this phenomenon and additional evidence on the forms 
that induced travel may take, especially when considering that the effects can be felt across 
the entire metropolitan area and not only around the influence area of particular road-related 
infrastructure projects. 
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The findings clarify how investment decisions affect other relevant variables with an impact 
on the development of urban areas. This is particularly relevant when looking at the 
opportunity costs of infrastructure investment for private transportation modes as opposed 
to investing in public transportation or other transportation alternatives. Probably the most 
important lesson is that a new, more integrated approach about urban development and its 
transit system is required. As long as there is a need to commute from home to the working 
place, or to access all kinds of public services, such as education, health care, leisure, 
etcetera, there is going to be increasing pressure over the transit system. Furthermore, an 
ever-expanding city restrains the possibilities to provide quality public transportation due to 
drops in population density, and consequently, reduction of the public transport system 
financial feasibility. 
Therefore, the debate should be about how to balance out the costs and benefits of the 
desired model of city. “Business as usual” will only deepen road congestion problems, will 
have a larger negative impact on environmental quality, and will raise travel time. Probably, 
one of the few alternatives that would prevent the continuation of the downward spiral of 
induced travel has to do more with looking back at revitalizing city cores by regaining, and 
even increasing population density and taking advantage of the already installed 
infrastructure, than looking at ways to tackle road congestion. Such a turn in the urbanization 
pattern would reduce the amount of driving in several ways: 1) by shifting transport modes 
from private to public transport or non-motorized alternatives, due to its relatively higher 
availability and shorter travel distances, 2) by reducing travel distance since employment 
alternatives and services would be available in the surrounding areas; and 3) by reducing 
travel time due to a more efficient road system. 
If these conditions were met, it is reasonable to expect general efficiency gains in the 
transport system in the short run, including reductions in roads usage that, in turn, would 
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create a positive incentive to go back to driving a private vehicle. In order to prevent this 
from happening, and bouncing back to a previous and less efficient state of affairs, any 
urban policy should be accompanied by a shift in the transportation system. In the first place, 
it should be a priority to look for ways to account for the externalities that driving, in terms of 
road congestion, air pollution or noise, among others, imposes on society. There are many 
approaches to internalizing those externalities, such as congestion charges (congestion 
Pigouvean taxes) or tradable driving permits (analogous to cap-and-trade systems), which 
are based on the economic instruments for point source air pollution control, and that are 
potentially capable of attaining the road congestion goal at the most cost-effective way while 
imposing the lowest overall costs to society. (Kolstad, 2011) Finally, all measures should 
aim at expanding the transport alternatives for all types of users, in such way that every 
individual may assess their ability or willingness to shift mode or face the additional costs for 
covering the externalities they impose on other citizens.  
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CHAPTER 4: 
ROAD CONGESTION AND AIR QUALITY MANAGEMENT IN MEXICO CITY: 
POLICY ALTERNATIVES 
 
Abstract 
In chapter one, the Hoy No Circula program for Mexico City was evaluated in three moments 
in time, and the results showed limited effects for the improvement of Mexico City’s air 
quality. An unintended effect of this program was a substantial increment in the size of the 
vehicle fleet that circulates in the city. Chapters two and three discussed the Induced Travel 
phenomenon and estimated the effect size for the Mexico City, Los Angeles and San 
Francisco metro areas. On all cases, the evidence suggested the existence of Induced 
Travel, and made clear that adding road capacity in these metro areas, induces a larger 
number of vehicle registrations, hence worsening the problem of road congestion. 
This chapter takes the findings from the previous ones in order to frame the discussion about 
some of the most salient policy alternatives that would be available to deal with the problems 
of road congestion and air pollution in Mexico City. The need to redefine the policy approach 
stems from two facts. The first one is that, even though there has been a long-term reduction 
in air pollution, current concentrations have stabilized at a relatively high level in a way that 
negatively affects human health. On its part, road congestion has worsened to the point that 
Mexico City has been regarded in past years as the city with the worst traffic in the world. 
With these considerations in mind, two market-based policy instruments, congestion 
charges and tradable driving permit programs, are discussed in terms of their efficiency 
characteristics, as well as in terms of their political feasibility and equity concerns. Finally, in 
the last section of this chapter, several versions of these market-based alternatives are put 
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forward within the context of Mexico City’s features. These alternatives include proposals 
made by other authors (a fuel tax and a congestion charge), as well as one new proposal (a 
tradable driving permit system) and, on all cases, they are analyzed in order to assess their 
viability from a technical, as well as from a political standpoint. 
Each of the analyzed policy alternatives have important advantages and drawbacks. The 
results of the analysis suggest that the tradable driving permit system is the most viable 
alternative, especially since it would create a supporting coalition that would move forward 
its implementation; however, it would also face a steep learning curve that would require an 
intense training process and a progressive implementation. 
1. Introduction 
The goal of this chapter is to look into the broader policy implications that emerge from the 
relationship between air quality and road congestion in metropolitan areas, which were 
discussed in chapters one through three, in terms of the Hoy No Circula (HNC) program on 
air quality in Mexico City, and the Induced Travel phenomenon for the cases of the Mexico 
City, Los Angeles and San Francisco metro areas. Such discussion should help to 
understand how those policies affect Mexico City’s environmental quality and its relationship 
to road congestion, and be the foundation for a new policy approach on how to tackle these 
two issues from a comprehensive perspective. This chapter starts by discussing some of 
the contextual features of Mexico City considered for the analysis of the policy alternatives. 
Then the discussion addresses market-based instruments, which are the most salient policy 
alternatives and, finally, the last section of the chapter puts forward a set of policy 
alternatives for tackling road congestion and the loss of air quality in Mexico City. These 
policy alternatives consider the evidence and findings that were obtained in all previous 
chapters, but with special interest in chapters one and two that specifically address the case 
of Mexico City. 
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The road congestion and air pollution problems of the Mexico City Metropolitan Area 
(MCMA) impose high public, private and social costs. Public budgets suffer from an ever-
increasing pressure to maintain the existing infrastructure and meet the demand for 
additional infrastructure, for private, public and non-motorized transportation. The costs 
citizens face are also increasing, due to losses in productive time, travel comfort and low-
quality roads and public transportation infrastructure. But the most important loses are faced 
by the society in general, since the problems of road congestion and air pollution have 
relevant negative effects on human health, in the form of congestion-related stress, 
accidents, respiratory affections and cardio-vascular diseases, among others. Cravioto, 
Yamasue, Okumura, and Ishihara (2013) estimate the total external costs of road transport 
in Mexico for 2006 to be between the range of 4.71 to 7.7% of that years’ nominal GDP. 
Note that these costs were estimated at the national level, and they consider accidents 
(37.6% of total costs), road congestion (28.5%), air pollution (17.8%), infrastructure (9.6%), 
noise (3.4%) and greenhouse gas emissions (2.9%). The Mexican Institute for 
Competitiveness IMCO (2019) used the productive value of time lost in traffic to estimate 
the congestion costs for 32 Mexican cities, including Mexico City’s Metro Area in 2019. They 
found that about 0.25% of the national GDP was lost due to losses of productive time, which 
represented a per capita cost of approximately US$621 PPP (MX$5,827). 
The problem of road congestion has worsened in time and no solution seems to be at hand, 
whereas the problem of air pollution has been merely managed in order to obtain moderate 
concentration reductions in the past three decades, but without actually reaching a fair 
degree of air quality. The most concerning issue is that these non-solutions are embedded 
within the actual policies that have been implemented so far to address such problems; 
therefore, they have reached a plateau where it is unlikely that they will be able to improve 
the conditions without a substantial policy transformation. 
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The evidence presented in chapter one about the impacts of the Hoy No Circula program, 
showed that it had limited effects for the improvement of Mexico City’s air quality, however 
it had important side effects that partially offset those improvements, and generated more 
severe road congestion in the long run. The evidence also showed that the policy changes 
of 2014 and 2015 had mild positive and negative effects respectively. Recall that these 
impact evaluations are limited to brief periods (between six and 24 months) before and after 
the policy implementation and the rules changes, and they are not designed to address the 
entire period that falls between the first implementation of 1989 to date. 
The long-term pollution concentration trends for Mexico City clearly show important 
improvements in air quality for the past 30 years. These results might be due to the existence 
of HNC, but they could also be the result of improvements in vehicle’s fuel efficiency, the 
implementation of the Comprehensive Program for Air Pollution in the MCMA (PICCA by its 
Spanish acronym) and subsequent environmental programs, other unobserved factors, or a 
combination of all of the above. CO is the pollutant that had the largest improvement, with 
concentration levels at around 10% of those observed in 1986, with a downward trend which 
seems to continue to date. NOX and O3 concentrations have also experienced an overall 
reduction. Today the former is about 60% of the levels of 1986, and the latter is about 70%, 
and both seemed to have stabilized around 2005, with a very slight downward trend. 
Nonetheless, the important point is that, there is a variety of factors that might have helped 
reduce pollution emissions, and there is no evidence to specifically pinpoint HNC’s overall 
impact on air quality in the long-run trend. Furthermore, one cannot rule out the possibility 
that HNC has actually contributed to limit the potential improvements in Mexico City’s air 
quality. Figure 1 depicts the overall pollution concentrations from 1986 to 2018. 
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Moving forward, the evidence presented in chapters two and three suggests the existence 
of the Induced Travel phenomenon in the metro areas of Mexico City, Los Angeles and San 
Francisco. Particularly in chapter two, where Mexico City is analyzed, the evidence showed 
that a relevant percentage of each year’s additional vehicle registrations can be traced 
directly to road-related infrastructure investment (for 2016, about one third of all additional 
vehicle registrations in the Mexico City Metro Area were induced by the road-related 
infrastructure investments), due to the incentives of adding road capacity or improving 
existing conditions over individual decisions, favoring the usage of private vehicles as the 
main transportation mode, rather than shifting to other modes. 
If these policies were to remain unchanged for the coming years, the above arguments 
portray a negative scenario for the city’s road congestion and air quality, that would continue 
to hamper the chances of attaining a higher quality of life, as well as social and economic 
development at all levels. These arguments also work for asserting the existence of a 
downward spiral that will continue to move down unless some substantial policy redefinitions 
are set in motion. In the first place, the HNC maintains a somehow stable status quo in terms 
of air quality and mobility. However, it does not provide a solution in the long run, but rather 
it only manages the problem, allowing for the implementation of emergency measures such 
as for episodes of air quality crisis (the so called contingencia ambiental). In second place, 
there is a continued effort to add road capacity, and to build additional road infrastructure to 
improve vehicles’ flow which will aggravate the road congestion, as it was argued in chapters 
two and three. On the other hand, this is happening at the opportunity cost of having a higher 
capacity and quality public and non-motorized transportation systems. 
Keep in mind that these programs deal with two different, however self-reinforcing problems: 
road congestion and air quality loss. Given the existing conditions of the vehicle fleet, where 
the vast majority of vehicles depend on fossil fuel, the policy goals should be to reduce road 
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congestion as a mean for reducing emissions, but also as a goal in itself. (Raux, 2007) 
Furthermore, increasing fuel efficiency and moving toward hybrid and electric vehicles would 
have a positive impact on air quality, but it is unlikely that it would reduce road congestion. 
Empirical studies have showed that, on the aggregate, driving time budgets tend to remain 
constant over time, although with some variations depending on individual and household 
characteristics, destination, and type of residential area. (Gunn, 1981; Metz, 2008; 
Mokhtarian & Chen, 2004) Also, it has been argued that increasing fuel efficiency may 
increase travel time and/or distance, (Duncan & Graham, 2013) due to the lower fuel costs 
(Metz, 2008), and due to the perception of having a lower driving-related individual carbon 
footprint. Therefore, policies that focus on more fuel-efficient vehicles only, might actually 
increase the amount of driving and aggravate the problem of road congestion, even if they 
have an individual positive impact on air quality. 
Moving forward to the policy alternatives that are available to address road congestion, 
Grant-Muller and Xu (2014) classify the management instruments and measures into five 
categories5: 
1. Infrastructure: These measures expand the available road capacity, by enlarging 
roads, adding lanes, building solutions for bottlenecks and so on. These may also 
include the organization and mixture of land use types, and manage residential 
density in order to reduce personal travel. 
2. Public transport: These measures are intended to increase the public transportation 
mode share by increasing its coverage and improving the quality of its service. Public 
transport is dedicated to passengers’ transit; therefore, it does not reduce the 
sources of congestion related to freight transport, and dedicated public transport 
 
5 These categories are an adaptation and do not exactly coincide with Grant-Muller and Xu (2014) 
classification. 
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infrastructure may actually reduce capacity for freight and the other transportation 
modes. 
3. Physical restrictions on vehicle use: These instruments consider government 
regulations to attain policy goals by imposing conditions on transportation policy, 
such as restrictions on vehicle ownership or restrictions on the allowed day, time or 
distance for driving; allocation of pedestrian areas, limited access zones, parking 
restrictions, dedicated lanes or similar restrictions, among others. These instruments 
might be packed within the command-and-control category that is used in the 
environmental economics literature. 
4. Technology instruments: These measures aim at optimizing transit by relying on 
information and communications technology. These measures include intelligent 
transport systems, demand-responsive transit signaling and lane allocation, and in-
vehicle navigation systems, among others. 
5. Economic (market-based) instruments: These instruments rely on the use of 
economic incentives and market principles to guide behavior change. These 
instruments could be tradable credit schemes, Pigouvean taxes and subsidies on 
emissions, on fuel or on vehicle use; and congestion charges. 
There is, of course, the option of not doing anything about traffic, and allowing cities to grow 
congested without making relevant efforts. However, when road congestion becomes a 
more salient issue for city governments and transportation authorities, the traditional first 
response usually consists in expanding the current infrastructure to release existing traffic 
conflict points, such as main road crossings or merging sections. However, these first 
responses usually result in the worsening of the problem, engaging decision-makers into the 
first steps of the Induced Travel vicious circle.  
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2. Discussion of Market-Based Instruments 
Based on the environmental policy literature, market-based instruments for pollution control 
possess several advantages over other policy alternatives since they rely on economic 
incentives and disincentives to drive behavioral change toward the attainment of 
environmental goals; however, they also face some shortcomings that need to be addressed 
in order to be considered as viable alternatives. From an economic standpoint, market-
based instruments are capable of attaining a higher degree of efficiency, and even an 
optimal allocation of resources, minimizing the social costs of implementing these 
instruments; therefore, being the preferred option over prescriptive alternatives. When 
properly designed, they are able to meet the environmental goal in the most cost-effective 
way. (Keohane, 2007) This means that environmental regulation using market-based 
instruments will impose the lowest overall costs to society, since they create incentives for 
those firms that have the lowest (pollution) abatement cost to make the largest pollution 
emissions reduction. (Stavins, 2007) This cost minimization is attained because market-
based instruments equate the marginal costs of abatement per unit of output for all regulated 
entities (equi-marginal principle), rather than equating their actual abatement level. (Goulder 
& Parry, 2008) If there were a perfectly competitive market with no transaction costs 
(theoretical), there would be a symmetry between a Pigouvean tax and a tradable credit 
system in terms of costs and the environmental goals. 
Going back to the instruments to address road congestion and its related air pollution, 
economists prefer market-based instruments since they account for the heterogeneity of 
drivers, their needs and the nature of their trips. This is an analogous interpretation of the 
equi-marginal principle, where those vehicle users with relatively lower costs for driving 
abatement or shifting transportation mode (from private to public or non-motorized modes), 
make the largest contribution to the overall reduction in the amount of driving and its 
 158 
consequent reduction of road congestion and pollution emissions. In this case, the costs 
would be related to the availability of alternative transportation modes, the capacity to use 
them, and the overall willingness to reduce driving by the means that are available to the 
user. These elements are overlooked by command-and-control instruments, such as driving 
restrictions; therefore, they increase the individual and social costs of the policy, and loose 
effectiveness for attaining their congestion and environmental goals. (Mahendra, 2008) 
Some of the most important arguments against the implementation of market-based 
instruments for addressing environmental problems or, as in this case, road congestion and 
its corresponding air quality loss, are several. They range from political limitations, to equity 
concerns and ethical considerations. These issues are addressed further down this section 
for each specific case. 
a) Congestion Charges 
A congestion charge is an instrument intended to put a price on the costs that drivers impose 
on other road users in terms of time and delays. (Albalate & Bel, 2009) The charge may be 
conceptually broaden to also put a price on the environmental costs that drivers impose on 
all citizens by reducing air and ecosystems quality, as well as affecting human health. 
Following the same principle of a Pigouvean tax, the economic rationale behind a congestion 
charge is that the maximum net benefit for society will occur when the marginal social cost 
of driving (the average cost of having an additional vehicle entering the city’s roads), and 
not only the individual cost, is internalized; (Thomson, 1998) or, in different terms, when 
drivers, by means of paying a tax, assume the cost they are imposing on the rest of society, 
due to the congestion of public space (roads) and its related air pollution. 
Singapore was the first city to ever implement a congestion charge scheme in the world, 
beginning in 1975. At first, the system relied on paper permits and manual enforcement, but 
in 1998, it started using in-vehicle electronic smart cards to automatically charge whenever 
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a vehicle crossed a gantry. (Santos, Fraser, & Newbery, 2006) This program had positive 
results considering that it reduced traffic volume in 45% during peak hours; (Willoughby, 
2000) nonetheless, it also had unexpected results by causing congestion to substantially 
increase right before and after the restricted hours. (Santos et al., 2006) 
The most salient case of a congestion charge is that of London’s downtown area, which was 
first implemented in 2003. Several authors consider this program to be successful in terms 
of its congestion reduction goal, as well as from the indirect impacts on economic activity. 
(Albalate & Bel, 2009; Quddus, Carmel, & Bell, 2007; Santos et al., 2006) The number of 
vehicles circulating in London’s downtown dropped between 15 and 20% two weeks after 
implementation, and up to 30% after several months. Of those reductions, about 50% shifted 
mode to public transport, 10% shifted to taxis, motorcycles or bicycles, 25% shifted route to 
avoid passing through the congestion charge area, and the remaining 15% adjusted their 
trip to free-of-charge hours or simply avoided making trips. (Albalate & Bel, 2009; Santos et 
al., 2006). These estimations show that a relevant portion of the reductions (25%) were trips 
diverted from the downtown to other parts of the city, and mainly to London’s Inner Ring 
Road, which saw an increment of 4% in the vehicle flow. (Santos et al., 2006) This side 
effect shows that, similar to what was observed in Singapore, where the congestion shifted 
to the hours where no restriction was in place, the congestion charge in London moved the 
vehicle flow to different areas of the city. 
Another relevant case of successful implementation of a congestion charge is that of 
Stockholm, Sweden, where a traffic volume reduction of 19% was observed, and around 6% 
of drivers shifted mode to public transport. (Albalate & Bel, 2009) One feature that is unique 
to the Stockholm case is that the congestion charge was tested first for a temporary exercise, 
after which the program was subjected to a referendum, where citizens decided to maintain 
the charge. There is evidence suggesting that the support for the congestion charge 
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reflected the benefits obtained from reductions in time travel, showing that Stockholm 
citizens highly valued their time. (Quigley & Hårsman, 2010) An interesting feature of the 
Stockholm case, observed in a cost-benefit analysis, is that, according to the evidence, the 
congestion charge did not actually produce an overall welfare gain, even though the level of 
the charge (the tax level) was near optimal. (Kopp & Prud'homme, 2010) Three features 
seem to be the main drivers of the negative results of the cost-benefit analysis. The first one 
is that Stockholm’s road congestion problem was not as high as, say London’s; therefore, 
the lesson to be learned is that in order for a congestion charge to have a positive outcome, 
it is necessary to have a relevant road congestion problem. The second is that enforcement 
costs (particularly when it is necessary to control potentially millions of trips) tend to be high. 
Even though these costs were half in Stockholm than those observed in London, it was not 
sufficient to make the welfare gains larger than the losses. The third feature is that imposing 
a congestion charge caused some drivers to shift modes from private to public transport, 
and affected public transport capacity and quality. In order to make a congestion charge a 
viable option, one must evaluate the public transport alternative and its ability to meet the 
expected increased demand, which involves potentially high costs for the infrastructure 
development and operation. (Kopp & Prud'homme, 2010) 
The city of Edinburgh, Scotland, worked for over a decade on the design of a congestion 
charge, replicating London’s model. Before putting it into effect, the city held a referendum 
to decide if such a program should be implemented; however, differently than the path that 
Stockholm followed, in Edinburgh, no temporary trial was put in place in order to test the 
efficacy of the measure. The result of the referendum was a generalized reject of the policy 
proposal, eliminating any chance to move forward for its implementation. (Albalate & Bel, 
2009) 
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Most policy instruments tend to create winners and losers when they are implemented. 
Pigouvean taxes, regardless of whether they take the form of a carbon tax for pollution 
emissions or a charge for road congestion, face relevant political feasibility issues since they 
seem to create losers only, (Albalate & Bel, 2009; Downs, 1992; Farrow, 1995) even when 
some stakeholders may benefit from the measure, or in this case, some drivers who highly 
value their time, may end up better off than before the tax. (Thomson, 1998) For the case of 
congestion charges, drivers must pay for what many assume to be the right for a “free” use 
of roads, even though it is hardly free if one considers the externalities that are imposed on 
other citizens, and society in general. (Albalate & Bel, 2009) Drivers also have to take driving 
reduction measures that may involve additional costs in the form of travel comfort, or other 
indirect costs. 
Albalate and Bel (2009) identify three features that need to be considered when designing 
a congestion charge system. The first one is what fee structure and operational technology 
will be used. In particular, it is relevant to assess if the congestion charge is to be applied 
with variations depending on the time and place, or if it will be constant. While the latter is 
simpler to implement, it may face inefficiencies on trip allocations. The second is what the 
purpose of the tax revenues will be. Such purpose is relevant since it may bring upfront 
benefits of the tax, e.g. to improve the road or public transport infrastructure, in order to 
balance up the negative perception of the tax. (Harrington, Krupnick, & Alberini, 2001) The 
third is related to the political impacts of imposing a tax under conditions of loss aversion 
and free-ridership. The former implies that the perceived loss from an already enjoyed 
benefit (free use of roads) is greater than the expectation of a future gain (reduced 
congestion and improved air quality), thus creating a strong opposing coalition against a 
policy measure such as the implementation of a congestion charge. The latter phenomenon 
implies that, when the costs of policy decisions are distributed among a diffuse group (such 
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as drivers), there are incentives to avoid incurring in such costs (providing political support 
for an unpopular measure), while enjoying the benefits from the decision. In the case of the 
congestion charge, it is reasonable to expect a low degree of active support, even when 
there are clear gains for specific groups. (Albalate & Bel, 2009) 
In terms of equity and distributional concerns, depending on the design, a congestion charge 
may be regressive in the sense that there is a proportionally higher negative monetary 
impact for lower-income drivers than for those with higher income, (Thomson, 1998) which 
would end up being the ultimate winners. This effect, however, would be inversely 
proportional to the extent that there are quality transportation alternatives to driving, in which 
case the negative effects would decrease, and would become positive as the alternatives 
equally or better satisfy the mobility needs. A congestion charge could also affect public 
transport users if a mode shift from private to public transport occurs as a consequence of 
the charge, by reducing its relative capacity and quality. In such scenario, there would be 
relevant concerns since public transport users have a relatively lower, or even neutral 
contribution to the road congestion and air quality loss; however, they would be forced to 
assume some of the costs of tackling those problems. In general, it is not possible to assert 
that a congestion charge would have negative equity or distributional outcomes, since the 
net effect depends on the policy design, as well as on the characteristics of the mobility 
system as a whole, with special consideration of the mass public transport. Nonetheless, 
these issues must be accounted for in order to have the best possible design and attain the 
congestion and environmental goals, but not at the expense of specific population groups. 
b) Tradable Driving Permits 
There is a large body of literature addressing various alternatives of tradable driving permit 
instruments. (Fan & Jiang, 2013; Goddard, 1997; Verhoef, Nijkamp, & Rietveld, 1997; Yang 
& Wang, 2011) This literature is mainly based on the development of environmental policy 
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instruments that have been around since the early seventies and, in particular, this literature 
takes its foundations from the tradable emissions markets, otherwise known as cap-and-
trade programs. These systems consist on allocating pollution rights to firms and allow them 
to trade those permits. Firms with higher marginal costs for pollution abatement would 
purchase permits from lower marginal cost firms within the total pollution allowance (cap) 
which is set as the program’s yearly goal, and that would be tightened progressively in time 
until reaching the ultimate goal. This in turns creates a market for pollution permits, and 
eventually the determination of a price for the right to pollute. The economic logic behind 
these systems is that, under competitive market conditions, firms will have an incentive to 
reduce their emissions to the point in which they minimize their marginal costs of pollution 
abatement, creating an optimal level of pollution at the firm level, and meeting the 
environmental goal at the aggregate level. (Hanley, Shogren, & White, 2007) By allowing 
firms with high marginal abatement costs to purchase allowances, and low marginal 
abatement cost firms to sell them, overall costs are minimized both at the firm and at the 
industry levels (Kolstad, 2011) and, again, under competitive market conditions, this would 
also allow to price the permits at the optimal level. The environmental logic of this instrument, 
is not only about internalizing the cost of the pollution externality, but it is also about a 
progressive reduction on the emissions cap, that will allow to reach the environmental goal 
by incentivizing firms to innovate and improve pollution reduction technologies. 
A tradable driving permit system is analogous to a cap-and-trade pollution control system, 
however there are some differences. While the goal for a cap-and-trade program is to reduce 
point source pollution emissions, a tradable driving permit system has a double goal: 
reducing road congestion and reducing mobile source’s (vehicles) pollution emissions. 
Therefore, the externalities in this case are the congestion that vehicles cause by their use 
of public space (roads) and that should be available to everyone, and the externality caused 
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by their pollution emissions affecting the city-wide air quality. It is important to consider that 
there might be ways of reducing one externality without changing the other, such as driving 
electric vehicles, which would reduce pollution emissions, but would be neutral in terms of 
road congestion. 
Rather than having polluting firms or industries under a tradable driving permit system, there 
are drivers that, instead of abating their emissions, take measures to reduce their amount 
of driving, which would reduce their pressure on the overall road infrastructure and would 
also reduce their emissions. Their “abatement” alternatives would be to cut down their trips 
in number and/or distance, shifting modes (from private vehicles to public transport or non-
motorized alternatives) or sharing vehicles. In such scenario, those drivers with higher 
marginal costs (for instance, because of a lack of alternatives to driving a vehicle, or because 
of having a lower willingness to reduce their driving), would purchase the permits; while 
those drivers with lower marginal costs to reduce their driving would be permit sellers. 
Finally, rather than having an environmental goal measured in terms of total pollution 
emissions, under a tradable driving permit system there would be a maximum number of 
vehicles allowed to circulate at any given time, which would reflect the relationship between 
road capacity, travel time and pollution emissions. Fan and Jiang (2013) define five elements 
that should be considered when designing a tradable driving permit program: 1) the permit 
quota, which is usually pre-determined, 2) the initial permit allocation to selected recipients, 
3) the permit trading mechanisms at the marketplace or at road access controls, 4) the 
operational rules for permit usage, that may be differentiated by time, place and vehicle’s 
characteristics, and 5) the enforcement mechanisms to ensure compliance. 
Moving past the economic efficiency argument that supports a tradable permit system, there 
are several elements that would favor the implementation of such a program. In the first 
place, a tradable permit program accounts directly for the public problem that it intends to 
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address, in this case, road congestion and air pollution. Secondly, a tradable permit program 
creates an incentive for the participating agents to be vigilant about other players complying 
with the program, since the permit value depends on its proper use; and thirdly, tradable 
permit programs allow that some agents with a low permit usage receive benefits from 
selling their permits. (OECD, 2001) This feature is important from two perspectives. From a 
political standpoint, a tradable driving permit would generate a group of permit sellers that 
would financially benefit, hence potentially becoming a supporting coalition of the program. 
(Colby, 2000) If we consider that political agents tend to favor conferring benefits rather than 
imposing costs, (Barthold, 1994) a decisive factor might be the final balance between 
perceived winners and losers of the program. Second, a tradable driving permit program 
might also improve the distribution of income if we consider that higher-income agents with 
lower willingness to reduce their driving would dedicate a larger amount of financial 
resources in order to maintain their driving status, transferring resources to those with lower 
income and/or financial capacity, whose expected willingness to shift transportation mode 
would be higher. (Goddard, 1997) 
This argument, however, has a flip side for the case of Mexican cities, where the areas in 
which the lowest income families live, tend to be farthest away from city centers, and with 
the least accessibility to mass public transport or non-motorized alternatives. Therefore, a 
tradable driving permit program that do not consider these limitations would impose a 
disproportionately large cost to lower income families, further reducing their available 
income and quality of life. This equity issue would not only be applicable to lower income 
families since public transport accessibility differences affect many areas of Mexico City, 
and all income ranges. Additionally, there is a group that would not be able to shift transport 
mode, even if they were willing to do it. This group includes the elderly, people with 
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disabilities, and other people with specific characteristics whose case would have to be 
addressed in the design and implementation of the program. 
Another potential drawback is that the group that would most likely oppose such a system 
is the one with the lowest willingness to shift transport mode, which tends to have a higher 
financial and lobbying capacity, thus posing a relevant political obstacle. Furthermore, two 
socio-economic characteristics that affect the willingness to shift driving patters in order to 
reduce the carbon footprint are age and income. Several studies found that as age and 
income increase, the willingness to participate in a tradable driving permit program is lower. 
(Dogterom, Bao, Xu, & Ettema, 2018; Gehlert, Kramer, Nielsen, & Schlag, 2011) Therefore, 
it is reasonable to expect opposition from groups that share these characteristics to the 
implementation of a tradable driving permit program. Finally, there are some controversies 
between economists and environmentalist groups since the latter argue that a permit trading 
system is privatizing a natural resource that should be available freely and openly. 
(Tietenberg, 2007). Furthermore, a tradable permit system would turn pollution into a 
commodity, thus moving the pollution problem into doing “business as usual”, instead of 
taking a more direct action to tackle the problem. (Auer, 2000; Pesci, Pérez, & Pesci, 2007) 
The empirical studies about tradable driving permits have considerable limitations, since 
there are no actual real-life programs being applied in the world. This literature relies on 
perception and self-reported data about hypothetical situations, on computer-based 
laboratory experiments, or on games and computer simulations. (Dogterom, Ettema, & Dijst, 
2017) Even with these limitations, these studies have commonly found that, in terms of their 
potential to change individual behavior (the willingness to reduce their carbon footprint by 
changing driving patterns), tradable driving permit programs would have a similar, or even 
larger effect for reducing the amount of driving, than imposing a tax (on fuel or on carbon). 
(Aziz, Ukkusuri, & Romero, 2015; Capstick & Lewis, 2010; Dogterom et al., 2018; Raux, 
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Croissant, & Pons, 2015; Wallace, Irvine, Wright, & Fleming, 2010; Zanni, Bristow, & 
Wardman, 2013) Nonetheless, the option of maintaining the current driving patterns, or even 
the option of paying in order to keep the status quo is, in general, preferred rather than any 
other policy alternative. (Raux et al., 2015) 
In general, it is not possible to assert that a tradable driving permit program would outperform 
a congestion charge, since there is no real-life evidence to support such a claim. 
Nonetheless, there is positive evidence from the environmental policy field regarding the 
results of cap-and-trade programs, even when considering the wide degree of variation in 
terms of relative success. (Colby, 2000; Schmalensee & Stavins, 2013; Solomon, 1999) In 
any case, the previous paragraphs underline several aspects that must be taken into 
account when designing and implementing a tradable driving permit system, and these 
elements will determine its viability and success. 
3. Policy Alternatives and Conclusions 
Mexico City and its metropolitan area face an immense challenge for tackling the problems 
of road congestion and poor air quality. According to the evidence presented in previous 
chapters, current policies are not properly designed to provide a long-term solution to these 
interrelated problems and, in particular, the continued decisions for investing in additional 
road capacity have proven to be counterproductive to the goal that they intend to solve. 
These conditions call for an in-depth redefinition of these policies from a comprehensive 
perspective. Therefore, we start this section by stating a proposed definition of the public 
problem, as well as the policy goals, and then we move forward to the discussion of the 
means to attain the latter. 
Adequately defining a public problem is probably the most relevant part of the policy process, 
since the definition will determine the lines of action that will be utilized. For Moore (1976), 
one should keep in mind three considerations: 1) the interests that will be affected by the 
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persistence of the problem or by the policy instruments that are used, 2) the instruments 
that are available, and 3) the causal variables that will determine the effectiveness of the 
instruments. Furthermore, the definition of the problem will determine the extent to which 
there are policy instruments to address the public problem in question. (Moore, 1976) For 
the problems that have been discussed throughout this research, there are at least three 
alternatives to guide the public problem definition. The first one is in terms of the air quality 
loss as a consequence of emissions by internal combustion engine vehicles. The Hoy No 
Circula program follows this logic; however, there could be other instruments, such as 
launching an intensive program to substitute fossil fuel for hybrid or electric vehicles. Such 
a program would significantly reduce pollution emissions from mobile sources, however, if a 
one to one substitution occurred, it would be neutral in terms of road congestion. 
A second alternative would be the definition of the problem in terms of insufficient road 
capacity that causes congestion, which has two implications. The first one is that urban 
mobility loss is a problem in itself, and the second is that the air quality loss is a byproduct 
of the road congestion. Infrastructure investments in road-related infrastructure, even with 
the unintended and counterproductive effect of increasing traffic, follow this logic. 
Finally, the third alternative would be to define the problem in terms of the interrelation that 
exists between these two problems and other conditions that create a complex problem 
which, consequently, require a similar set of solutions in order to address multiple causes. 
Figure 2 portrays the problem tree, where multiple causes and interactions work toward 
shaping the problem. Note that, even though air pollution is a significant issue in terms of air 
quality and human health, it is not necessarily the main problem to address, but rather a 
consequence of a different set of problems. 
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An adequate policy should aim at addressing the causes of the problem; however, it is 
necessary to differentiate between those structural causes that would require an overarching 
systemic transformation, and those that may be addressed by means of a public program. 
In this case, the causes related to land governance, urban planning and control of land use 
would be out of the scope of this analysis, but the conditions of the public transportation 
system, as well as the conditions that drive the overload of the road infrastructure, 
particularly the extensive use of private vehicles as the main transportation mode for a 
relevant portion of Mexico City’s population, are the causes that are subject to a public policy 
redefinition. In order to address these public problems, some proposals have been put 
forward in the past. 
Eskeland (1994) proposed the implementation of a two-pronged air pollution control 
program, with one component aiming at the enforcement of a stricter emissions abatement 
requirement for vehicles coupled with a gasoline tax, which together would mimic the 
incentives produced by an emissions fee. He developed a formal model for the estimation 
of the optimal level of the Pigouvean gasoline tax, which could be reduced according to the 
attainment of the environmental goal, but it could also be increased if the tax did not induce 
the expected behavioral changes in the gasoline demand. 
This two-pronged proposal was intended to address air pollution, but not necessarily road 
congestion. One feature of the model is that it differentiates between polluting and non-
polluting goods, but it does not differentiate between private or public transportation modes. 
Such difference is relevant since the individual marginal costs of abatement would strongly 
vary depending on the availability of alternative and less pollutant transportation modes, 
such as non-motorized, subway or light rail systems. Even if the social marginal costs of 
abatement were minimized, there would be strongly differentiated effects at the individual 
level that would disproportionately affect lower income families or people living in lower 
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accessibility areas. Another potential way of abating individual emissions would be the 
substitution of internal combustion engine vehicles with electric ones. Even if this possibility 
were viable given the relative mismatch between average income and the price of electric 
vehicles in Mexico City, if all vehicles were substituted, the mobile source air pollution 
problem would be solved, but the road congestion would remain the same. 
Additionally, a proposal partially based on a gasoline tax in Mexico City raises several 
concerns about its political viability, as well as its equity effects. In the first place, gasoline 
price in Mexico is fixed and determined by the national oil company Pemex, which 
possesses monopolistic powers, and suffers from very low productivity and high production 
costs. Furthermore, the gasoline price has gotten decades of subsidies, which keeps its 
price artificially lower than what it would be given the domestic production costs, the 
international oil prices and the heavy fiscal regime that falls upon Pemex. It is worth noting 
that there has been a progressive reduction of the subsidy over the past two decades, known 
as gasolinazo (gasoline price gouge), which has substantially increased the price and has 
been highly unpopular causing social protests. Under such scenario, a gasoline tax would 
mean not only the elimination of the subsidy, but also the imposition of a tax which would 
further increase the gasoline price. As it was mentioned in the previous section, taxes seem 
to create losers only, thus it is only reasonable to expect a very intense social and political 
opposition to such measure. 
From an equity perspective, fuel prices are among the most sensitive factors that affect 
quality of life, for at least two reasons. The first one is that transportation is one of the most 
important social and economic activities, since it allows families to go to school, to the work 
place, and satisfy every need that cannot be satisfied at home. Keeping all other variables 
constant, a gasoline price hike would make transportation costlier, thus reducing the 
disposable income and the quality of life, and disproportionally affecting lower income 
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families. The second reason is that a tax-related fuel price hike has the potential of 
generating inflation across the board, again reducing disposable income and quality of life 
with a disproportionate negative effect over the lowest income groups. 
In terms of Moore’s (1976) design considerations, a fuel tax would be readily available in the 
policy maker’s tool kit and would have the potential to address the causal variables that 
determine the road congestion problem. However, the interests that would be affected are 
so large and distributed across policy makers and social groups, that it is highly unlikely that 
this policy would move to its actual implementation. 
An alternative to a fuel tax would be the imposition of a congestion charge. Such a policy 
would be less controversial than a fuel tax, since it would not directly affect the overall energy 
and fuel markets; nonetheless, it would still face the same negative perception of creating 
losers only, and disproportionally affecting lower income groups. Mahendra (2008) studied 
the perception of transportation experts from academia, consulting firms and practitioners, 
regarding a hypothetical congestion charge that would be implemented in four Latin 
American cities, including Mexico City. When experts were asked about the Hoy No Circula 
program, only 44% considered that it had a positive effect for relieving road congestion, and 
when asked about the alternative solutions to road congestion, the highest ranked response 
was expanding, improving and integrating the public transport system, followed by the 
introduction of physical restraints to driving, such as restricted lanes and pedestrian zones. 
Among the lowest ranked solutions were the imposition of a fuel or a vehicle ownership tax, 
as well as increasing road capacity. About the latter, if we consider that Mexico City 
authorities have invested in massive road infrastructure projects for decades, and continue 
to do so to this day, it is worth noting how disconnected the public investment decisions are 
from the experts’ opinions. (Mahendra, 2008) 
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The obstacles that a congestion charge would face, according to the respondents, are lack 
of public knowledge and information about such a program at the decision-making level, as 
well as a lack of political will; but most importantly, it would face important opposition from 
most drivers, regardless of the income group to which they pertain. For affluent car owners, 
the respondents argue, a congestion charge would have no sizeable effect, since they would 
not be sensitive to the charge; while lower income drivers would face a disproportionally 
large negative effect on their disposable income. Finally, respondents considered that the 
revenues obtained from a hypothetical congestion charge should be used to improve the 
public transportation system, since low- and middle-income drivers would likely shift mode 
if public transport were an actual quality alternative to driving. (Mahendra, 2008) 
Nonetheless, as long as there is no universally available transportation alternative that 
services the entire city, the effects of a congestion charge would disproportionally affect the 
lowest income groups. 
Again, looking at Moore’s (1976) design considerations, a congestion charge would be 
available in the policy makers’ tool kit, however it would require to take several steps before 
moving into an implementation phase. In the first place, further quantitative analysis to 
estimate the optimal level of the charge would be required; followed by a more precise 
identification of daily vehicle flows, restriction areas, entry points and potential areas that 
would likely receive the diverted trips. Nonetheless, this information could be produced and 
analyzed without much problem. As per the second consideration, a congestion charge 
would address the causal variables that determine the nature of the problem, since it would 
aim at reducing road congestion and, consequently, would also reduce pollution emissions. 
In order to enhance the effectiveness of the charge, the collected revenues should be 
directed to improving the public transportation system. The third consideration about the 
interests that the policy will affect is more problematic. Taxes are usually not well received 
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and there are few politicians that would be willing to risk imposing a brand-new tax. Also, 
the lowest income population would be disproportionally affected, and so the program would 
have to go through a progressive implementation, and making sure that alternative 
transportation modes become available to cover underserviced areas. 
One final alternative is the implementation of a tradable driving permit system. The most 
important issue to be resolved in order to make this type of program viable, would be 
attaining a balance between the perceived winners and losers, and the political interests that 
those agents would be supporting. 
In regards to the technical part, current and already available technology makes relatively 
simple to track any vehicle’s mileage, as well as implementing an application to link the 
mileage to a hypothetical driving credit market and bank accounts. The challenging part 
would likely be the system integration between drivers and monitoring and enforcement 
authorities. Let us not forget that the current Hoy No Circula program is “manually” enforced, 
and police officers are continuously monitoring vehicles to make sure that only those 
meeting the check-up requirements are on the streets. This type of enforcement has proven 
to be effective in Mexico City, but also to impose relatively high costs, that could be 
substantially reduced by having an automated technology-based monitoring and 
enforcement system. Nonetheless, driving-related automated systems of this type, such as 
for freeway toll payments, are not widely used in Mexico; and even less common is the use 
of direct trading applications to participate in the financial markets. Finally, since no similar 
program has been implemented in any city so far, there are multiple gray areas that would 
potentially challenge the implementation, amplifying the learning curve for fully 
understanding and controlling the tradable driving permit system. Similar to what was 
observed by Mexican experts about a congestion charge, it is reasonable to expect the same 
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lack of knowledge and information about the program and its implementation at the decision-
making level. (Mahendra, 2008) 
As mentioned before, the most important strength of a tradable driving permit system is that 
it has the ability to create a supporting coalition by those drivers whose driving abatement 
costs would be lower, thus willing to shift mode or undertake measures to reduce their 
driving, and become permit sellers. Additionally, it is reasonable to expect that some of the 
lowest income drivers would pertain to such a coalition, since the gains from the permit 
trading would be higher than the costs of abating the amount of driving, thus having net 
disposable income gains. To obtain the support from such varied and diverse coalition would 
be highly desirable from a political standpoint, and would increase the chances of the 
program to move forward to its actual implementation. 
Nonetheless, as with any other policy that arises from the need to internalize the costs of an 
externality, at first it will require all agents to incur into additional direct or indirect costs, such 
as acquiring a permit, stepping out of their comfort zone in order to shift mode, or letting go 
some travel comfort. In the case of a tradable driving permit system, the distribution of these 
costs might be highly unequal, particularly when no viable transport alternatives are readily 
available. Of special interest would be the lowest income families that would be forced to 
face these additional costs, since they would be disproportionally affected. In order to 
address these limitations, any tradable driving permit system should be enforced with a 
relatively lenient goal in terms of the number of allowed permits, to be tightened over the 
course of a long enough time period as to sufficiently reduce the accessibility differences 
across the city, until reaching the desired goal. 
The initial permit allowance distribution would be determinant to reduce, and even eliminate 
any equity concern. One alternative would be grandfathering a significant proportion of 
permits, say 80%, where half of that percentage would be randomly allocated, and the other 
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half would be allocated considering an index of geographical accessibility to alternative 
modes of transport, as well as the relative financial capacity of the typical family by 
geographical area. The remaining 20% would be auctioned and the revenues could be used 
to improve the public transport system and the non-motorized infrastructure. Of course, 
there is an infinite number of possible allocation combinations, thus a more in-depth study 
would be required to determine the specific figures. On all cases, and regardless of the 
source of the funding (revenues obtained via the auctions or public funds), the system must 
be accompanied by an infrastructure investment program for public transportation and non-
motorized alternatives, aiming at having an equal accessibility and service quality 
throughout the city. 
In terms of Moore’s (1976) design considerations, this alternative is the strongest and 
possesses the highest level of viability. In the first place, it is the only one with the potential 
to actually create a supporting coalition that would be politically desirable, and that would 
balance the debate with other opposing groups. Secondly, the availability of technological 
instruments to implement the program would not be an issue since they already exist, 
however their social understanding and ability to use would potentially be a problem, 
particularly for police officers who would be the enforcement authorities. Therefore, a 
program of this complexity would require to be tested, preceded by a long period of 
socialization and training, similar to what Stockholm did to implement their congestion 
charge. Finally, the causal variables of road congestion and air pollution would be fully 
addressed, thus potentially providing a long-term comprehensive solution. 
Each of the above-mentioned policy alternatives is capable of substantially reducing road 
congestion and air pollution; however, they all would require complementary programs in 
order to tackle the expected equity issues that would accompany them. All alternatives would 
require to improve the quality and coverage of the mass public transport system, but also to 
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provide adequate infrastructure for non-motorized alternatives and short-distance 
commutes. Additionally, each alternative should go hand in hand with campaigns to raise 
awareness on the positive long-term effects of air quality, relief of road congestion and the 
overall people’s wellbeing, as well as ongoing training for police officers and public servants. 
One advantage of these alternatives is that they are capable of generating potentially large 
revenues, although with important variations among programs, which would provide 
resources to invest in public transport and non-motorized infrastructure. Additionally, 
considering that the expected gradual reduction in the overall amount of driving in the city 
would reduce the financial pressure to invest in new road-related infrastructure projects, as 
well as the pressure to maintain and update the existing infrastructure; a large batch of 
resources would be released, and could be used to further improve the public and non-
motorized transportation systems. At the end, the aim of the chosen alternative should be 
to break and turn the current vicious circle of Induced Travel and Hoy No Circula, into a 
virtuous one, where individuals, based on their own values and abilities, decide which 
transportation mode is best for them, and whether they are willing to reduce their amount of 
driving, while generating the means to self-sustain the program. This would allow to 
transform the entire transportation system, and would substantially reduce pollution 
emissions and their impact on air quality, human health, and the overall quality of the city-
wide urban ecosystem.  
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organization committee for the Reunion of the Administration Council of the World 
Association of Large Metropolis and Tasks Commissions, Ixtapan de la Sal, Mexico. 
October 2003 – March 2004. BBVA-Bancomer Bank. Market risks consultant. Responsible 
for the supervision and measurement of the market risk of a couple of the bank’s portfolios, 
Mexico City, Mexico. 
 
Research 
2015 – 2019. School of Public and Environmental Affairs, Indiana University, Bloomington, 
Indiana, USA. PI: Jose A. Iracheta. Estimation of the Induced Travel phenomenon at the 
metropolitan level for Mexico City, Los Angeles and San Francisco. 
2015 – 2019. School of Public and Environmental Affairs, Indiana University, Bloomington, 
Indiana, USA. PI: Jose A. Iracheta. Impact evaluation of the flagship air pollution control 
program in Mexico City (Hoy No Circula) for the time of the first implementation of the 
program (1989), and for the policy changes of 2014 and 2015. 
2016 – 2017. School of Public and Environmental Affairs, Indiana University, Bloomington, 
Indiana, USA. PI: Jose A. Iracheta. Research on the environmental policy instrument choice 
for pollution control in the Lerma River, Mexico, which crosses the Metropolitan Area of 
Toluca, and provides a substantial percentage of drinking water for the Mexico City 
Metropolitan Area (in progress). 
2014 – 2015. School of Public and Environmental Affairs, Indiana University, Bloomington, 
Indiana, USA. PI: Lisa Blomgren Amsler, and Jose A. Iracheta. Research on the effects of 
the conflict mediation processes in the USPS on perception of fairness by USPS employees 
using survey data (in progress). 
2013 – 2014. School of Public and Environmental Affairs, Indiana University, Bloomington, 
Indiana, USA. PI: Prof. Douglas Noonan, Prof. Abdul-Akeem Sadiq, and Jose A. Iracheta. 
Research on how U.S. urban communities located in floodplain areas undertake preventive 
and corrective actions for flooding risks according to the incentives provided by FEMA´s 
Community Rating System program. 
2012 – 2013. School of Public and Environmental Affairs, Indiana University, Bloomington, 
Indiana, USA. PI: Jose A. Iracheta. Research on metropolitan governance in Mexico. The 
research aims at analyzing the adequacy of the outcomes and decision-making process of 
sixteen metropolitan areas based on the differences of the corresponding institutional 
arrangements between them. 
2012 – 2013. School of Public and Environmental Affairs, Indiana University, Bloomington, 
Indiana, USA. PI: Prof. Evan Ringquist. Research on identifying what characteristics 
predispose international environmental agreements (IEAs) to effectively address 
environmental problems based on a meta-evaluation of European IEAs. 
 2009. Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas –CIDE– (Center for Research and 
Teaching in Economics), Mexico City, Mexico. PI: Jose A. Iracheta. Research on the effects 
of crisis perception in the decision-making process applied to the case of the 2008 legal 
reform of the oil industry in Mexico. (Thesis for obtaining the degree of Master in Public 
Administration and Public Policy). 
 
Publications 
2016. UN-Habitat, Kenya. Ndugwa, Robert, Vigier, François, Iracheta, Jose A., and El-
Sheik, Tarek. Report: Saudi Arabia National Report (in press). 
2014. CLEAR, CIDE, IADB, SHCP, Centro Eure, El Colegio Mexiquense, Mexico. Iracheta, 
Alfonso X. and Iracheta, Jose A. Book: Evaluación de los Fondos Metropolitano y Regional 
del Gobierno Federal Mexicano (Evaluation of the Mexican Federal Metropolitan and 
Regional Funds). 
 
Non-professional experience 
January – May 2008. Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas –CIDE– (Center for 
Research and Teaching in Economics), Mexico City, Mexico. Policy analysis about the 
smoking forbiddance in non-vented public places in Mexico City. 
August – December 2007. Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas –CIDE– 
(Center for Research and Teaching in Economics), Mexico City, Mexico. Policy analysis 
about the incentive program for commercial forest plantations of the National Forest 
Commission (CONAFOR). 
October 2001. Universidad Iberoamericana campus Santa Fe (Ibero-American University), 
Mexico City, Mexico. Chairman of the Organization Committee of the XXVI Economics 
Seminar (elective office). 
August – December 1999. Universidad Iberoamericana campus Santa Fe (Ibero-American 
University), Mexico City, Mexico. Academic assistant for the course of Econometrics II 
 
Fellowships and awards 
August 2011 – 2014. Fulbright-Garcia Robles scholarship for the PhD program in Public 
Affairs. 
August 2011 – 2013. Indiana University tuition and fees waiver for the PhD program in 
Public Affairs. 
August 2011 – 2015. Central Bank of Mexico Fund for the Development of Human 
Resources (FIDERH) student loan for the PhD program in Public Affairs. 
February 2010. Latin American Forum for Environmental Sciences scholarship for the 
Master in Sustainable Development Program. 
May 2007 – June 2009. Mexican National Science and Technology Council (CONACYT) 
fellowship for the Master in Public Administration and Public Policy program. 
 
  
 Activism and professional organizations 
August 2014 to date. Latin America Policy Association (LAPA), Bloomington, Indiana, USA. 
Founding member. 
2014 to date. Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management (APPAM). Member. 
August 2013 – August 2014. Association of SPEA PhD Students (ASPS), Bloomington, 
Indiana, USA. Board member. Chair of the 2014 ASPS Conference. 
August 2010 to date. Foropolis, Mexico City, Mexico. Founding member. Foropolis is a 
policy network focused in Urban Sustainable Development. It´s objective is to summon 
Mexican specialists to dialogue with public authorities of all levels, to propose supported 
alternatives and to effectively impact the decision-making process about Mexico´s Urban 
Development. 
August 2008 to date. Tlaloc Foundation, Toluca, Mexico. Activist and project leader. Active 
participant in varied initiatives and leader of a project looking for the foundation of a 
Sustainability Policy network in the region of the Metropolitan Area of Toluca. 
March 2001 – April 2002. Universidad Iberoamericana campus Santa Fe (Ibero-American 
University), Mexico City, Mexico. President of the Students Association of Economics 
(elective office). 
March 2001 – April 2002. Universidad Iberoamericana campus Santa Fe (Ibero-American 
University), Mexico City, Mexico. Member of the Students Representatives Council (elective 
office). 
May – August 2000. Kfar-Hanassi Kibbutz, Israel. Volunteer for community work. 
 
Languages 
Spanish (native language). 
English (advanced). 
French (beginner). 
 
Software 
Microsoft Office (advanced). 
Stata (intermediate). 
SAS (intermediate). 
ArcGIS (beginner). 
 
Hobbies 
Interpretation of music (piano, drums, guitar and bagpipes). 
Literature and writing. 
Filmmaking. 
Indoors rowing, rock climbing, jogging, and football (soccer). 
